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THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: A DECISION-MAKING ANALYSIS
OF THE QUARANTINE POLICY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS UPON 
THE IMPLICATION FOR DECISION-MAKING THEORY
CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION
In 1954, Richard C. Snyder circulated a paper among 
his fellow political scientists. His purpose was to present 
a new approach to the study of international relations, and 
the paper contained the essential elements of this novel con­
ceptual framework. The importance of this paper was great: 
it not only put forth a new way of studying international 
relations, but it also challenged the heart of the older, 
more traditional approaches.
In the period between the two world wars, most of the 
political scientists concerned with the study of inter­
national relations fell into one or the other of two schools, 
These schools have been referred to as the "Utopians" and 
the "realists."^ The Utopians were those who approached 
international politics with the view that reason and order
These terms, and the nature of the approaches for 
which they stand, are discussed in James E. Dougherty and 
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of Inter- 
national Relations (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company,
1971).
were one; if states acted with reason there would be peace 
and order in the world. Their approach was legalistic or 
formalistic in that reason and order were tied to inter­
national law and organization. With respect for and adher­
ence to the system of international law, and with support 
for world government, they believed that the world would be 
ordered and peaceful. They were idealistic in that they be­
lieved that an ordered world was the natural state of the 
international environment; it devolved from the natural 
harmony of interests which all nations had in peace and 
order. The Utopians were more concerned with how nations 
ought to behave than with how nations actually did behave, 
and they actively sought to create the world order which 
they desired by promoting international understanding and the 
human attitudes necessary for the foundation of such an 
order.^
The realists rejected the idealism and legalistic for­
malism of the Utopians. They regarded such idealism and 
formalism as representative of normative biases which pre­
cluded the systematic analysis and understanding of inter­
national politics. They believed that power and interest 
were the driving forces in international politics, and that 
a nation's interests could be expected to be supported only 
insofar as that nation had the power upon which to base such
2Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of
International Relations, pp. 6-7.
support. The realist sought to determine how and why nations 
behaved as they did; in doing so, he regarded the state as 
the primary actor in international affairs, and he looked 
for the sources of its behavior in the "objective realities" 
of its position in the international community. Such ob­
jective realities as circumstances of geography, politics, 
and technology, as well as many others, were tied to the 
power of a nation to serve itself and its interests, and the 
study of international politics was predicated upon the ex­
amination of the efforts of nations to use their capabilities 
in pursuit of their interests. The state was regarded as an 
ambitious and selfish one. The realists were drawing upon 
the power politics of first one, and then two world wars in 
order to describe the nature or the patterns of international 
relations.^ Hans J. Morgenthau, perhaps the "dean" of post- 
World War II realists, came to define international politics 
as the international struggle for power by the various 
nations of the world. International politics was, in his 
mind, nothing more than the scramble by the various nations 
of the world for influence over the actions of the other 
nations.^ By the post-World War II period, the realists
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of In­
ternational Relations, pp. 7-13. See also James N. Rosenau, 
‘‘The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," 
Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. by James C. Charlesworth 
(New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 194-198.
4Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 19487"!
had almost completely displaced the Utopians in the ranks of 
those who studied the relations of nations.^
It was clear that the idealism and formalism of the 
Utopians did not explain international relations, but there 
were problems associated with the realist approach as well. 
Not all international relations were explainable in terms of 
power or its pursuit, and not all international relations 
were explainable in terms of a selfish national drive for 
interest satisfaction. Humanitarian foreign aid, for in­
stance, was an aspect of international relations, but it 
could not be fitted into the struggle for power or the 
pursuit of national interests. The realists had reified 
the state; they had given it an existence and a personality 
in international affairs which ignored the human aspect. 
Snyder recognized that this human aspect was being ignored, 
and the decision-making approach was the result of his ef­
forts to build a new conceptual framework which took this 
into account. He believed that concentrating on the human 
aspect would lead to a clearer understanding of international 
relations; all aspects of international relations, including 
such aspects as the extension of humanitarian foreign aid, 
could be understood and studied if it were realized that 
state action was nothing more than the result of the de­
cisions of those empowered to act in the name of the state.
^Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of
International Relations, p. 10.
The state had no international personality except as such 
a personality was manifested in the decisions and actions 
of those who were empowered to decide and act in its name.
If considerations of power and interest formed the basis for 
the actions of a nation's decision-makers, then the power 
approach of the realists was applicable in explaining that
nation's actions, but if considerations of humanitarianism,
morality, or idealism formed the basis for the actions of a 
nation's decision-makers, then the power approach was not 
applicable in explaining that nation's actions. As James 
Rosenau has noted, the heart of Snyder's original approach 
was based upon the concept that political action was the 
product of the acts of human beings; to understand political 
action, one had to understand the reasons for these human 
acts.^ The environment of the decision-makers had to be 
comprehended in order to understand the pressures which
prompted them to make the decisions and take the actions
which they did make and take; when these pressures were 
understood, and when their impact was understood, then 
international relations could be understood. This was the 
nature of the approach which challenged the dominance of 
Morgenthau and others.
In addition to the specially circulated paper by 
Snyder, the first published paper on this new approach was
^James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of
Decision-Making Analysis," p. 194.
made available in 1954. Snyder was joined by H. W. Bruck 
and Burton Sapin, and their product was the refined and 
elaborated concepts found in Decision-Making as an Approach
7to the Study of International Politics.
The first in-depth application of the approach was 
published in 1958. Glenn D. Paige joined Snyder in a 
decision-making analysis of the American, decision to inter­
vene in the war caused by the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea in 1950, and they produced an article entitled "The 
United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The
OApplication of an Analytical Scheme."
Later, Paige developed this work into a much more 
elaborate study. This study was published in 1968 as The 
Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950.̂  This book was much
longer and much more complete than the original effort of 
Paige and Snyder. In addition to attempting an explanation 
of the decision to intervene, Paige developed some action
7
Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, 
Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International 
Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 3 (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954). (Future
references to this work will refer to an edition published 
in 1962 and cited later in the footnotes.)
O
Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United 
States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Applica­
tion of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, III (December, 1958)"j 341-378. (Future refer- 
ences to this work will refer to an edition published in
1961 and cited later in the footnotes.)
9
Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30,
1950 (New York: Free Press , 1968).
implications or empirical hypotheses which he felt would be 
applicable to all similar situations. It was not only an 
attempt to apply the decision-making analysis, but it also 
sought to add to the basic theory with hypotheses based on 
observations made in the study.
These three items constitute the major published work 
which is to be found in this particular area of decision­
making theory. The concepts and methods contained in them 
serve as the theoretical and methodological bases for this 
study.
The Decision-Making Approach
Snyder^^ began his approach with the assumption that 
the state would be the significant unit of international 
political action and authority for the foreseeable future. 
Through this assumption, Snyder maintained that international 
politics were the product of actions that were taken in the 
name of states and that were directed at other states. It 
was at the level of the state that the decision to follow 
one policy or course of action rather than others would be 
made, and it was at the level of the state that the study of 
international politics would be rendered meaningful. This 
concept was not a reification of the state; Snyder intended
Since Snyder originated this approach, and since he 
collaborated on most of its refinement, this study uses his 
name to designate not only his efforts, but also the efforts 
of Bruck, Sapin, and Paige when the paper refers to the 
works which Snyder co-authored with the others.
to use the concept only as a shorthand device in referring 
to a collectivity normally designated as a "state.
This collectivity acted through its decision-makers, 
or those given the higher positions of political authority 
within its society. By choosing one policy over others, 
these decision-makers set the policy of the state; through 
their authoritative acts, the state acted. It followed from 
this that one had to study the actions of the decision­
makers if one were to understand the actions of states.
Since states were the primary political units at the inter­
national level, the study of international politics had to
be based upon the study of the actions of the decision-
12makers comprising the states.
Implicit in this approach was the idea that it would
transcend formal or legalistic lines. The concept of the
decisional unit was important here. This unit was composed
of all who were responsible for making a decision, or whose
activities led to the choice of a particular course of action,
Formal lines of authority were to be ignored; only those who
participated in rendering a particular decision were to be
13included, regardless of their official position. This
Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, 
"Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International 
Politics," Foreign Policy Decision-Making, ed. by Richard C. 
Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 62-64.
^^Ibid., p. 65.
^^Ibid., pp. 92-94.
enabled a decisional unit to encompass such figures as the 
Attorney General or the President's speech writers, even 
when the decision rendered dealt with American foreign 
policy. The only requirement was that the individuals play 
a major role in rendering an authoritative decision.
There were two types of decisions which were rendered 
by these decision-makers. The first was an intellectual 
decision; this was the substantive choice. It dealt with 
issues, or the desirable course of action which a state 
might take in a given situation. The second type of de­
cision was that of an organizational, or procedural, nature. 
This decision had to do with who would participate in a given 
decision-making process, or how the process would progress.
Both types of decisions were important in regard to 
the foreign policy of a state. In any event, it was this 
decision-making process which would determine foreign policy 
(and international politics), and Snyder felt that it was 
this process which should be used as the focal point for the 
study of the decision-makers, their actions, and inter­
national relations.
Snyder hypothesized that decision-makers did not act 
upon the basis of purely random response. Neither was there
Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United 
States' Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Appli­
cation of an Analytical Scheme," International Politics 
and Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau [New York:
Free Press, 1961, p. 195.
10
an assumption of rationality, nor was unconscious motivation
ruled out. Snyder simply believed that decisions were the
product of actions structured by some calculations. These
calculations could be rational, or they could be irrational;
they were made, however, and they had to be studied in order
15to determine why a particular decision was rendered.
Another assumption made by Snyder was that official 
decision-makers did not behave as discrete individuals.
They were part of an organizational system, and they be­
haved as role players or participants within it. The de­
cisional unit was a decision-making system in that it had 
parts which functioned to accomplish the tasks of the system. 
These parts were the individuals who made up the decisional 
unit. Each part (or individual) had a role to play, and
when these roles were fulfilled, the system produced de-
. . 16cisions.
Finally, Snyder assumed that the decisions which were 
made, and the actions or policies of the state in the inter­
national system, were the product of the way in which the 
decision-makers perceived the situation. In order to be 
compelled to act, the decision-makers had to believe that 
the situation called for action. The action which was then 
taken also depended on the perception of the situation.
l^lbid., p. 195,
pp. 87-100
^^Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, "Decision-Making,”
11
because the action was a response designed to achieve a
more desirable setting or environment, and the perceptions
of the decision-makers would determine what course of action
17would best serve this end.
From the body of theory presented, Snyder drew four
sets of factors which affected how a decision-maker would
act: organizational-individual factors, internal setting
factors, external setting factors, and situational factors.
These factors were interrelated, and they would vary in
presence from situation to situation; there would, however,
always be some subfactor (part of one of the four major sets
18of factors) present.
Organizational-individual factors referred to "the 
total relevant institutional environment." This total en­
vironment included the individuals, agencies, roles, rules, 
functions, and interpersonal and interagency relationships
which were found in a particular decisional unit and under
19which a particular decisional unit operated. (The im­
portance of these factors is evident; the composition of 
the decisional unit and the way in which the decisional 
unit operates are major determinants of what decisions will 
be made.)
^^Ibid., pp. 65-66.
18Snyder and Paige, "Application of an Analytical
Scheme," p. 195. 
19.Ibid., p . 195,
12
Internal setting factors were the societal and cul­
tural factors or pressures, and the physical habitat.
Snyder felt that this formulation provided two things.
First, it provided for a wider range of potentially relè­
vent factors than the more usual listing of terms like 
"morale," "attitudes," "national power," "party politics," 
et cetera. Second, it provided for an approach which could 
go beyond these derived conditions listed above; it was im­
portant that this be done if one were interested in ac-
9 0curately determining why states behaved as they did.“
The external setting factors comprised those condi­
tions foreign to the internal environment. Allies, enemies, 
neutrals, international organizations, international law, 
treaties, relevant internal factors of other states, foreign 
policies of other states, and physical characteristics were 
all part of the external environment. Snyder believed 
that the external setting was always changing and that it 
would be composed, in the minds of the decision-makers, of 
what they censide.*.,d to be important. The impact of ex­
ternal factors, and their peculiar nature of relative im­
portance. was shown by Snyder through the use of the example 
of the Soviet Union and its impact on American foreign 
policy. Prior to 1933, Soviet foreign policy was not im­
portant to American decision-makers, and it was not a part
20Snvder, Bruck, and Sapin, "Decision-Making," pp,
67-68.
13
of the external setting of the American foreign policy
decision-making process. Today, it is important to American
decision-makers, and it is an extremely important part of
the external setting of American foreign policy formulation.
The key to this change lies in the different way the United
21States now views the Soviet Union.
Situational properties were those factors which were 
comprised of ’’the occasion for decision plus its ’core con­
text* consisting of perceived variables abstracted from the
2 7total internal, external, and organizational setting.”
Snyder said that the key to the explanation of why a state 
behaved as it did lay in the manner in which the decision­
makers defined (or perceived) their situation. This defini­
tion % s based upon the projected action as well as the 
reasons tor the action. The definition of the situation 
was an orieitation to the situation by the decision-maker, 
and three features emerged: perception, choice, and ex­
pectation. Situational properties were, then, those prop­
erties which were viewed by the decision-maker as the rele­
vant factors causing him to act in a decision-making situa­
tion and affecting these actions and their product once the
2 3process had begun.
Z^Ibid., p. 67,
22 Snyder and Paige, ’’Application of an Analytical 
Scheme," p. 195.
23Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, "Decision-Making,” pp.
65-66.
14
These were the four sets of factors operating upon a 
decision-maker. The decision-maker identified and examined 
the relevant subfactors of each category in making his deci­
sion. The manner in which this was accomplished, and the 
results of these efforts, had to be recreated in order for 
the scholar to understand why a decision-maker made a par­
ticular decision. In order to do this, Snyder proposed 
three sets of variables which the scholar should use; 
organizational roles and relations, communication and in­
formation, and motivation. These three variables were 
the determinants of the action of a decision-maker; when 
examined, they enabled the scholar to recreate the sub­
jective perception or definition of the situation by the 
decision-maker. The four factors which operated upon the 
decision-maker in a decision-making process, and the inter­
relationships of these factors, were incorporated into 
these three determinants. In short, Snyder proposed that 
with the application of these three variables, the decision­
making process could be more easily studied and more thor­
oughly understood; all factors, whether intra-personal or 
extra-personal, could be meaningfully examined.
Organizational roles and relations were variables 
which corresponded to the organizational-individual fac­
tors present in the decision-maker's calculations. They 
represented the relationships and roles operative in a
^^Ibid., p. 105
15
decisional unit and the manner in which they affected the 
product of that unit.
Communication and information were term; used to 
describe the factors which were the product of the internal 
and external settings. What these settings were to the 
decision-maker depended on the information which he re­
ceived and the manner or structure of the communications 
system which transmitted this information.
Motivation referred to the factors which formed the
body of personal preferences or predispositions of the
decision-maker: these factors included values, attitudes,
cognition, and perception. Snyder was not concerned with
all the motives of the decision-makers, however; he was
interested only in those motivational factors which might
help to account for the behavior of decision-makers in a
2 5given decision-making situation.
Motives were important in two ways. There were 
preparatory or promotional motives which prompted action, 
and there were also motives which might be called drive or 
orientation, which sustained activity toward a particular 
end. These two types of motives were acquired through ac­
culturation or learning processes in the society, the 
bureaucratic organization, the decisional unit, or the 
political process (some motivations had as their ends the
25Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, "Decision-Making," pp.
138-139.
16
satisfaction of particular interest groups to which the 
decision-maker might necessarily belong).
While the body of motivations operating in an indi­
vidual was large, Snyder, it should be stressed, felt that 
only those motivations relevant to the decision-making 
situation were important to the analysis of a decision. 
Participants were not viewed as discrete, real individuals, 
but as actors (used in an analytical sense) in a particular 
type of process. Because of this view, Snyder was able to 
hypothesize that only the properties relevant to the par­
ticular process were relevant to the construction of the
decision-maker as a participant in a decision-making 
27process.
These three variables, then, were collectively the 
determinants of action in a decision-making process, and it 
was toward these three variables that the scholar had to 
direct his inquiry and analysis.
Paige's Evaluation of the Decision
to Intervene in Korea
In the introductory chapter of The Korean Decision, 
Paige wrote of the very general nature of the body of theory
put forth by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin. This theory was not
based upon a systematic empirical foundation, and it also
Z^lbid., pp. 138-161. 
Z^Ibid., pp. 138-139.
17
lacked proof of its applicability. It had not been the goal
of the three men to put forth a fully developed framework,
however; they had sought to present a broad approach which
would order the study of international relations in the
manner in which they thought it should be ordered. They
had put forth the decision-making framework in order to
provide scholars with a better tool to use in analyzing and
explaining international relations, and they had. left the
ultimate verification and refinement of this approach to
2 8those who would use it.
Paige's work, The Korean Decision, was an application 
of the decision-making approach. He sought to prove its 
applicability as well as to aid in developing it into a 
usable body of operational theoretical statements. In order 
to accomplish these two things, Paige reconstructed a de­
cisional event and then analyzed this event in terms of the 
decision-making variables presented in the Snyder, Bruck, 
and Sapin framework. The event which he chose was that of 
the American decision to intervene on behalf of South Korea 
in 1950.
Paige's method of recreating this decisional event 
was that of "guided reconstruction." He presented a nar­
rative history which was based upon the decision-making 
approach. The variables were not mentioned nor noted;
28Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 6-7.
18
they simply served as a basis for the reconstruction of the
event. The historical points or facts were set against the
approach in a manner designed to emphasize data which were
related to the decision-making variables. In short, Paige
took the decision-making approach and sought the facts which
would satisfy the variables; he then wrote his history upon
29the framework which this approach provided.
This narrative history served as the basis for the 
hypotheses which Paige drew from the study. He was engaged 
in the process of theory-building in the sense that he was 
generalizing relationships which he hypothesized would be 
present in any decisional event similar to that of the Korean 
decision. He was putting forth propositions based upon the 
relationships which he found in a particular type of deci­
sional event, and these propositions were empirical addi­
tions to the body of decision-making theory. It should be 
noted that Paige realized the dangers inherent in general­
izing from a discrete event, and he prefaced his general­
izations with this realization. He felt that the proposi­
tions which he put forth could be checked and rechecked
through further applications of the decision-making ap-
. 30 proach.
Paige qualified his hypotheses by stating that they 
were the product of the study of a crisis decision. There
Z^Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
30lbid., pp. 273-275,
19
was no specified typology of decisions in the original 
decision-making approach, but Paige introduced this concept 
with his qualification. The hypotheses which he presented 
might be applicable to any decision-making process, but to 
be valid they had only to be applicable to the process which 
produced the crisis decision. In this manner, Paige pre­
pared the theory-building process for the possible need for 
different kinds of hypotheses based upon different types of
decisional processes which produced different kinds of
, . . 31decisions.
Paige defined a crisis decision as a "response to a 
high threat to values, either immediate or long range, where 
there is little time for decision under conditions of sur­
prise." A crisis decision was, then, the product of a 
situation in which a major decision had to be made as to 
what response should be directed against a perceived threat. 
This decision had to be made quickly under conditions of
stress caused by the product of surprise, the need for speed
32and the nature of the threat.
Paige further qualified the hypotheses which he drew 
from his study by classifying the Korean decision as a 
crisis decision with certain "empirical characteristics." 
First, the occasion for the decision was thrust upon the
^^Ibid. , pp. 275-276 
32lbid., p. 276.
20
decision-makers from outside their sphere of control.
Second, the decision-making organization was composed of 
an executive headquarters plus subordinate departments 
whose heads participated in the decision-making process at 
the request of the President. Third, the internal setting 
was one in which the decision-makers could be challenged 
and even replaced if there were dissatisfaction with the 
decisions rendered. Fourth, and finally, the external set­
ting was characterized by the existence of other nations,
friendly and unfriendly, over whom the decision-makers
3 3could exercise little control.
If one were to attempt to verify the hypotheses put 
forth by Paige, one would have to base one's work upon a 
crisis decision similar to that of the Korean decision. In 
addition, the empirical characteristics of the two decisions 
should be similar. While these empirical characteristics 
are not central to the consideration of the hypotheses put 
forth by Paige, they are important to any attempt at verifi­
cation. For instance, if a particular hypothesis were dis­
proved in a study of a decision, it could be argued that, 
rather than invalidating the hypothesis, this disproving 
represented a need to develop a more complete typology of 




It may be true that this typology must be ultimately 
developed, and it may also be true that the hypotheses put
forth by Paige apply to any decision-making process. This
dissertation, however, is not concerned with either of these 
possibilities. It seeks simply to validate or reject
Paige's propositions by studying a decision as similar as
possible to the one upon which Paige based his hypotheses.
If the hypotheses are rejected under these circumstances, 
they cannot be generally applicable hypotheses adding to 
the body of the decision-making theory. If they are vali­
dated, then a step has been taken toward the creation of 
the body of empirically generated theoretical propositions 
which Paige thought would aid in the ordering and control 
of international relations.
The decision chosen to serve as the basis for the ob­
servations which are to be used in validating or rejecting 
Paige's propositions was that of the American decision to 
blockade Cuba in the face of the Soviet missile build-up 
there in 1962.^^ This decision satisfied the characteris­
tics which served as Paige’s definition of a crisis decision 
in that it represented a response to a high threat to values, 
under conditions of surprise, and in which there were limita­
tions of time imposed on the decision-making process. The 
threat was manifest in the challenge to American supremacy
^^Hereinafter, this decision will be referred to as 
the "quarantine" decision.
22
in the Western Hemisphere and in the challenge to the 
relative nuclear balance of power. With the successful 
installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba, the effective 
nuclear strength of the Soviet Union would have been in­
creased, thus undermining American nuclear superiority.
The fact that the missiles could have threatened many Latin 
American cities would have undermined the influence of the 
United States in this area. In addition, time was a most 
pressing matter in that possible American reactions might 
have been inhibited because of the increased Soviet power 
if the missiles became operable.
In addition, the "quarantine" decision also satisfied 
the conditions imposed by the empirical characteristics 
which Paige said were present in the Korean decision.
First, the quarantine decision was the result of actions 
over which the American decision-makers had no direct 
control. The actions were those of the Soviets and the 
Cubans, and these actions were external to the American 
political system. Second, the decision-making organization 
which rendered the quarantine decision was composed of sub­
ordinate departments whose heads participated in an execu­
tive headquarters at the request of the President. Kennedy 
asked that certain men attend meetings in which a response 
would be drafted, and these men served as part of the de­
cisional unit. This group was composed of individuals 
whose knowledge and advice the President respected, and
23
also of individuals who represented certain strategic 
parts of the bureaucracy which the President thought were 
closely related to the problem. Third, the decision­
makers could certainly have been challenged, or even re­
placed, if the decisions which they made had not been ef­
fective as well as popular. The Republican Party had 
already made Cuba the central campaign issue for the fall 
elections, and there were also others who would not have 
hesitated to criticize any decisions which they considered 
suspect. Fourth, and last, the external setting was one 
occupied by other nations over whom the decision-makers 
could exercise little control. The Soviet Union might 
have reacted strongly against any move to dislodge them 
from Cuba; it was believed that the United States had to 
act, but its actions had to be the product of careful con­
sideration so that it might accomplish its aim without 
provoking war.
The similarity between the Korean decision and the 
quarantine decision has been shown, at least in terms of 
the characteristics which Paige put forth as relevant to 
his typology. The quarantine decision has been demonstrated 
to be a crisis decision according to Paige's definition, 
and Paige's contention that the Korean decision belonged 
to this variety of decision has been accepted as valid.
It is now necessary to demonstrate that the hypotheses put
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forth by Paige are either applicable or not applicable in 
the case of the quarantine decision.
The method of accomplishing this demonstration, as 
stated earlier, will be to present a narrative history of 
the American decision to quarantine Cuba. From this nar­
rative history will be drawn the observations which will 
serve to verify or reject Paige's proposals. The following 
chapter contains the narrative history, and the third chap­
ter will contain the observations and the analysis of 
Paige's hypotheses.
CHAPTER II: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
On December 31, 1958, Fulgencio Batista left Cuba for 
exile. At the time of his departure he was the military 
dictator of this Caribbean nation, as he had been for most 
of the previous twenty-five years. Resentment toward his 
rule had been building for a number of years, however, and 
an active rebellion had been transpiring in parts of the 
country. Fidel Castro, with the help of his revolutionary 
forces, was able to step into the void created by Batista's 
departure. It is important to note that Castro did not 
defeat Batista, nor was Batista defeated at all in the tra­
ditional sense; he simply had tired of the battle or saw no 
hope for the future. Whatever his reasons, Batista had 
gone, and Castro was now Cuba's political head by default.
As Castro's control over Cuba was consolidated, in the 
months after his initial seizure of power, a coolness toward 
the United States began progressively to manifest itself in 
Cuban foreign policy. What was first excused as "social 
reform" and "nationalism" soon began to be viewed in the 
United States as "illegal expropriation" and "anti- 
Americanism". In addition to the verbal attacks on the 
United States and the confiscation of private American
25
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economic interests on the island, the Cubans began the de­
velopment of a close relationship with the Communist bloc. 
The American response to these Cuban actions was to 
try to isolate Cuba; through economic and political sanc­
tions, the United States sought to force Cuban policy into 
a more amenable mold. These efforts by the United States, 
coupled with such things as the economic needs of the island 
and the self-avowed Marxist leanings of Castro, made Castro 
dependent upon the Communist bloc for his survival. As 
American pressure threatened Castro, the Soviet Union and 
other members of the Communist bloc were there to aid and 
strengthen him. Initially this aid took the form of trade 
agreements, but later there were military agreements as 
well. By mid-July of 1960, the tie between Cuba and the 
Soviet Union had become so strong that the Soviet Union 
promised to help defend Cuba against a rumored American in­
vasion, even if it meant that the Russians had to use 
nuclear missiles to do so.^
As the ties between Cuba and the Communist bloc were 
strengthening, American-Cuban relations were worsening.
Cuba was being armed by the Soviets, and she was using her 
new power in attempts to subvert other nations in the Carib­
bean area. These attempts troubled the United States, and 
it sought to gain some kind of cooperative venture within
^J. Lloyd Mecham, A Study of United States-Latin 
American Relations (Dallas : Houghton Mifflin Company,
1965), pp. 221-224.
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the inter-American system which would unite the hemisphere
against Cuba and force her to follow a more acceptable
course. Failing in this venture, the United States turned
2toward unilateral action.
When John Kennedy was sworn in as President, Dwight 
Eisenhower had already terminated diplomatic relations 
with Cuba. In addition, Eisenhower had authorized the 
equipping and training of a force of Cuban refugees, with 
the express purpose of allowing these men to launch an 
attack upon Castro and Cuba. This project was continued 
under Kennedy. In April of 1961, these refugee forces at­
tacked the Cuban coast. A planned simultaneous uprising in 
the cities and countryside by anti-Castro forces failed to 
take place, primarily because Castro had jailed all those 
whom he suspected. Without this simultaneous uprising, 
and without American air cover (which the refugee leaders 
later said they had been promised), the invasion attempt 
failed completely.
The American role in the invasion attempt was so 
obvious that Kennedy was forced to publicly acknowledge it. 
For its part in this debacle, the United States reaped a 
world-wide harvest of ill will, and American interests 
suffered. In the first place, it made America appear to be 
a scheming and imperialistic power bent on the control of 
those who would defy her. It raised the spectre of
^Ibid., p. 226.
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interventionism in the minds of the Latin Americans, and 
in the minds of others as well; this image was not one which 
endeared the United States to the developing countries, in 
Latin America or elsewhere. In the second place, the 
failure made the United States look irresolute. Embarking 
upon a policy which called for an action such as the Bay of 
Pigs invasion without committing the resources necessary 
to successfully complete the action seemed to demonstrate 
an unwillingness or inability to use the power that America 
had. In either event, the prestige of the United States 
suffered. Third, and last, the Bay of Pigs incident weak­
ened the legitimate case which the United States had against 
Cuba and her actions. Through the invasion attempt the 
United States had made Cuba a martyr in the eyes of the 
world, and it had done so by making itself the evil, martyr- 
producing agent.
With the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, the 
United States was forced to reevaluate its position and its 
policies regarding Cuba. One result of this réévaluation 
was a return to "multilateralism." Once again the United 
States used such vehicles as the Organization of American 
States to attempt to exclude Cuba from the hemispheric com­
munity; it sought to isolate Cuba by creating an environment 
in which the Cuban neighbors would ignore their sister 
republic. In addition, the United States sought to imple­
ment the Alliance for Progress, its plan for hemispheric
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development. It was thought that by "democratizing" Latin 
American politics and society, and by providing for the 
region's economic development and reform, a bulwark could 
be created against the possibility of anti-Yankee govern­
ments in the area. Finally, there was a resumption of 
American attempts to insulate itself from contact with Cuba. 
The restrictions on Cuban trade and travel and the absence 
of direct diplomatic relations were some of the ways in 
which the United States sought to limit relations with 
Castro's island. This policy of avoiding contact was in 
contraposition to that which had bred the interventionist 
Bay of Pigs invasion.^
While the United States sought to avoid contact with 
Cuba, especially military contact, there did exist certain 
contingency plans of a military nature which were related 
to the island.^ The arms which were being sent to Cuba and 
the Cuban attempts to subvert certain Caribbean governments 
had an unsettling effect upon the area that was judged con­
trary to American interests. The United States sought to 
avoid conflict, but in the event that American interests 
were threatened, the United States reserved the right to 
act. In an August, 1962, interview, Kennedy ruled out an 
invasion of Cuba as an American action based upon then
^Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper  ̂ Row,
Publishers, 1965), p. 669.
^Ibid.
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present conditions. If these conditions changed, it was 
obvious that the United States reserved the right to do 
whatever it deemed necessary to secure its interests.^
President Kennedy made the remarks reported above on 
the twenty-ninth of August. Also on that day information 
was being gathered which would affect Kennedy's appraisal 
of "present conditions." High altitude flights over Cuba 
by American U-2 surveillance planes verified the presence 
of Russian SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles. The pictures which 
the plane took revealed eight sites in which this weapon 
was being emplaced.^
John A. McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, evaluated this information as indicating something 
more sinister than simply the installation of anti-aircraft 
missiles to protect Cuba from foreign invasion. There were 
two reasons why McCone felt that way. First, the missiles 
were expensive. They had to be intended for the protection 
of something with intrinsic value to the Russians before 
the Russians would have decided to install them. They would 
not protect Cuba from a low-level attack because American 
planes could fly in under their effective range, so they 
had to be aimed at protecting something which would involve
^Tad Szulc, "Kennedy Rules Out Invasion," The New York 
Times, August 30, 1962, p. 8.
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
Investigation of the Preparedness Program: Interim Report,
88th Cong. , 1st sess. , 1965, 6l
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high-level flights. There were high-level reconnaissance 
flights over the island by American planes, and McCone sur­
mised that these flights were what the Soviets sought to 
prevent. Second, McCone believed that Cuba was the logical 
spot for the Soviets to install medium-range missiles with 
nuclear warheads. The Soviets had never before been in a 
position where such missiles could not be turned on and 
used against the Soviet Union itself; in Cuba, the Soviets 
were given a launching pad within easy reach of much of the 
United States, but there was no possible way that their 
missiles could be turned and fired back at them. McCone 
had suspected since the spring of 1962 that the Russians 
might try to install these weapons. When the SA-2 presence 
was verified, McCone drew the conclusion that the Soviets 
were planning to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba 
which could be used against the United States. When the
missile sites were completed, the United States would be
ypresented with a fait accompli.
McCone advised President Kennedy of his appraisal of 
the situation. Kennedy was also counseled by Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk;
7Edward A. Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the 
Brink : An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 61. See also Elie Abel, 
The Missile Crisis (New York; Bantam Books, Inc., 1966), 
pp. 7-8, and Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course: The Cuban
Missile Crisis and Coexistence (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 8.
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both these men disagreed with the prognosis which McCone
delivered, and their evaluations were accepted by the 
8President. Nevertheless, there was an order issued for
q
weekly air surveillance of Cuba during September.
On September 4, 1962, President Kennedy released a 
press statement in which he stated that there was no evi­
dence of any organized Soviet combat force in Cuba. He also 
specifically noted that there were no offensive, surface-to- 
surface missiles there. Included in this press release was 
a statement similar to the one which he had made on August 
29. After noting that the Soviet military presence in Cuba 
was not one of an offensive nature, he said, "Were it to be 
otherwise, the gravest issues would a r i s e . O n c e  again 
he was warning the Soviets that the United States would 
consider any move to make Cuba an offensive base as a 
serious matter, a matter in which the United States re­
served the right to choose its response.
The Soviet response was to assure the President, 
through his subordinates, that there would be no moves 
that could possibly embarrass him before the November con­
gressional elections. The Soviet military build-up and 
presence in Cuba was extremely alarming to the American
g
Arthur Krock, Memoirs : Sixty Years on the Firing
Line (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1968), pp. 378-379
gPachter, Collision Course, p. 8.
^^U. S., Department of State, Bulletin, September 24, 
1962, p. 450.
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people, and it was a volatile political issue. The 
Soviet message was conveyed to Robert Kennedy, the Attorney 
General, on September 4, and again to Theodore Sorenson, 
the President's assistant and speech writer, on September 6 
The content of the message stressed that the Soviet Union 
had no wish to cause the President trouble and that there 
were no offensive missiles being placed in Cuba. The 
military build-up on the island was explained simply as a 
defensive one. Dobrynin said that he had been empowered to 
deliver this message to the President via the two subordin­
ates by Premier Nikita Krushchev, the Soviet Chief of 
S t a t e . A w a r e  of the ticklish nature of the Cuban problem 
in American domestic politics, the Soviet Union, it seemed, 
was honestly trying to prevent its actions from pushing the 
American President into a position which could lead to more 
troubled relations between the two great powers.
The depth of American feeling on the Cuban issue was 
mirrored in the stands taken by key Congressmen. Everett 
Dirkson, Senate Minority Leader, and Charles Halleck, House 
Minority Leader, proposed on September 8 that Congress 
authorize the use of troops to defeat "Communism" in Cuba. 
This proposition coincided with a request by Kennedy for
For a discussion of the message conveyed to the 
President through these two close confidants, see Robert F. 
Kennedy, Thirteen Days : A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: W. W. Norton 5 Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 24-26,
and Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 667.
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authorization to call up army reserve units, but it was 
not related to this Presidential move. The President in­
tended to use the troop call-up as an indication that the 
United States would not "back-down" vis-a-vis Berlin,
while the two Republican leaders sought to embarrass the
12President on the issue of Cuba, Castro, and Communism.
The pressure on the President was bi-partisan, however, be­
cause he was also under attack from such Democratic Congress­
men as Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut.^^
These actions by Congressmen and the feeling of the 
American people led Premier Khrushchev to give warning that 
any attack on Cuba would mean war, and the inference was 
that this war would be nuclear. The Soviet Union also 
reacted to Kennedy’s call-up of reserves by characterizing 
it as an aggressive and threatening step.^^
Given the environment of domestic politics, and the 
prevailing feeling that the United States ought to get the 
Communists out of Cuba, this message was a challenge which 
the President had to answer. On September 13, in a Presi­
dential news conference, Kennedy said:
The New York Times, September 8, 1962, p. 2. See
also Arthur Krock, "Cuba and Politics," The New York Times,
September 9, 1962, Sec. 4, p. 13.
^^The New York Times, September 11, 1962, p. 16
^^The New York Times, September 12, 1962, pp. 1 and 16.
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If at any time the communist build-up in 
Cuba were to endanger or interfere in any 
way, including our base at Guantanamo, our 
passage to the Panama Canal, our missile 
and space activities at Cape Canaveral, 
or the lives of American citizens in this 
country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to 
export its aggressive purposes by force or 
the threat of force against any nation in 
this hemisphere, or become an offensive 
military base of significant capacity for 
the Soviet Union, then this country will 
do whatever must be done to protect its 
own security and that of its a l l i e s . 15
The message was as clear as it was possible to make it: if
the military build-up in Cuba reached a level which could
present a serious threat to American interests, the United
States would act to remove this threat.
Even this stand did not quiet criticism of the American
failure to rid the hemisphere of Castro and the problems
which he caused. On September 18, former Vice-President
Nixon called for a blockade of Cuba, saying that there was
"danger of war in intervening, but certainty of war in
d e l a y i n g . I n  addition, a Democratic Senate passed a
resolution on September 20 which endorsed the use of force
17to protect American interests in regard to Cuba. While
15U. S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States (Washington, Dl C.: Office of the FederaT
Register. National Archives and Record Service, 1953-%!
John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 674.
^^Bill Becker, "Cuba Quarantine is Urged by Nixon,"
The New York Times, September 19, 1962, p. 1.
17Max Frankel, "Resolution to Curb Cuba Adopted by 
Senate, 86-1," The New York Times, September 21, 1962, p. 1.
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this resolution supported the President's past pledges to
the American people, it was not requested by the President,
and it was symbolic of the feeling of the country: do
something to rid the United States of Castro.
Around September 20, American intelligence began to
get reports that offensive ballistic missiles were being
emplaced in Cuba. Long trailers covered with canvas were
seen late at night on Cuban roads. Castro's chauffeur was
reported to have boasted that Cuba now had missiles. Other
reports and sightings also were being examined by the 
1 RUnited States.
Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll, of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, testified in 1963 before Congress that 
the reports which American intelligence had received of the 
missile sightings were no different from thousands which 
had deluged the United States since 1959.^^ According to 
Roger Hilsman, the file for 1959 alone was over five inches
18Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of
Foreign Policy in the Administration oi John F. Kennedy 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday § Company, Inc., 1967),
pp. 174-176. See also U. S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Armed Services, Military Posture and Appropriations During 
Fiscal Year 1964 for Procurement^ Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation of Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels for 
the Armed Forces and for Other Purposes, Hearings before the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on 
H. R. 2440, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 235.
19U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Hear­
ings , before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 
1963, p. 168.
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2 0thick and was full of "persuasive detail." Reports of
missiles were a regular product of the interrogation of
exiles and others, but most of these were mistaken. When
the reports were based on fact, the observers tended to
confuse anti-aircraft SA-2 rockets with what they thought
21were surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.
In addition to the unreliability of "eye-witnesses," 
the "September Estimate," the evaluation of probable stra­
tegic actions or developments by the American intelligence 
community for the fall of 1962, ruled out the possibility 
that the Soviet Union would place offensive missiles in 
Cuba. This evaluation v̂ as delivered on September 19 and 
was based upon all available data. It was thought that the 
knowledge that a strong and negative American reaction 
awaited any introduction of offensive ballistic missiles 
into Cuba would deter the Soviets from this course. In ad­
dition, it was thought that such things as Castro's volatile 
nature and the logistical and command problems which dis­
tance produced would aid in deterring the Soviets from this 
path. Even though it believed the danger remote, the United
States Intelligence Board counseled security and surveillance
2 2in the event that it was proved wrong.
70Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 169.
21 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 28-29. 
^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, pp. 172-173.
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According to McNamara, the continued reports of large
missiles were suggestive enough to arouse the suspicions of
2 3the intelligence establishment. Some kind of activity was 
suspected in the western portion of the island; it was here 
that many of the missile sightings had taken place, and it 
was also here that American intelligence noted a "rhomboid­
shaped area" protected by SA-2 missiles. The intelligence 
community (with the exception of McCone of the CIA) believed 
that it was unlikely that the Soviets would place offensive 
missiles in Cuba, but the reports of missile sightings and 
the protective placement of anti-aircraft missiles near 
Guanajay and San Cristobal prompted the issuance of orders 
on October 4 which provided for a special flight over the 
region by an American U-2, or high-level reconnaissance 
plane. The overflight was to be carried out as soon as 
practicable.
If the reconnaissance flight over Cuba were to produce 
evidence of offensive missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy 
would be placed in a ticklish position. American security 
and international prestige were seen as demanding action, 
but if this action led to nuclear war, it was not unfair to 
ask if American interests would be served by such a
23U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Hearings, be- 
fore a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 4.
^"^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, pp. 175-176.
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holocaust. Domestic politics were such that the problem 
would be made even more complex because of the pressures of 
public opinion. A straw poll by The New York Times indi­
cated that Americans were concerned with Cuba and the Ameri-
2 5can inability to rid itself of Castro. The American 
people were dissatisfied with the state of relations with 
Cuba, and they viewed Kennedy as "soft" and "vacillating"
2 c
in regard to the island republic.
These public feelings were fanned by such things as 
the actions and statements of the Southern Governors’ Con­
ference, the Republican Senatorial and Congressional Cam­
paign Committees, and individuals like Senator Kenneth 
Keating of New York. The Southern Governors' Conference 
followed the lead of the United States Senate in adopting 
a resolution calling for American action in removing the
Castro threat from the hemisphere. In effect, they were
2 7pressuring the President to act. The Republican campaign 
committees made Cuba the dominant issue for the 1962 Con­
gressional elections; it was their plan to use American 
disappointment and frustration over Cuba as a tool with
2 SWallace Turner, Donald Johnson, and Joseph Lofters, 
"Citizens in Three Areas Talk About Cuba," The New York 
Times, October 5, 1962, p. 14.
2 6Edgar Robinson, Powers of the President in Foreign 
Affairs (San Francisco: The Commonwealth Club of Cali­
fornia, 1966), p. 166.
^^The New York Times, October 4, 1962, p. 21.
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which to help elect Republican Senators and Représenta-
2 8tives. Senator Keating's speeches to the Senate during 
the early days of October were attacks upon the President 
and his handling of the Cuban situation. Keating even 
charged that there were offensive missiles in Cuba, de­
claring that the island was undergoing a massive Soviet
29military build-up. While these attacks upon the President 
and his handling of the Cuban question were by no means the 
only ones being made, they were characteristic or repre­
sentative of what was happening. If missiles were dis­
covered in Cuba, or if there were any significant offensive 
military capacity introduced onto the island, the President 
would not be able to avoid action. The "public would not 
have tolerated acquiesence.
The Administration, aware of its political problems, 
was taking steps to meet all possibilities; it had ordered 
surveillance of Cuba. There was a slow but steady American 
military build-up of forces in the southeastern United 
States. This build-up was a reaction to the increase in 
Cuban military power, but it also had an air of contingency 
planning about it. If missiles or some other offensive 
capacity were to be discovered in Cuba, the United States
2 8Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 670.
29Hilsman, To Move A Nation, pp. 177-179.
A. Kissinger, "Reflections of Cuba," The 
Reporter, November 22, 1962, p. 22.
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would have a force in the states near the island to at
31least counterbalance the threat which Cuba might present.
In addition, the Administration ordered special security
arrangements in the event that knowledge of offensive
weapons was gained; only those who needed to know would
be told. The code word for this operation was "Psalm,"
and its purpose was to give the United States the time
necessary for drafting a proper response, should the need 
32arise.
The Strategic Air Command was given control of flights 
over Cuba on October 12. This was an intelligence matter, 
and the CIA had handled it before, but it was decided that 
in the face of the SA-2 defenses in Cuba, it would be better 
to place the surveillance in the hands of the Air Force. If 
a plane were shot down, it was thought that it would be
33better if the pilot were military rather than a civilian.
The projected flight over the western end of Cuba did 
not occur until the 14th of October. Weather conditions 
were part of the reason for this delay, but perhaps more 
important was the fact that the United States had more or 
less current reconnaissance pictures of western Cuba.
Flights on September 5 had provided intelligence with
31U. S. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings,
p. 1273.
^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 187.
33U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Interim 
Report, pp. 8-9.
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pictures showing no military build-up of offensive weapons 
in the Guanajay-San Cristobal area; there were, however, 
other areas which needed coverage. In addition, there 
were a large number of SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles in the 
western part of the island, making high-level flights dan­
gerous. As a result of all these factors, the intelligence 
flights were sent elsewhere until October 14.^^
The processing and the analysis of the films taken 
with the cameras of the U-2 planes usually took twenty-four 
hours, and in the late afternoon of October 15, the United 
States intelligence establishment was beginning to form a 
picture of the results of the flight. This picture was 
one which would produce no joy for the administration, for 
some of the thousands of intelligence photos taken by the
U-2 indicated evidence of two medium-range ballistic mis-
5 5sile sites in the area around San Cristobal.
Two deputy directors of the Central Intelligence 
Agency were the first high governmental officials to be 
told; Ray Cline and Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter 
then began to alert key figures with the information which 
they had just received. Lieutenant General Joseph F. 
Carroll, of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was notified, 
and he began to alert key figures in the Department of




Defense. Many of those who were told of the missiles were 
attending parties, receptions, and dinners of a social or 
official nature; care had to be taken to avoid alarming 
Washington society and perhaps showing the American hand 
before the Administration was ready for it to be shown.
Many of the key figures were told in halls outside banquet 
or reception rooms, and others were told in clandestine 
phone conversations. Before the evening was over, those 
notified would include Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell 
Gilpatric, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, State Depart­
ment Director of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman, 
Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
American Affairs Edwin M. Martin, Undersecretary of State 
George Ball, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter­
national Security Affairs Paul Nitze. McGeorge Bundy, the 
President's special assistant for national security affairs, 
was also told of the discovery.
Two key figures were not told on the 15th of October. 
McCone, Director of the CIA, was out of Washington, and was 
not informed. The President was not informed either. It 
was Bundy's job to alert the President, but he chose to 
wait until the morning of the 16th. Kennedy had attended 
a dinner on Monday evening, and he had been unavailable for
^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 193. See also Abel, 
The Missile Crisis, pp. 18-22.
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consultation when Bundy had learned of the missiles. In
addition, the President had been up very late the night
before, and Bundy simply thought that he would benefit
more from a sound night's sleep than he would from the
knowledge which would be given him early the next morning.
Bundy, in short, was shielding the President from the
knowledge of the missiles so as to enable the President to
rest and regain his strength. Bundy reasoned that there
was nothing which the President could do Monday night, and
that the crisis which was looming ahead would require a
3 7refreshed and rested national leader.
The presence of other offensive weapons in Cuba was
also verified on October 15. Intelligence had suspected
the presence of Soviet IL-28 light bombers in Cuba, and on
the fifteenth there was photographic proof that they were
there. This knowledge was important, but it was greatly
overshadowed by the photographs of the missiles. Events of
the next few days would be predicated on the missile pres-
38ence more than anything else.
October 16
At 7:30 a.m. on October 16th, McNamara was shown the 
photographic evidence of the missile sites. After noting
37Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 673.
38U. s. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings,
p. 249.
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that there were no pictures of the missiles themselves,
he said that he felt that the information was not "hard
enough" to warrant presenting it to the President. He felt
that the information raised strong suspicions, but that it
39simply was not definitive.
Bundy saw the information at 8:00 a.m., and he 
thought that it was rather definitive. Although there were 
no missiles visible, the analysts could point out the tell­
tale characteristics of Soviet medium-range ballistic 
missile bases. Shortly before 9:00 a.m., Bundy went to 
the President's bedroom to show him the pictures and explain 
what they meant.
The President's initial reaction was one of surprise 
and anger. He felt that he had been deceived by Khrushchev's 
promises that Cuba would not be turned into an offensive 
base for the Soviets. The President believed that the 
United States had to secure the removal of the missiles.
He did not feel that the United States could allow these 
weapons to remain in Cuba, and he did not feel that they 
were negotiable in a diplomatic way. After ensuring that 
there was no mistake in the interpretation of the data.
39"Red Missiles in Cuba: Inside Story from Secretary
McNamara," U. S. News and World Report, November 5, 1962, 
p. 47.
^^Robinson, Powers of the President in Foreign Af­
fairs , p. 165. See also Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 3"1.
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Kennedy ordered Bundy to call a meeting of certain key ad­
visors for 11:45 a.m.^“
Shortly after his meeting with Bundy, the President 
went to his White House office. There he telephoned his 
brother, Robert, and asked him to come to the White House.
He also called in Ted Sorenson, his speech writer and aide.
In separate meetings with the President, each of these men 
was told of the photographic evidence of a missile build-up 
in Cuba. Upon finishing Sorenson’s briefing, Kennedy sent 
him off to review the past public statements of the President 
on Cuba and on offensive missiles. Robert Kennedy also left 
after talking with the President, but the two talked by
42phone several more times before the 11:45 a.m. meeting.
In order to avoid alerting anyone that there was a 
crisis facing American decision-makers, the President kept 
his scheduled appointments for Tuesday morning. This 
schedule had been prepared well in advance of October 16, 
and to depart from it would have caused suspicion. Even 
though he was very much concerned with the new matter before 
him, Kennedy made such guests as Astronaut Wally Schirra and
Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: JFK in the
White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965),
pp. 801-802. See also Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 31-32, 
Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 673-674, and Graham T. Allison, 
"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The Ameri­
can Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 19Ô9), 713.
42Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 23. See also Sorenson, 
Kennedy, p . 674 and Abel, The"Missile Crisis, p. 33.
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his family feel welcome, even when this involved showing 
Schirra's children the ponies in the White House back yard.^^
In between his scheduled appointments and calls to his 
brother, the President contacted John J. McCloy, a New York 
Republican lawyer whose judgment the President trusted. 
McCloy's counsel was for the United States to take drastic 
action so as to remove the missiles from Cuba as soon as 
possible. Rusk was being told the same thing by former 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson said that the mis­
siles could not be allowed to stay in Cuba; the United 
States had to remove them in the quickest and surest way.^^
At 11:45 a.m., others would also appraise the situation and 
advise the President on the proper reaction for the United 
States.
The men who were being contacted for the 11:45 meet­
ing represented much of the membership of the National 
Security Council. There were others invited to the meeting, 
however, who were not members of this council but who were 
simply people whom the President trusted and relied upon 
for advice. The Vice-President, Lyndon Johnson, would be 
there. From the State Department would come Rusk, Ball,
U. Alexis Johnson, Martin, and the two Soviet experts, 
Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen. (Bohlen would leave
^^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 674. See also Abel, The 
Missile Crisis, p. 32.
44Abel, The Missile Crisis, p . 33.
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the next night for his new post as Ambassador to France). 
From the Department of Defense would come McNamara, Gil- 
patric, Nitze, and General Taylor. Carter, the Deputy 
Director of the CIA, would be there, but he would later 
be replaced when his superior, McCone, returned to Washing­
ton. Others in attendance would include Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, 
and the President’s aides, Bundy, Sorenson, and Kenneth 
O'Donnell. This group would later be called the Executive 
Committee of the National Security Council, or Ex Comm for 
short. These were the men whom the President sought to 
bring together to help him decide what reaction to the mis­
sile bases the United States should make.^^
At 11:45, the group that Kennedy had called together 
met in the Cabinet Room. General Carter of the CIA 
briefed these people on what air reconnaissance had indi­
cated existed in Cuba. They were told that there were 
bases being readied for an undetermined number of medium- 
range ballistic missiles. These missiles were capable of 
carrying a nuclear warhead over a range of approximately 
eleven hundred nautical miles, thus making potential 
targets of such American cities as Saint Louis, Dallas, 
Washington, D. C., and many more. These missiles could 
be operational in two weeks, and while there was no sign
Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 674-675. See also Abel,
The Missile Crisis, pp. 33-34, and Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 
pi JDl
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of the missiles or warheads, the intelligence establishment 
was certain that they were there or were enroute.^^ Many 
of those at the meeting knew of the information which the 
U-2 had provided, but the reaction of the others was one of 
"stunned surprise." No one had anticipated that the Soviets 
would actually place offensive missiles in Cuba.^^
President Kennedy's first directive following the in­
telligence briefing was to order more photographic coverage 
of the island. He said that the United States needed as 
much evidence as was possible if it were to prove cause 
for whatever course of action it took. Second, the Presi­
dent enjoined all those present to the tightest security 
possible. The knowledge of the missiles and the response 
to their presence would be kept secret until the United 
States was ready to act. In this way, Kennedy thought, the 
United States could guard its options and maximize the im­
pact of whatever course of action it would take. Finally, 
the President ordered those present to put aside whatever 
else they had before them; their primary job now was to
make a prompt and intensive survey of the problem and its
•  ̂ . . 48nossibie solutions.
46Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 675. See also Abel, The 
Missile Crisis, p. 17.
^'^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 23-24.
4 SHilsman, To Move A Nation, pp. 194-198. See also 
Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 675-676.
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Kennedy rejected a "do-nothing” policy from the out­
set. The projected global political impact of the mis­
siles was seen by the President as one in which the United 
States would most certainly lose. The military value of 
the missiles was important, but even if it were not, Kennedy 
felt that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba would 
seriously damage the credibility of American might and 
determination. The Soviet Union had secretly introduced the 
missiles into Cuba; if this move were allowed to go un­
checked the Soviets would accept this as an invitation to 
other provocative and dangerous moves. Miscalaculations 
of this nature could lead to nuclear war. In addition, 
the other nations of the world would question American 
strength and commitment; with missiles aimed at the heart 
of the United States from only ninety miles away, American 
allies would question whether the United States would en­
danger itself to provide for their sovereignty and free- 
49dom. finally, even though it war. not openly mentioned, 
Kennedy had placed himself in a domestic position from which 
he had no exit; the American people had heard his dichoto- 
mization of weapons into those that were "offensive" and 
those that were "defensive," and they had accepted his word 
that he would act if the military build-up in Cuba became 
an offensive one with danger for American interests. If 
the President failed to act in the face of the missiles.
49Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 683.
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the Republicans would be able to seriously attack him 
politically.
The United States could have tolerated a gradual 
shifting of the nuclear balance, but Kennedy felt that such 
a sudden and provocative move as the installation of mis­
siles in Cuba was completely unacceptable. Kennedy had 
been humiliated in Cuba in 1961; if he suffered a second 
humiliation in Cuba, he thought that he would lose all hope 
for a stable world peace.
Secretary of Defense McNamara had a different re­
action to the missile presence. He favored taking no action 
because of the danger of a nuclear holocaust if war devel­
oped over the issue. The missile presence was evaluated 
by him as of negligible importance; the Soviets could al­
ready reach the United States with their missiles based in 
the Soviet Union. McNamara felt that it did not matter 
from which base a missile was launched. Since the Soviet 
Union was evaluated as already possessing the power neces­
sary to destroy the United States, what missiles they 
placed in Cuba would only represent a redundance in their 
capability.
^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, pp. 196-198.
^^Pachter, Collision Course, P- 13. See also Hilsman,To Move A Nation , p. 202.
52„.,Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 195. See also Abel,The Missile Crisis, p. 38, and Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 
682-683,
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Paul Nitze, McNamara's Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, differed from McNamara 
in his evaluation. He viewed the missiles as endangering 
the Strategic Air Command; much of this nuclear force was 
based in the southeastern portion of the United States, and 
it would be rendered extremely vulnerable to a sneak attack 
from the Cuban-based missiles. Earning times would be 
reduced from fifteen minutes to less than three minutes.
Others also attacked McNamara on the grounds that the 
political implications were important, even if the military 
ramifications were not. McNamara came to concede that the 
political effect would be important, even if the strategic 
balance were not upset.
Kennedy had come to the meeting convinced that the 
United States had to do something about the missiles. He 
had developed only two alternatives other than simply ac­
cepting the missiles; the United States could destroy the 
missiles with an air strike, or it could appeal directly to 
Khrushchev for their r e m o v a l . O t h e r  alternatives would 
would have to be developed and analyzed, and he charged Ex 
Comm with helping him choose the proper course of action
53Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 195. See also Abel, 
The Missile Crisis, p. 40.
^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 38.
55Robinson, Powers of the President in Foreign 
Affairs, p. 166.
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through the discussion of alternatives and the presentation 
of recommendations.^^
The rest of the meeting was dominated by speculation 
as to what the move meant. Did it represent a feint in the 
struggle over Berlin? Was it a calculated move or was it 
one of Premier Khrushchev's impetuous acts? Did Khrushchev 
make the decision, or was it the result of some reversal of 
power in which Khrushchev and his "peaceful co-existence" 
had been deposed? Did this represent a military take-over 
of the Soviet Union? Was it the preparation for an attack 
upon the United States? All of these questions were 
asked.
If the move were one that was not based on calculated 
thought, the group felt that it would be impossible to 
determine exactly what the move meant. While not ruling 
out irrational or impetuous behavior, the group concentrated 
on the discussion of rational or calculated goals which the 
Soviets might have had in placing missiles in Cuba. Five
possible goals were developed in the discussions of the
58group.
^^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 33.
57Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 194.
58For the best presentation of these deliberations, 
see Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 676-678. The discussion of 
the five possible reasons for the Soviet action are based 
on Sorenson’s text.
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First, Ex Comm discussed the Soviet move as a possible 
adjunct to "cold war" politics. Khrushchev, it was believed, 
thought the United States too "liberal" to fight; it was 
possible that he expected the United States to concern itself 
with "legalisms" over the similarity between American over­
seas bases and Cuba. This would force the United States to 
appear weak and irresolute; American allies would doubt 
American commitments. Out of self-preservation, they would 
be forced to seek accomodations with the Soviets. In ad­
dition, if the move were successful, the United States could 
expect more such moves in other areas. Unchecked, these
COmoves would ultimately isolate and weaken the United States.
Second, the possibility of a "diverting trap" was dis­
cussed. If the United States reacted by striking Cuba, 
American prestige would suffer tremendously. The under­
developed world would be more alienated than it already v;as 
by the American part in the Bay of Pigs action, and American 
allies would be split. In the problems and confusion that
would follow, the Soviets could move, possibly into Berlin,
. ., . .. 60 with some impunity.
The idea that Khrushchev considered Cuba such an im­
portant satellite as to place the missiles there for its 
defense was also discussed. Soviet missiles would not only
59Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 676-677. 
G^Ibid. , p. 677.
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"arm" Cuba, but would represent enough of a solid Soviet 
commitment as to intimidate any American invasion plans.
That the bases were designed to serve as some kind of 
barter was the fourth possibility discussed. Knowing that 
missiles in Cuba would be an extremely sensitive matter to 
the United States, the Soviets might have placed them there 
with every intention of taking them out, but with a major 
concession by the United States. American missile bases 
in Turkey and Italy were possible concessions, as was 
Berlin.
Finally, the group discussed the missiles as a Soviet 
attempt to increase its strategic power. The Soviets were 
"behind" in the missile or nuclear arms race, and the 
economic costs involved in reaching parity with the United 
States would be enormous. Inter-continental ballistic 
missiles were very expensive to manufacture, as were 
submarine-based ballistic missiles. Relatively cheap 
medium-range missiles could be placed in Cuba; there they 
could easily reach the United States. In addition, the 
missiles would tend to neutralize much of the power of the 
Strategic Air Command because of the relatively quick strike 
capacity their proximity to the United States engendered. 




Soviets reached parity with the United States, but the
"appearance" of the balance of weapons would be altered.
It was noted that the appearance was extremely important 
because others acted upon the basis of what they thought
reality to be. Even though the United States was far in
front of the Soviet Union in terms of strategic power,
American allies and neutral nations alike might re-evaluate 
their relationships with the United States and the Soviet 
Union if their image of the strategic arms balance was 
changed by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.^^
The action of the Soviets seemed to provide possible 
answers for several of their problems, and for this reason 
it was thought that their goal was broad and general. If 
there was an improvement in the strategic stance of the 
Soviet Union, then it was thought that the Soviets would 
reap the benefits of the increase in influence and prestige 
which this improvement would offer. An increase in the 
missile strike capacity of the Soviet Union would accomplish 
this improvement, and if it were accomplished by placing 
relatively inexpensive medium-range missiles in Cuba, the
64disruption or cost to the Soviet economy would be minimized.
The meeting was terminated before 1:00 p.m., and an­
other meeting was set for 6:30 that evening. The President
^^Ibid., pp. 677-678.
^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, pp. 201-202
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would continue to keep his scheduled appointments, but the 
others were to meet in two smaller groups during the after­
noon. One of these would concern itself with diplomatic 
problems, and it would meet at the State Department; the 
other group would concern itself with the military ramifi­
cations of the problem, and it would meet at the Defense 
Department. The results of these meetings would be dis­
cussed at the 6:30 gathering.
Shortly after the 11:45 meeting was over, Kennedy 
told Pierre Salinger, his press secretary, "I expect a lot 
of traffic through here this week -- Rusk, McNamara, 
Stevenson, the Chiefs of Staff. If the press tries to read 
something significant into it, you're to deny that anything 
special is going on." Kennedy was protecting himself against 
a premature public knowledge of the crisis.
At 1:00 p.m. Adlai Stevenson, the American Ambassador 
to the United Nations, was told of the impending crisis by 
President Kennedy. Kennedy characterized the acceptable 
alternatives as an air strike or some other action to render 
the missiles inoperable. Stevenson counseled against the 
air strike until other possibilities had been developed and
Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 675.
^^Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday § Company, Inc., IF66), pp. 249-250.
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explored. The President then asked Stevenson to stay in
67Washington and participate in the meetings of his advisors.
Two developments on the afternoon of October 16 af­
fected the environment in which a response to the Soviet 
move would be made. In regard to the domestic setting, 
the Republicans formally announced that Cuba was to be the 
main issue in the remaining campaign time before the Novem­
ber elections. This was done through a press release by 
the Republican National Chairman, William E. Miller. Cuba 
was referrred to as the "symbol" of the President's "tragic 
irresolution."^^ The international setting was affected by 
a statement which Khrushchev made to Ambassador Kohler, the 
American ambassador in Moscow. Khrushchev summoned Kohler and 
then told him, among other things, that the Soviet purpose
in Cuba was entirely peaceful, and that there would be no
69offensive weapons installed on the island. The President 
was confronted with a situation caused by a man who was 
currently pledging that he would never do what he had al­
ready done; he was also under serious domestic political 
attack for not acting to prevent far less obnoxious develop­
ments in Cuba than now existed.
^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 36-37.
^^Cabel Phillips, "G.O.P. Keys Race to Foreign 
Policy," The New York Times, October 17, 1962, pp. 1 and 
24.
69Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 37.
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In the two afternoon meetings, and later at the 6:30 
p.m. White House meeting, Ex Comm proceeded to "box the 
compass" of possible American responses. All possible re­
actions to the missiles were reviewed and re-reviewed. The 
meetings at the State Department, the Defense Department, 
and later at the White House merged together so that Tuesday
afternoon and evening were characterized by one continuous
. 7 0discussion.
During the course of this discussion, six possible 
responses were developed. First, the United States could 
accept the presence of the missiles and do nothing to bring 
about their removal. Second, the United States could exert 
diplomatic pressure through formal protests and appeals to 
the United Nations. Third, the United States could approach 
Castro in order to attempt to convince him that the missiles 
were not in the best interests of his island republic and 
that the Soviets were only using him to gain ground in the 
strategic arms balance. Fourth, Kennedy could order the 
Strategic Air Command to effect a "surgical" strike in which 
the missiles would be destroyed with pin-point bombing. 
Fifth, he could order American invasion forces onto the is­
land to ensure the destruction of the missiles through their 
physical capture. Sixth, and finally, the United States 
could undertake indirect military action, such as the action 
characterized by the blockade of the island. In addition,
^°Ibid., p. 38.
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there could be various combinations of these six basic 
71moves.
Possible Soviet reactions to American moves were also 
discussed. The Soviet Union had said that American action 
against Cuba would mean the unleashing of Soviet rocket 
power . . .  in the face of American action to remove the 
missiles in Cuba, would this threat be backed by action? 
Would there be a reaction against American bases surrounding 
the Soviet Union, or would there be a move on Berlin? Would 
Castro act in a rational way; he was known to be volatile, 
so how would he react to American actions to remove the 
missiles? Would the Soviet Union feel that war was in­
evitable and act accordingly? Finally, would the Kremlin 
make another major miscalculation of American determination?
These were questions which had to be asked in relation to
72almost any one of the basic courses of action discussed.
Most of those in attendance at the Ex Comm meetings
of the first day were in favor of a military response to
the missile presence. Dillon was representative of this
majority. He thought that "the fat was in the fire" and
that the United States had no other course open to it but
73to use an air strike to remove the missiles. The
71Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 682. See also Hilsman, 
To Move A Nation, p"! 19 5.
72Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 680-681.
^^Abe1, The Missile Crisis, p . 40.
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invasion course of action had only one supporter; General 
Maxwell Taylor represented the point of view of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff at the meetings, and he felt that the United 
States had to go into Cuba and dislodge not only the mis­
siles, but also Castro and the Soviets. This expulsion 
could only be accomplished by an invasion. The rest agreed 
with the President that the invasion course should be a 
last step; this feeling was based upon the danger of a third 
world war which might arise out of an invasion and the 
direct confrontation of American and Soviet troops.
Those who actively opposed armed and direct military 
action included McNamara, Ball, Gilpatric, Bundy, Sorenson, 
Thompson, and Robert Kennedy. Even though it was obvious 
that the President favored the course of action based upon 
an air strike, these men sought to develop a response which 
did not involve the use of force; by so avoiding open armed 
conflict, they hoped that there would not be war over the 
issue. In relation to this search for a response at least 
initially free from armed conflict, the blockade was put 
forth as a possible course of action. Most of these men 
thought that the United States had to respond to the mis­
siles; they simply were trying to avoid the chance of
75nuclear war over the matter.
^^Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 685-684. See also Allison, 
"Conceptual Models," p. 714.
75Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 40. See also Sorenson, 
Kennedy, pp. 683-685, and Allison, "Conceptual Models," p.714,
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The day ended without any decision as to what course 
of action would best serve American interests. There was 
a majority in favor of the air strike, but the minority that 
opposed this action was composed of influential people, in­
cluding the President's brother and his Secretary of Defense, 
In addition, the Secretary of State was noncommittal as to
which policy he favored; Rusk hid his feelings and thoughts
7on the first day of the crisis. With his advisors so 
split, the President chose not to pick a course of action 
on October 16; instead, he directed them to continue their 
meetings until they had been able to explore all reasonable 
possibilities.
October 17
On Wednesday, October 17, the President campaigned 
for Abraham Ribicoff, the Democratic candidate for the 
United States Senate in Connecticut. This campaign in­
volved personal appearances in the state, and Kennedy was 
gone from Washington for the entire day. Again, as on 
October 16, the President was acting to fulfill previous 
commitments so as to avoid arousing suspicion of a crisis.
In his absence. Ex Comm met in George Ball's conference
room at the Department of State for most of day and well
7 7into the night.
^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 40. 
T^Ibid. , p. 43.
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With the President elsewhere, the "host" as well as
the senior official present was Secretary of State Rusk.
7 8He refused to chair the meeting, however. In the absence
of the President, Ex Comm experienced a freedom of discussion
unmatched on the previous day. There was no rank recognized,
79nor did anyone act as chairman. The urgency of the Soviet 
threat and the inter-departmental nature of possible Ameri­
can responses tended to produce an environment of equality 
within the meeting. All members of Ex Comm were advisors 
to the President; they no longer represented narrow depart­
mental jurisdictions, nor did they have masters other than 
the President. Secretaries and assistant secretaries within 
the same department differed drastically in their inter­
pretation of the situation and in their proposed courses
of action. The group was composed of individuals who were
8 0free to say whatever they thought should be said.
The manner in which the meeting progressed was greatly 
affected by the Attorney General. He assumed the role of
O 1
the "devil's advocate." He took it upon himself to 
question and challenge the other members of the Ex Comm so 
as to help them clarify, in their own minds, the nature of
T^Ibid. , pp. 44-45.
79Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 46.
80Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 679.
oi
Abel, The Missile Crisis, p . 45
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the problem and the possible solutions to it. He also 
sought to ensure that the discussions proceded smoothly, 
but this goal was difficult to achieve because of the fluid 
nature of Ex Comm and its meetings. Two new people 
McCone and Acheson -- joined the group on Wednesday, and 
other members came and went while the meetings were in 
progress. Under these conditions, constant attention had 
to be directed toward ensuring that the discussions did 
not degenerate into repetitiousness. Robert Kennedy, with­
out acting as chairman, was able to provide the direction
8 2needed to maintain momentum and progress.
There was some resentment directed at the actions of 
the Attorney General. Stevenson disliked the "brain­
storming" tactics of Robert Kennedy, as did others. Some 
members also felt that his presence represented "little 
brother," ready to carry tales to the President. In 
general, however, most felt that the Attorney General was
serving a useful function; he was providing direction and
8 3force to a somewhat unstructured meeting.
A more meaningful personal clash between members was 
represented by the conflict between Acheson and Stevenson. 
Each of these men despised the other, and their conflict 
was a long-standing one. In the October 17 meeting, and 
in the others that would follow, the two men were never in
8 2 Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 679.
O *7
Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 45-46
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the room at the same time; both were important and influ­
ential members of Ex Comm, and both were officially present
in the record, but each sought to avoid the other, even at
84the cost of missing important information or discussion.
Beginning on October 16, and then at 8:30 every morn­
ing thereafter, the United States Intelligence Board met 
at the old Office of Strategic Services in Washington.
Here all the latest intelligence was studied and evaluated. 
McCone was the chairman of this board, and upon his return 
to Washington, on October 17, he resumed his post. After 
chairing a meeting of the Intelligence Board, McCone would
attend Ex Comm where he would brief the members on the
8 5latest information.
The raw intelligence data which the Intelligence 
Board evaluated was based, for the most part, on the photo­
graphic reconnaissance of the U-2's. In keeping with the 
order of the President in the Ex Comm meetings on October 16, 
there was a sharp increase in intelligence flights over 
Cuba. There were approximately three over-flights made per 
day, and in addition, there were large numbers of flights 
made around the periphery of the island which did not in­
volve flying through Cuban air space. Massive efforts 
were made to drain refugees of any information which they
'̂̂ Ibid. , p. 45.
O C
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 261-263. See also Hilsman,
To Move A Nation, p. 200, and Abel, The Missile Crisis, p.46.
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might have had, but the major source of intelligence re­
mained the air surveillance.^^
The Wednesday meeting of Ex Comm began with an intel­
ligence briefing by McCone. He told the members that more 
missile sites had been discovered; there was now photo­
graphic proof that the Soviets were constructing at least 
six medium-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba. These 
bases were located around the towns of Guanajay, San 
Cristobal, and Sagua la Grande, and each had four launchers 
In addition, there were now actual photos of the missiles 
themselves. The films did not reveal pictures of warheads, 
but there were some oddly-shaped buildings with reinforced 
roofs which were regarded as storage rooms for the war­
heads .
McCone also told the members of Ex Comm that inter­
mediate- range ballistic missile sites had been discovered. 
There were two of these sites in the Guanajay region, and 
there was one site near Remedies. These missiles had a 
range of approximately twenty-two hundred nautical miles. 
With the exception of Alaska, Hawaii, and extreme north­
western Washington state, the entire United States would 
be vulnerable to a missile attack from Cuba. The countries
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Interim 
Report, pp. 9-10. See also U.S. House Committee on Ap­
propriations, Hearings, pp. 4-5.
8 7U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 
p. 8. See also Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 46-47.
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in the northeastern portion of South America would also be
O O
vulnerable to attack.
The military threat which the Soviet missiles in Cuba 
represented had greatly increased. With both types of mis­
siles operable, the Soviet Union would be able to deliver 
around forty nuclear warheads to almost all parts of the
United States. This would increase their nuclear megaton-
89nage delivery ability by approximately fifty per cent.
McNamara still maintained that the Soviet missiles
represented no real strategic threat. A "missile was a
missile," and it did not really matter from where it was
fired. The Soviets had more than enough missiles in the
Soviet Union to destroy the United States; the missiles in
Cuba only represented needless Soviet military expenditures.
McNamara could not dispute the challenge to American pres-
9 0tige which the missiles represented, however.
The other members of Ex Comm were split on the issue 
of the strategic threat of the missiles. Some felt, as 
did McNamara, that the missiles did not threaten American 
interests militarily any more than did presently operable 
Soviet missiles in the Soviet Union itself. The Cuban
8 8U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 
pp. 241-242. See also Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 4'6̂ 47. 
and U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, p. 8.
89Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 201. See also Abel, 
The Missile Crisis^ pp. 46-47. 
onAbel, The Missile Crisis, p . 47.
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missiles were doser, and there was less warning time,
but these members felt that the over-all strategic balance
was of such a nature as to make the use of the Cuban-based
missiles as remote a possibility as the use of the missiles
in the Soviet Union. Any Soviet attack would initiate an
American counter-attack of such magnitude as to destroy
the Soviet Union. If there were an attack, many accepted
McNamara's argument that it did not matter from what
launching pads the missiles came . . . they would come,
and they would do so in sufficient numbers to destroy the
United States. Other members disagreed with the Secretary
of Defense; they felt that the Cuban missiles presented a
very real strategic threat. Most of the United States
would be subject to attack with an extremely short warning
time; in this area would be included most American military,
civilian, and industrial targets. Both sides were able to
agree that the political implications of the missiles were
91important enough to force the United States to respond.
Whatever response the United States made was going 
to hurt American interests. The President had asked Rusk 
to evaluate the probable reactions by American allies to 
possible responses which the United States might make.
Rusk gave his report on Wednesday, and it was his evalua­
tion that the United States had been placed in an untenable
Sllbid., p. 48.
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position. If the United States failed to react vigorously 
to the Soviet move, it would cost America the faith of many 
of its allies. If, on the other hand, the United States 
did react forcefully, many other American allies would turn 
away from it. Rusk felt that the United States had to 
react because of the over-all aspects of the situation, but 
he counseled that the American response should not force
Khrushchev into a political "blind alley"; he should be
. . , _ 92given room in which to manuever.
The discussion on October 17 was based on the six 
possible courses of action which had been presented in the 
previous day’s meetings. Of these six, most of Ex Comm's 
attention was directed at the air strike and at the block­
ade .
An invasion of Cuba to remove the missile threat was
not seriously considered: it had been effectively killed
in the meetings on October 16 because it was an irreversible
step and because its necessary preparations would alarm
those whom Washington wished to surprise.Direct talks
with Castro were set aside in the October 17 discussions;
it was felt that this was a super-power conflict and that
the missiles would have to be removed by Soviets in response
9 4to a direct American action.
92Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 681-682.
Q Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 50-51.
94Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 683.
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Diplomatie action was discussed by the group as a 
possible reaction to the missiles, but it was decided that 
it would not serve American interests. Zorin, the Russian 
delegate, was Chairman of the United Nations Security 
Council for October. Zorin's position, coupled with the 
Soviet veto power, was seen as negating the United Nations 
as a possible avenue for solution; the Soviets would be 
able to block any meaningful action. Protesting directly 
to Khrushchev was perceived to endanger American interests; 
the Soviets would be able to seize the initiative if, 
through American discussions with their Premier, they 
learned that the United States knew of the missile presence, 
They would be able to prepare themselves for the American 
response and they would even be able to preempt such a 
response through moves undertaken before the United States 
was ready to act. In addition, it was thought that a 
protest delivered to the Soviets would only lead to a con­
ference in which the United States would be pressured to 
surrender its bases in lands near the Soviet Union in 
exchange for the removal of the Cuban missiles. Ex Comm 
felt that the result of these types of diplomatic action 
would not achieve the removal of the missiles without 
disastrous consequences to American prestige and strategic 
strength; in addition, these actions would allow the
9 5Russians to seize the initiative from the United States.
^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 48.
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There was discussion of confronting Andrei Gromyko 
with the evidence in his scheduled meeting with the Presi­
dent on Thursday, October 18, but this confrontation was 
rejected on virtually the same grounds that other forms 
of diplomatic action were rejected. A policy which asked 
that the missiles be removed without backing such a 
request with force was simply handing the initiative to
the Soviets; it would enable them to prepare for any other
96action which the United States might take.
One of the two courses which did receive a great 
amount of attention in the Wednesday meeting was that of 
the "surgical" air strike. In this response, the United 
States would "cut away the diseased tissues" like a surgeon; 
through the use of pin-point bombing, the United States 
would destroy the missiles and their launching sites. This 
action was justified by its supporters on the grounds that 
the United States had to remove the missile threat before 
it became operative; the weapons were being installed to 
intimidate the United States, and they had to be removed 
before this intimidation could be accomplished. Since 
there was no other course of action which would effectively 
and immediately remove the missiles (with the exception of 
the discarded invasion proposal), many members of Ex Comm
^^Ibid.
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felt that the United States should strike with its air
9 7power as soon as was possible.
As Ex Comm discussed the surgical air strike, some 
dangers inherent in this approach were brought forth. In 
the first place, no air strike could ensure that it would 
be one hundred per cent effective; there could be signifi­
cant numbers of weapons left untouched. These weapons would
have to be destroyed, and it was thought that an invasion
9 8might prove necessary, after all. In the second place, 
Khrushchev might react with an attack upon the United States, 
or some of its bases or allies. Russians would be killed 
in the strike, and it was doubtful that Khrushchev could 
avoid a response to these deaths. If his response were 
directed at American bases or at American allies, there was 
the chance that a nuclear war might result. If he reacted 
with a strike on the United States itself, nuclear war was 
almost a certainty. In the third place, even if Khrushchev 
did not order an attack upon the United States, there was 
the danger that this would be done by a field commander in 
charge of the missiles or planes in Cuba; since the American
9 7Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 34-35. See also Abel, 
The Missile Crisis , p . 50.
98U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1964, 
hearings, before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 
on H.rT 2440 (S. 843), 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 580. 
See also Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 34, and Hilsraan, To 
Move A Nation, p . 203.
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air strike could not guarantee complete success, one of 
the Soviet field commanders could be able to fire his re­
maining weapons at American targets in a kind of independ- 
99ent reaction. Even if there were no independent launch­
ings of missiles by a Soviet field commander, the American 
attack would most assuredly encounter resistance; Soviet 
and Cuban forces would try to repel the American planes, 
and an attack upon the American base at Guantanamo Bay 
might result.
George Ball was the first member of Ex Comm to argue 
against the air strike. He based his argument not on the 
dangers inherent in an air strike, but in the irreversibil­
ity of the move and in its negation of basic American values 
He pointed out that if the United States acted to destroy 
the missile sites with an air strike, it would have made 
less drastic action impossible. Once an air strike was 
launched, the United States would face the possibility 
of war with the Soviet Union; it would have by-passed the 
opportunity to solve the problem which the missiles pre­
sented in a less dangerous way. In addition, a sneak 
attack, such as was called for by those who supported the 
air strike, would violate American traditions and values.
99Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 684-685. See also Abel, The 
Missile Crisis, p. 50, and Hillsman, To Move A Nation, p. 205,
^^^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 684.
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If the United States responded with a clandestine air
strike, it would have to undergo grave risks; if it were
successful in removing the missiles, and if no nuclear
exchange resulted, it would still bear a moral stigma which
would cost it its own self-respect as well as international
respect and prestige.
Ball was joined in his position by Robert Kennedy.
The Attorney General felt that the loss in Cuban lives
would make the air strike into a massacre; those who lived
in areas adjacent to the bases would be subject to stray
bombs, and many would be killed. This would not represent
a decent regard for humanity, according to the President's
brother. If the United States could not forewarn the
targets, which it could not do if it were to best achieve
the neutralization of the missiles, then it could not
102morally place innocent Cubans in danger.
The arguments which Robert Kennedy and George Ball 
put forth stressed the importance of acting in a fashion 
consistent with one's values and with the values of others. 
A surprise attack might remove the threat to the United 
States, but it might destroy American prestige; national
Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 51. See also Seyom 
Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United 
States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968} , p . 261.
i n ? .Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 51. See also 
Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 684-685.
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influence was viewed by both Ball and Kennedy as being a 
product of moral action and restraint as well as of other 
things. A surprise attack would ultimately work against 
the best interests of the United States, because it would 
undermine American influence in the rest of the world, and 
it would make the Soviets and the Cubans into martyrs.
Robert Kennedy was determined not to let his brother be­
come the "Tojo of the I960's.
Acheson struck out at the "morality” argument being 
presented by Ball and the Attorney General. According to 
the ex-Secretary of State, there had been warning given; 
this warning was represented in the Monroe Doctrine, inter- 
American treaties, and in the many public statements of
President Kennedy. The Soviet move was clearly unfriendly,
104and it represented a direct threat to American interests.
The President was charged with protecting the interests of 
the American people; to Acheson, there was no path open to
the President other than that of the rapid destruction of
• *1 105the missiles.
Acheson was respected by Robert Kennedy, and the 
attack which Acheson made on Kennedy's position made him 
unsure of it. He still continued to oppose the air strike,
^^^Brown, The Faces of Power, pp. 261-262. 
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 51-52. 
^^^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 37-38.
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however. The President's brother argued that no matter 
what military and political reasons could be put forth, 
the air strike still represented "a surprise attack by a 
very large power against a very small one. This . . . 
could not be undertaken by the United States if . . . [it] 
were to maintain . . . [its] moral position at home and 
around the globe.
Sorenson supported Ball and Kennedy. He believed, 
however, that the moral opprobrium might be shifted to the 
Soviets if the United States were to forewarn Khrushchev 
that it would strike if the missiles were not withdrawn. 
Sorenson envisaged this warning as being done in such a 
way as to prevent the Premier from using the warning so as 
to prepare for the attack or seize the offensive. Ex Comm 
immediately pointed out that if Khrushchev refused to co­
operate, the United States would still face many of the same 
moral problems which Kennedy and Ball had outlined earlier. 
Sorenson then began to favor the blockade. The discussion
on advanced warnings and their benefits and dangers also
10 7began to turn others toward the blockade response.
The blockade response, later called the "quarantine," 
was to be an embargo on all offensive weapons being shipped 
to Cuba, and it was to be enforced by the United States
 ̂ pp. 38-39.
107Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 685-686,
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Navy. One of its advantages over the air strike was that 
it could be graduated in severity; it could include only 
weapons, or it could also be extended to other items as 
well. Another advantage lay in the fact that it involved 
a confrontation with the Soviet Union in an area where 
the United States had a preponderance of power. In ad­
dition, the blockade response was less provocative; it 
allowed time for second thoughts on the part of the Soviets 
because it was not an overt, physical attack, such as the 
air strike would be. It involved military confrontation 
which could graduate into conflict, but it avoided con­
flict initially.
There were problems with this approach, however,
just as there were problems with all the possible responses
which Ex Comm had discussed. This type of move would be
repugnant to those nations interested in "freedom of the
seas," some of which were close American allies. This
type of action was also commonly regarded as an act of war;
the initial step might avoid the use of force simply to
invite an immediate belligerent response on the part of 
109the Soviets. Even if there were no immediate Soviet
strike at the United States, the Soviets might impose a 
blockade on Berlin; if this were the case, the United States
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 49.
 ̂ p. 50.
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might be faced with a choice between war and the cessation 
of the Cuban blockade. If the Soviets chose to ignore the 
blockade, the United States might be forced to fire on 
their ships, thereby provoking war. Perhaps the greatest 
drawback to the blockade response was that of time; there 
could be a painful and prolonged confrontation, and it was 
most uncertain that the blockade could achieve the goal of 
the removal of the missiles. If the confrontation were to 
last for several weeks, it was thought that the missiles 
would become operative, and this was something which the 
United States wanted to avoid.
There were many uncertainties in the blockade re­
sponse, but McNamara chose to champion it. He argued that 
it was a limited form of pressure which could be increased,
or escalated. It was "dramatic" and "forceful," but it
allowed the United States to retain more control over 
events than did the air strike. A strike might ultimately 
be necessary, but McNamara thought it best to begin with 
the least provocative, yet forceful, response.
Robert Kennedy supported McNamara and the blockade.
He felt that "it had more flexibility and fewer liabilities 
than a military attack." Kennedy could not accept the
idea that the United States would "rain bombs on Cuba . . .
^^^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 687. 
^^^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 34.
79
in a surprise attack." He was not sure that the blockade
would work, but it seemed to be the most desirable alter-
112native to the air strike.
The majority of the members of Ex Comm still supported 
an air strike, as they had on Tuesday, but the minority op­
posing this action was increasing. Robert Kennedy, McNamara, 
Sorenson, Thompson, Bundy, Ball, and Stevenson favored a 
more cautious response. The rest of the members either 
favored the air strike or were keeping their choices to 
themselves. It should be noted that not all who opposed 
the air strike supported the blockade; the blockade's three
strongest supporters were McNamara, Robert Kennedy, and 
113Sorenson.
The meeting ended late Wednesday evening; Ex Comm 
was no nearer a solution to the problem which faced the 
President than it had been the day before. Again discussion 
had to be postponed in order to allow the members to rest 
and collect their thoughts.
Following the Ex Comm meeting, Sorenson and Robert 
Kennedy went to the airport to greet the President's plane 
as he returned from his day of campaigning in Connecticut.
ll^ibid., p. 37.
113James Daniel and John G. Hubbell, Strike in the 
West: The Complete Story of the Cuban Crisis (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1963)\ pT 65. See also 
Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 49, and Hilsman, To Move A 
Nation, p. 206.
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Robert briefed his brother on the discussions and events 
of the day; Sorenson told the President of the loose but 
productive nature of the meeting in his absence, and he 
advised the President to purposefully absent himself from 
some of the future meetings so that discussion would be as 
uninhibited as possible. After dropping off the President 
at the White House, both Sorenson and Robert Kennedy went 
back to the State Department to devote some more time and 
effort to the problem before them.^^^
October 18
Acheson was asked to come to the White House for a 
private conference with the President on Thursday morning. 
There the two had a forty-five-minute discussion on the 
options which were open to the United States. Kennedy 
mentioned the Pearl Harbor analogy that the Attorney 
General had made the previous day. In pointing out that he 
did not want his brother to be the "Tojo of the 1960’s," 
Robert Kennedy had referred to the Japanese sneak attack 
at Pearl Harbor; to the Attorney General, the air strike 
was an American "Pearl Harbor." Acheson presented his side 
of the issue, and then the two men discussed what lay ahead 
after an American response was chosen.
^^^Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 679 and 686. 
^^^Abe1, The Missile Crisis, p. 54.
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At 11:00 a.m., the members of Ex Comm met with the 
President in Rusk's conference room at the Department of 
State. There McCone briefed them with the latest intel­
ligence on the missile build-up. He reported that the mis­
siles were being installed at a rate which could render 
some of them operable within eighteen hours. It was esti­
mated that they could all be operable within a week. This 
report produced a new sense of urgency within Ex Comm.^^^
Following the intelligence briefing, Ex Comm turned
to a short discussion of goals. Some felt that the United
States should seek not only the removal of the missiles
but also the removal of Castro. It was noted that Castro's
removal could not be accomplished unless the United States
launched an invasion of the island. This course of action,
as an initial response, had been rejected in the earlier
meetings. If the United States sought only the removal of
the missiles, however, it was possible that the air strike,
or perhaps even the blockade, could accomplish this end;
both courses of action were less provocative than the in-
117vasion response.
Rusk opened the day's battle between the supporters 
of the blockade and the supporters of the air strike with 
an attack upon the air strike response. The Secretary of
^^^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 35-36. See also Abel, 
The Missile Crisis, p. 58.
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 58-59.
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State felt that this course of action was too risky; there 
was too great a chance that the Soviets would react in an 
emotional and spasmodic fashion. In addition, Rusk felt 
that the political costs would be prohibitive; if the 
United States responded to the missiles with an air strike, 
it would forfeit world opinion as well as the support of 
the Organization of American States and the United Nations. 
Rusk evaluated the long-term losses of an immediate re­
moval of the missiles as outweighing the short-term gains
118that could be made with the air strike.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were now attending the 
Ex Comm meetings, opposed Rusk's stand. They argued that to 
stall would mean that the missiles would become operational; 
when this happened, the Joint Chiefs felt that it would be 
extremely difficult to safely and prudently force their re­
moval. They argued that the blockade would not be effec­
tive; it would simply enable the Soviets to complete the 
installation of the missiles. General Curtis LeMay, the 
Joint Chief of Staff for the Air Force, argued that an im­
mediate attack was necessary; as far as a Soviet response 
was concerned, General LeMay counseled that the Soviets 
would not react.
^^^Ibid., p. 59
119Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 36.
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The President appreciated the argument which the Joint 
Chiefs were putting forth; he realized that the more time 
that the Soviets had, the more missiles they could make 
operable. He did not believe, however, that they would sus­
tain an American air strike without responding to it. He 
felt that they could not allow such an action to go un­
challenged any more than the United States could afford 
not to respond to the missiles. They had pledged support 
to Cuba, and an attack upon Soviet personnel, as well as
upon Cuba, would be an occurrence which demanded retribu-
120tion of some sort.
Others pointed out that it had been estimated that an 
invasion would be required if the missiles were to be com­
pletely destroyed; the air strike could not guarantee one 
hundred per cent effectiveness. An invasion would surely 
force the Soviets to respond militarily. The a:r strike, 
or the invasion for that matter, could not guarantee success,
and either could set in motion a progressive escalation that
121would lead to nuclear war between the two super-powers.
The legality of the air strike was also discussed in 
the 11:00 a.m. meeting. Acheson argued that legalities 
should be the least of the concerns before Ex Comm; he felt 
that the legal question was irrelevant. What was relevant
IZOibid.
171Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 204,
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was the security of the United States, and whatever the
protection of that security demanded. He called for the
air strike, saying that this would not automatically mean
12 2war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Ball disagreed with Acheson on the question of le­
gality. He felt that the United States did have an in­
terest in attempting to act as international law dictated. 
While the blockade response was based on a type of action 
traditionally regarded as an act of war, it was thought 
that it had more "legality” than did the air strike.
Leonard C. Meeker, Deputy Legal Advisor to the Secretary 
of State, supported Ball. Meeker, in addition, said that 
if the United States did act to blockade Cuba, perhaps it 
should call its action a "defensive quarantine." He thought 
that the United States might be able to create a better 
legal case for its action if there were no traditional
ties between its response and what was generally considered
12 3to be an act of war.
The supporters of the blockade were growing in number. 
This fact had little to do with the legal argument that Ball 
and Meeker were presenting; it was based upon the practical 
argument that the blockade would avoid killing Russians as 
well as give the Soviets an opportunity to step back.^^^




The meeting was drawing to a close; the President 
had to receive Eifaku Sato, the Japanese Finance Minister 
at noon. Another Ex Comm meeting was requested for that 
evening. As the members began to leave, the President re­
marked that "time was running out." This feeling was 
shared by the members of Ex Comm; the pressure caused by
the Soviet speed in installing the missiles was beginning 
1 7 Rto be felt.
Ex Comm met without the President on Thursday after­
noon; Kennedy had a scheduled meeting with the Soviet 
Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, and would be detained 
until evening. In addition, Robert Kennedy had asked that 
the President absent himself in order that the group could 
have a session in which the presence of the President would 
not hinder free d i s c u s s i o n . I t  was decided that the 
group would split into two parts, each of which would con­
cern itself with one of the two responses currently being 
seriously considered. Each sub-group would be charged 
with analyzing its response as carefully and as fully as 
was possible. At 6:30 p.m., the two sub-groups would
present their findings to an Ex Comm meeting at the De-
127partment of State.
12 5Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 691.
^^^Abe1, The Missile Crisis, p . 60. 
127Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 688.
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President Kennedy's talks with Gromyko covered a wide
range of topics, but the President was most interested in
the comments which the Soviet Foreign Minister had to make
in regard to Cuba. He told the President that the Soviet
intentions in Cuba were peaceful and that the Soviet Union
sought only to enable Cuba to protect herself; he pledged
that the Soviet Union would not place offensive weapons in
Cuba. Kennedy had his September statements brought to him,
and he repeated his warnings that the United States would
not tolerate Soviet action aimed at turning Cuba into an
offensive base. The President was extending an opportunity
to Gromyko to explain the new missiles in Cuba, but the
Foreign Minister simply repeated the past pledges that the
12 8Soviet Union would install no offensive weapons in Cuba.
Robert Kennedy spoke with his brother shortly after 
Gromyko's exit, and the President was angry at what he con­
sidered as deception and duplicity on the part of the
129Soviet Union and its Foreign Minister. Kennedy was not
quite sure that he had acted wisely in not confronting 
Gromyko with the knowledge of the missiles, but he was 
later reassured by both Rusk and Thompson. They believed 
that such knowledge would have given the initiative to the
17 8Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 61-63. See also 
Sorenson, Kennedy, p̂  690.
1 79 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 40-42. (This is in­
ferred rather than explicitly stated.)
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Soviets, an occurrence that Ex Comm was determined should 
130not happen.
While he was meeting with Gromyko, Kennedy had Robert
A. Lovett, a former Secretary of Defense under Truman,
brought to the White House. There Lovett was briefed by
Bundy. After Gromyko had gone, the President and Lovett
talked for a while, and the President asked Lovett to attend
the remaining Ex Comm sessions. President Kennedy also had
former Presidents Truman and Eisenhower notified of the
131crisis and of the possible American responses to it.
The newspapers on Thursday carried a story of a mili­
tary build-up in the southeastern part of the United States. 
Navy planes were reported to have been reassigned to Florida. 
The Pentagon announced that there was no reason for excite­
ment; the build-up was an ordinary thing to do in the face
132of Cuba's new Soviet fighter planes. While the Pentagon
was officially saying that there was no reason to be excited 
over the transfer of military equipment from one part of 
the country to another, McNamara was informing the President 
that the initial steps for a strike on Cuba had been taken, 
if that were to be the President's choice. The plans called
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 63-64.
^^^Ibid., p . 64.
132The New York Times, October 18, 1962, p. 1
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for an initial attack of five hundred air sorties against 
all Cuban military targets.
Rusk did not attend the early evening meeting of Ex 
Comm; he was host at a dinner for Gromyko on the eighth 
floor of the State Department Building. One floor below, 
in Ball's conference room, the other members of the group, 
with the exception of the President, were discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of both the air strike and 
the blockade.
Bundy, who now favored the air strike, headed those 
who supported this response. They included McCone, Dillon, 
Taylor, Acheson, and Nitze. Ball headed those who favored 
the blockade. Included in this group were Robert Kennedy, 
McNamara, Gilpatric, Thompson, and Lovett (who had just 
been added to Ex Comm). Many members, supporting both the 
blockade and the air strike, were not in attendance because 
of other commitments. Each side did its best to present 
its case forcefully, but the arguments also tended to point 
out the perils and pitfalls which each response encompassed. 
Ex Comm was made more aware of the difficulties involved in 
either course than it had been earlier; before, the dif­
ficulties had been discussed, but now they were under­
stood.
11 %Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 37. 
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 65-66.
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It was in this meeting that Robert McNamara made his 
plea for "maintaining the options." In this speech, the 
Secretary of Defense argued that the decision which the 
President would have to make was not an "either/or" type.
The President could and should initially act to blockade 
Cuba; offensive weapons would not be allowed onto the 
island; and the American Navy would enforce this decision.
If the blockade failed, the President could escalate the 
American response to an air strike or invasion; further 
military action was not ruled out, but was simply postponed 
until it was proved to be necessary. In effect, the United 
States was protecting its options; it could react with a 
military strike if this proved necessary, but if it began 
with a military strike, the possibility of solving the
1 7 Cproblem more peacefully would be lost.
Dillon was struck by the logic of McNamara's proposal, 
and he was also affected by the comparison which Robert 
Kennedy had earlier made between the air strike and Pearl 
Harbor. That evening, in the 8:00 p.m. meeting, he decided 
to support the blockade as a course of action.
Bundy was also drawn over to the side favoring the 
blockade. He was impressed with the argument that the 
blockade could be a first step followed by more severe
IS^Ibid., p. 67. 
^^^Ibid., p. 66.
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actions when and if they were needed. Bundy credited Dillon 
with the reasons for his switch to the blockade side; Dil­
lon's switch, plus his discussion with McNamara on "main­
taining the options," convinced Bundy that the blockade was
137the proper response.
The blockade was gaining support; the fact that other
action could be taken as needed convinced many that it was
a more desirable response than the air strike. This argument
had been presented on Tuesday and on Wednesday, but it was
not appreciated until the exercises on Thursday afternoon
indicated how many pitfalls and problems the air strike
had. There were problems involved with the blockade, too,
but these problems were modified by the fact that the Soviet
Union would not be put into a position in which it would
have to decide, in a very short time, whether or not to
respond to an American attack upon Soviet bases in Cuba.
With a course of action based upon a blockade, the United
States retained more control over events than otherwise
would have been the case; it would also avoid the stigma of
138a sneak attack upon a small nation.
Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on Thursday, Ex Comm 
moved its meeting from Ball's conference room to the White
137Ibid., p. 67
138Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 688. See also Hilsman, To 
Move A Nation, p. 2ÜTT
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House. The majority were now in favor of the blockade, and
139they so informed the President.
The President maintained complete control of the Ex 
Comm meetings which he attended. Feeling that subordinates 
might be silenced by the presence of their department heads, 
he used his power and prestige to enable them to speak 
freely; he shielded them so that they were responsible to 
him and to no one else.^^^ His manner and attitude were 
calm, and his emotions were kept well hidden from all but 
the most intimate of his associates. He would have to 
decide ultimately what response the United States would 
make to the missile presence; he was forcing the others 
to work to help him make that decision. He sought candid 
and personal exchanges between the participants so that 
all facets of the problem would be brought forth. He was 
guarding his position and his feelings so as to ensure 
that Ex Comm could most effectively aid him.^^^
The majority opinion which was presented to Kennedy 
by the members of Ex Comm was immediately challenged. The 
President began to ask pin-point questions which "shot 
holes" in the agreement of the members. Some people began
1 39 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 43.
^^^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 679.
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 58.
^^^Weintal and Bartlett, Facing the Brink, p. 65.
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to switch s i d e s . T h e  Secretary of State altered the 
stand which he had taken earlier in the day. He had spoken 
against an air strike in the 11:00 a.m. meeting on Thursday, 
but at 10:00 p.m. he said that the United States could not 
tolerate the missiles, and that if they were not withdrawn, 
the United States should respond with an air attack. He 
characterized his feelings by saying that it was better "to 
go down with a bang" than "with a whimper." Whether he 
favored the air strike is unclear, but his position was 
more belligerent than it had earlier been.^^^ Rusk's 
change of mind was representative of what everyone was go­
ing through; people changed their minds many times during 
the week that Ex Comm was in session. The nature of the 
threat and the immediate need for the proper response 
placed a great amount of pressure on all the participants; 
when President Kennedy's questions began to pressure the
participants even more, many of them switched sides or be- 
145came unsure.
After questioning his subordinates in a severe, 
relentless way, Kennedy announced that he tentatively 
favored the blockade plan.^^^ He had been pressing Ex
143Kennedy, Thirteen Days , p. 43.
1 44Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 56. 
l^^ibid., p. 57.
^^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 204.
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Comm*s members in order to help himself see the problems
and pitfalls as completely as he could.
The President favored the blockade over the air strike
because it left the other side with a path for withdrawal.
It began at the lowest level of the use of force, and it
could be escalated if the need arose. It avoided, however,
the initial use of force. It would help to prevent the so-
called "independent" r e a c t i o n , a n d  it would also work to
prevent pushing Khrushchev into a political corner. Kennedy
was convinced that Khrushchev would not flinch from the use
of nuclear weapons if he were placed in a position where
his back was to a wall. Kennedy felt that the air strike
14 8just might place Khrushchev against that wall. The
President was not in favor of the blockade because of moral
considerations; he was unwilling to discard the air attack
simply because it was "wrong." His position was one in
which he felt that the blockade response would be the least
149costly alternative.
Orders were issued to begin preparations for a possible 
blockade of Cuba as soon as was practicable. The State 
Department and the Justice Department immediately began to
l^^ibid., p. 205.
1 4 8 Salinger, With Kennedy, pp. 175-176.
1 40 Brown, The Faces of Power, p. 262. 
^^^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 807.
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work upon a legal and political basis for the action which 
would appeal to the rest of the world. The Defense Depart­
ment immediately began to issue the orders which would 
bring the necessary ships to the area; it also began to 
prepare a list of items which should be prohibited as 
"offensive weapons." All American ambassadors were ordered 
back to their posts, and the armed forces in the areas of 
the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico were alerted.
The President also asked Sorenson to begin drafting
the speech which would announce the blockade to the world,
if this were ultimately the response which the United States 
152would choose.
October 19
On Friday morning, October 19, Salinger confronted 
the President with the questions that reporters were asking 
about rumored troop movements in Florida. Kennedy instruc­
ted his press secretary to say that there was nothing to 
these rumors. The Pentagon also denied that there was 
anything underway which was militarily important to the 
United States; in a statement which was released to the 
press, the Pentagon said that there were no offensive mis­
siles in Cuba, and that no alert of American forces in the 
Caribbean existed. Washington was asking questions, and
^^^Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 691-692.
1 57Abel, The Missile Crisis, p . 67.
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Ex Comm was moving to prevent knowledge of it deliberations
and its actions. Suspicion of the denials issued by the
Pentagon and the President's press secretary existed in the
15 3minds of the Washington press corps, however.
Also on Friday morning, Ed Wilson, Deputy Director 
of the United States Information Agency, was told of the 
nature of the forthcoming crisis. He was instructed to 
ensure that the President's speech, which would announce 
whatever course of action the United States would take, 
would be heard in Latin America, particularly in Cuba. He 
immediately began to make arrangements for this speech.
In an early morning meeting with the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the President impressed upon them that the blockade 
response was only tentatively approved. The "quarantine," 
as the President now termed the action, was favored by him, 
but he was not certain that this would be the response ulti­
mately chosen and put into effect. The Joint Chiefs had 
requested the meeting in order to impress upon the President 
their distaste for the blockade. They believed that the 
United States had to make a strong and forceful response to 
the missile threat; the air strike was their choice because 
it not only answered the Soviet challenge, but it also 
removed the threat which the missiles posed. Their 




Soviet Union would do nothing when faced with a resolute 
United States.
The opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff repre­
sented a major obstacle to the final choice of the blockade 
as the American response. Kennedy was waiting to make 
this decision until he had their support. If he were to 
choose the blockade approach, and it failed, he would then 
face serious political problems. Position papers of the 
Joint Chiefs would "leak" to the press, and the President 
would be placed in the untenable position of having "over­
ruled his military advisors on a military issue.
Others in addition to the Joint Chiefs opposed the 
blockade; such men as Acheson and McCone were important 
enough to force the President to also seek their support.
It was a situation in which the President was faced with 
choices or options that were initially mutually exclusive; 
in addition, no one of these options could guarantee the 
removal of the missiles without the grave risk of a nuclear 
war. The President was faced with a choice that had to be 
based upon calculated risks with extremely high stakes;
The response that he chose could prove successful, or it 
could fail miserably. If the response failed to achieve
Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 205. See also Abel, 
The Missile Crisis, p. LI. S . House Committee on Appropria-
tions. Hearings, p. 445, and U.S. House Committee on Armed 
Services, Hearings, p. 733.
^^^Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 205.
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the removal of the missiles, the President would face the 
possibility of great domestic political losses through 
attacks which disgruntled advisors might make upon him. 
While the fact that he had overruled his military advisors 
on a military matter might weaken his position if his 
response failed, so might the fact that he had overruled 
civilian advisors, including the head of the American 
intelligence establishment. Kennedy had to develop a 
consensus behind the response which he ultimately would 
choose; only in this way could he prevent his advisors from 
attacking his actions if the response which he chose
failed.IS?
After his meeting with the Joint Chiefs, Kennedy told
Sorenson of their position. Others were also expressing
doubts, and the President told Sorenson that he needed a
consensus behind the blockade if that were to be his choice.
The President had to leave Washington for several days on
a scheduled campaign trip; he would depart later Friday
morning. In his absence, Kennedy wanted Sorenson to work
with Robert Kennedy in "pulling things together." The
President was charging the two with the task of engineering
a consensus; when this was done, Robert Kennedy would call
158the President back to Washington for the final action.
lS?ibid.
158Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 692
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Ex Comm met in Ball's conference room on Friday 
morning. It was soon discovered that the near unanimity 
of the previous night had begun to fall apart. Acheson 
still maintained that the air strike was the only course 
open to the United States, and he was persuasive enough 
and prestigious enough to cause others to have doubts about 
the b l o c k a d e . O v e r  Sorenson's protests the arguments 
that had filled earlier meetings were reopened.
Those who favored the air strike once more put forth 
the argument that the missiles had to be removed before 
they could be made operational. This course might lead 
to war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
but there was no guarantee that the quarantine would remove 
the missiles without war. The blockade response gave the 
Soviets the time necessary to complete the installation of 
the missiles, and it also warned them of possible American 
action to forcibly remove these weapons. The Soviets would 
be allowed to strengthen their strategic position by in­
creasing their nuclear might and alerting their armed 
forces for possible war. The crisis, according to the 
supporters of the air strike, represented a test of wills; 
there would be a "showdown," and it was better that this 
confrontation take place in an environment in which the
1 SqHilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 206. 
^^^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , p. 806.
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the United States had every advantage possible. If there 
were to be war over the missiles, then this war would come 
with the initial American air strike, or it would come with 
the air strike that was required when the blockade failed. 
American political and strategic interests demanded that 
the missiles be removed, and the most feasible course to 
follow in removing them was the one which denied strength 
to the Soviet position. The argument that the blockade 
would prevent possible war was viewed as unsound. If 
there were to be war, the blockade would permit the Soviets 
to strengthen themselves for it; if there were to be no 
war, then a surgical air strike would not provoke one.^^^
Instead of developing a consensus behind the blockade. 
Ex Comm was splitting itself into factions favoring dif­
ferent courses of action. The arguments that were being 
presented were based on those that had been rejected in 
earlier meetings, but the support which had developed on
the previous day for the blockade was disintegrating on
1Friday morning.
Much of the conflict in the meeting was traceable to 
the strain of the crisis. The members of Ex Comm were be­
ginning to feel the toll of working long hours under
161Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 692. See also Schlesinger, 
A Thousand Days, p. 806.
162Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 44. See also Sorenson, 
Kennedy, p. 692.
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conditions in which they were asked to choose a course of 
action that might lead to nuclear devastation. There was 
no simple answer to the problem posed by the missiles; there 
were inherent weaknesses in every possible response, and 
opponents were quick to point them out. The participants 
were physically and mentally tired, and this fatigue was 
manifesting itself in anger and impatience.
Even after several days of discussion, the air strike 
and the blockade were still rather nebulous generalities; 
little had been done to crystallize them into the form 
which they would have to take if they were to be implemented, 
Sorenson thought that if he were to draft two speeches, each 
announcing to the world one of the two currently considered 
responses, the policies might be made more specific. This 
drafting, he thought, might provide Ex Comm with a better 
basis for its deliberations than the loose and general 
phrases which were presently being put forth as answers to 
the problem of the missiles. He returned to his office to 
draft these speeches.
Perhaps taking a cue from Sorenson, Ex Comm again 
split into two groups. Each of these groups was to care­
fully evaluate every facet of one of the responses; when
Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 44. See also Theodore 
Sorenson, Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive
Branch or the Arrows (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), p. 30.
164Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 692.
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discussion was completed, each group would present specific 
proposals for implementation of that response to the other 
for comments and questions. Bundy headed those who initially 
worked on the air strike, and U. Alexis Johnson and Paul 
Nitze headed those who worked on the blockade. During the 
afternoon, the groups exchanged papers, and each one dis­
sected and criticized the other's work. The papers were 
then returned for the development of answers to the criti­
cisms. Through this procedure, both groups were developing
definitive plans for the implementation of either course of 
165action.
The results of these efforts, however, did not solve 
the deadlock that existed between the two groups. In an 
afternoon meeting, Acheson again led those who supported 
the air strike against the proponents of the blockade; he 
maintained that the United States had to remove the missiles 
in order to satisfy its strategic interests. Robert Kennedy 
answered Acheson's attack with much the same argument that 
he had been presenting since Tuesday; the United States 
could not afford to launch a sneak attack against Cuba. 
American ideals and political reality made this impossible; 
a strike against Cuba represented a Pearl Harbor in reverse.
^^^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 44. See also Abel, The 
Missile Crisis, p. 72, and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 
WTl
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and the United States would pay too dearly for such an 
action, both internally and externally.
Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
listened to the debate between Robert Kennedy and Acheson 
on Friday; he decided that Robert Kennedy was right, at 
least in relation to his comments on the impossibility of 
a sneak attack. Taylor put forth a compromise which called 
for a warning that would precede an attack upon the missiles 
by twenty-four hours. This course of action was not a
sneak attack, but it had all the other drawbacks of the air 
strike.
The threat posed by the missiles had to be removed 
from the hemisphere, but it had to be done in such a way 
as to prevent damaging other American interests. It was 
not in the interest of the United States to see her allies 
or overseas bases intimidated or attacked by the Soviets, 
nor was it in her interest to engage in a nuclear exchange 
with the Soviet Union. The United States had to remove 
the missiles, but it had to do so with a minimal risk to 
international p e a c e . T h e  air strike would remove most, 
if not all, of the missiles, but there was a high degree 
of risk involved. The Soviets might react, emotionally or
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 73-74.
^^^Ibid.
^^^U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, December 31,
1962, p. 989.
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rationally, with an attack upon American bases, allies, or 
even the continental United States. The blockade would not 
remove the missiles directly, and it might not be success­
ful at all; this route was judged to have fewer risks of 
war than did the air strike, however. There was no simple 
response that would nullify the missile threat in an abso­
lute way without risking war between the two super-powers.
Sorenson returned to Ex Comm late Friday afternoon.
He had been unable to prepare the two speeches that he had 
left the earlier session to write. Most of his time had 
been spent in trying to answer several questions about the 
blockade which plagued him. He presented these questions to 
Ex Comm in order that the members might help him answer
them.169
Ex Comm was able to readily answer some of these 
questions; they dealt with the mechanics of applying the 
blockade, and Friday's sub-group sessions had developed 
elaborate and definitive plans for the implementation of 
either response. Two of the questions which Sorenson put 
before Ex Comm did not deal with mechanical applications, 
however; they were connected with substantive policy mat­
ters. First, how would the quarantine work to secure the 
removal of the missiles? Second, what could and would the 
United States do if the missiles became operable? In
169Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 692.
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attempting to answer these two questions, Ex Comm was able
170to develop a response which most members would support.
A consensus began to grow behind an amalgam of the 
blockade and the air strike approaches. The blockade was to 
be the first step; if it worked, then the matter would be 
settled without the great danger of war which the air strike 
entailed. If, however, the blockade did not work within a 
reasonable time, the United States would resort to an air 
strike upon the missiles. This response differed from the 
one that had been supported on Thursday night in that the 
two responses were now combined into the same policy. If 
the blockade did not work, the United States would mount an 
air strike; it was not a question of simply allowing the 
United States the opportunity to choose the air strike 
if it so desired. The air strike was an integral part of
171the proposed American reaction to the missiles. Acheson 
knew that in continuing to support the air strike as an 
initial move, he was supporting a response that would not 
be chosen, and he felt that his usefulness had ended; the
Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 75. See also Patrick 
Anderson, The President's Men: White House Assistants of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S.'"Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
John P. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson (Garden City, New York : 
Doubleday d Company, Inc., 1968), p. 295, and Sorenson, 
Kennedy, p. 692.
171Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 692. See also Abel, The
Missile Crisis, p. 731
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former Secretary of State left on Friday evening for his
172farm in Maryland.
A majority of the Ex Comm members were in support of 
the amalgam approach. According to this response, the 
United States would act to blockade Cuba as soon as was 
possible; if this action achieved the removal of the mis­
siles, then the more belligerent second part of the amalgam 
response, the air strike, would not be used. The rest of 
Friday evening was filled with preparations for the imple­
mentation of the quarantine.
Earlier, Thompson had said that the Russian mind had 
a great respect for law; while they did not always adhere 
to the strict interpretation of law, they usually did at­
tempt to prove the "legality" of their actions with a some­
what "twisted" logic. He felt that if the United States 
could gain the support of the Organization of American 
States, the American position would be improved. Nicholas 
Katzenbach of the Department of Justice, who had just 
joined Ex Comm at the behest of Robert Kennedy, agreed 
with this idea, as did Meeker of the State Department.
The three men were able to convince the others of their
position, and the preparations for assembling the inter-
173American body were made on Friday evening.
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 75.
17%Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 73. See also Robert 
D.Crane, "The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic Analysis of
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With his questions answered, Sorenson retired to 
write the speech with which the President would announce 
the American quarantine of Cuba. It was after 5:00 a.m. 
before he stopped writing.
October 20
Ex Comm met at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday. In this meet­
ing Sorenson presented the speech draft which he had pre­
pared. This draft, with minor amendments, was approved by 
the members. Following this approval, the Attorney General 
called his brother and asked that he return to Washington; 
the move toward consensus was gathering momentum, and
Robert Kennedy thought that the President would be able to
175soon make a decision with the full support of Ex Comm.
The President was in Chicago when he received the 
call from the Attorney General. Salinger was then called 
in to see the President, and he was told to issue a press 
release which stated that Kennedy had developed "a slight 
upper respiratory infection.” Because of this infection 
and a slight fever which accompanied it, Salinger was also
American and Soviet Policy,” Orbis, VI (Winter, 1963), 
542-543, and William P. Gerberding, "International Law and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Law and Political 
Crisis : An Analytical Casebook, ed. by Lawrence Sheinman
and bavid Wilkinson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1968) , p. 182.
174Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 693.
1 7 '>Abel, The Missile Crisis, p . 77.
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told to say, the President was canceling his campaign trip 
and returning to Washington.
Upon leaving the 9:00 a.m. meeting, McNamara stopped 
and called the Pentagon. He ordered four tactical squad­
rons prepared for a possible air strike against the missiles. 
He justified this order by saying that if the President did
not accept the recommendation of Ex Comm, there would be no
177time left in which to order this preparation.
Other military preparations were also under way on
Saturday. The American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
received reinforcements from the First Marine Division.
The First Armored Division began to move from its base at
Fort Hood, Texas, into the southeastern part of the United
States. At 8:12 a.m., a message alerting American bases
for unspecified trouble with Cuba was sent by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; all major American military bases received
this message. Whatever action the President chose to take,
178the military wanted to be ready.
The President arrived back in Washington at 1:40 p.m.
He immediately went for a swim in the White House pool in 
order to relax. His brother joined him there, and the two
^^^Salinger, With Kennedy, p. 252. 
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 77. 
IT^Ibid., pp. 77 and 81-82.
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talked until they left for the scheduled Ex Comm meeting 
179at 2:30 p.m.
The Saturday afternoon meeting of the Ex Comm was
composed of the entire National Security Council. Those
who had participated in the Ex Comm deliberations but who
were not members of the National Security Council were
also present. The participants arrived by different doors
at the White House; care was still being exercised to pre-
180vent outside knowledge of the Ex Comm deliberations.
The two initial responses with which the United States
had been concerned through most of the deliberations of
Ex Comm were once more put before the President, McNamara
presented the case for the blockade, and the Joint Chiefs
181of Staff presented the case for the air strike.
The supporters of the air strike, who still encom­
passed some civilians in their ranks, presented the Presi­
dent with the arguments which they had been presenting for 
several days. In addition, one of the members of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff now advocated the use of nuclear weapons in 
the proposed air strike; the justification which he offered 
was that the Soviet Union would use their nuclear weapons 
against the United States if the conditions were reversed.
1 7 9 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 47.
180Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 693. See also Kennedy, 
Thirteen Days, p. 4Fi
181Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 808.
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Robert Kennedy felt that the proposal was of questionable 
validity.
McNamara, in presenting his response, stressed once 
more that the United States should maintain its options. 
Either course of action had risks for the United States, 
but McNamara felt that the blockade response had fewer
TOT
risks than did the air strike. He believed that the 
greatest danger lay in the fact that the situation might 
escalate uncontrollably; there was a danger that Khrushchev 
would strike at the United States, but there, was an even 
greater danger that the matter would mushroom into some­
thing which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
184could manage. If the United States began with the
blockade, it would not preclude an eventual air strike, or 
even invasion. The United States had to choose the block­
ade response because it might remove the missiles and be­
cause there was far less danger of war inherent in it than 
in the air strike. If it did not remove the missiles, the 
United States would escalate its military response to the 
level of the air strike. The consensus that had been 
developing behind the amalgam of the blockade and the air
182 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 48. See also Schlesinger, 
A Thousand Days, pi 80S.
1 0  7
Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 78.
184U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings,
p. 85.
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strike was moving toward unanimity; McNamara’s case for
maintaining options was continuing to draw away support
185from the air strike as an initial response.
Rusk presented a summary of his stand at the Saturday 
meeting, also. He called for the blockade as the initial 
response to the missiles. The most important consideration 
to him was the fact that the air strike would be irrevers­
ible. This presentation represented a change in his stance 
from Thursday evening, but many of the members of Ex Comm 
were now shifting their support to the blockade.
Gilpatric summarized the choice facing the President.
He said that the President could choose between limited or 
unlimited action. The blockade represented a course based 
on limited action, and Gilpatric noted that most of the Ex
Comm members thought that it was the most desirable re- 
18 7sponse. The members did not have any faith in the
"balance of t e r r o r . T h e  fact that the United States and 
the Soviet Union could bring about mutual destruction was 
not seen as a deterrent to serious armed conflict between 
the two super-powers; there could be a nuclear conflagration.
185Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time of 
Crisis," The Saturday Evening Post, December 8, 1962, p. 20.
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 78.
187Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 693.
188George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company',' 1968) , ^  2 68.
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and any actions which could make this possibility more re­
mote were welcomed.
After the members of Ex Comm had presented their 
stands, the President indicated that he would begin with the 
limited response; the United States would impose a blockade 
upon offensive weapons being shipped to Cuba. This block­
ade would be called a "quarantine” in order to marshall as
189much international support for it as was possible.
The President chose the blockade because it repre­
sented a strong register of American protest and indigna­
tion at the missile presence in Cuba. The Soviets would 
see that the United States regarded the missiles as a 
serious threat to its strategic interests and that the 
United States intended to see the missiles removed. While 
it represented a relatively strong international action, 
it still left the Soviet Premier with a path for retreat.
The Soviet Union would not be placed in a corner; if there 
were war, then it would be because the Soviets did not re­
move the threat which they had thrust into the hemis- 
190phere. The President and the other members of Ex Comm
all felt that if the Russians were ready for nuclear war 
over Cuba, no course or response would avoid this most 
serious of all conflicts. It was thought that a war might
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 78. 
1 onSalinger, With Kennedy, p. 255.
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191as well come then as at some time in the future. If
the Soviets were not ready for war, then the American
quarantine would not push them toward that eventuality as
much as would an air strike.
Kennedy made it clear that the air strike was not
ruled out. If the blockade did not work, then the United
States would go to the air strike. The President also said
that he wanted to talk to the "air specialists" before he
finalized his decision; Ex Comm was to proceed, however,
as if the President had already designated the quarantine
192as the official American response.
When Kennedy had finished speaking, those who had
come to the meeting supporting the air strike were convinced
that the response which the President had outlined was es -
19 3sentially the most desirable. The consensus that Kennedy
sought had been achieved.
A bitter controversy developed in the meeting after 
the President had indicated what course of action the 
United States would take. It involved the question of 
what diplomatic moves the United States would make while 
it implemented the quarantine. Stevenson, the United
191 Alsop and Bartlett, "In Time of Crisis," p. 16.
1 9 7 Abel, The Missile Crisis, p . 78.
193Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 694. See also U.S. Presi­
dent, Public Papers', p. 8^7.
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Nations Delegate from the United States, began to propose
that the President offer to withdraw from the American
naval base at Guantanamo Bay in exchange for the removal of
the missiles. He also proposed that the United States might
trade the American missile bases in Turkey and Italy for
194the Soviet weapons in Cuba. Stevenson was proposing
that the United States negotiate on the missiles in order
195to lessen the danger of nuclear war.
Stevenson was immediately attacked for this proposal.
Dillon, McCone, and Lovett sharply criticized negotiating
196for the removal of the Soviet missiles. The President
rejected Stevenson's proposals; he said that the time was 
completely wrong for an American action of this nature. A 
major reason for any American response was to convince 
American allies that the United States was not irresolute 
and undependable. If the United States now acted to bargain 
with the missile bases in Turkey and Italy, or with the naval 
base at Guantanamo Bay, it would make the United States ap­
pear as if it would sacrifice the interests of its allies for
19 7its own security. Such a course of action was unthinkable.
194Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 49-50. See also Soren­
son, Kennedy, p. 6'95, and Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 79-80.
19 5Stewart Alsop, "Footnote to Historians," The 
Saturday Evening Post, January 26, 1963, p. 76.
1 Q6Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 80.
19 7Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 696. See also Kennedy,
Thirteen Days, pp. 49-50.
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The last few minutes of the meeting were spent in a 
discussion of the time at which the speech would be de­
livered. It was scheduled for Monday evening at 7:00. If 
it appeared that the news of the missiles were going to be 
made public, the President said that the speech might be 
delivered on Sunday. The United States wanted to ensure
that it announced the presence of the missiles in the
198speech announcing the American quarantine.
After the meeting, all the participants returned to
their offices to ensure that their preparations for the
199blockade of Cuba were complete.
October 21 and 22
Sunday morning at 9:00, Salinger was briefed by Bundy,
He was told of the missiles, the deliberations of Ex Comm,
and of the quarantine approach. Bundy explained that the
President would want to make a television announcement of
the blockade and that it probably would come on Monday 
200evening.
While Salinger was being briefed, orders were being 
prepared for the evacuation of Washington, if the need 
presented itself. White House personnel, as well as other
19 8Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 696-697. 
l^^ibid., p. 697.
^^^Salinger, With Kennedy, p. 254.
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high-ranking government personnel, were to be told to pack 
large bags of clothing and food; they were then to stand 
by for the order to evacuate. In the event of an attack, 
the government would provide a continuation of operations 
through these and other emergency plans that were also be­
ing developed.
The military had accepted the blockade, or quarantine,
because the amalgam approach represented a compromise. They
still desired an initial air strike, but they supported the
blockade because it did not rule out this action for the
future. If the blockade failed, then the United States
was committed to the removal of the missiles, no matter
202what this removal required.
In order to dispel the doubts of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff who still preferred the air strike as an initial 
response, Kennedy scheduled a Sunday morning meeting with 
the Tactical Air Command chief, General Walter C. Sweeney. 
Sweeney, several other Air Force officers. General Taylor, 
McNamara, and Robert Kennedy met with the President before 
church on October 21. The President asked Sweeney if he 
could remove all the missiles with a surgical air strike. 
Sweeney replied that he could not guarantee a one hundred 
per cent removal of the missiles; the best which could be
^^^Ibid., p. 256.
202 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 807.
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guaranteed, he said, was a ninety per cent removal. A clean 
surgical removal was a military impossibility, according to 
the head of the Tactical Air Command.
Kennedy said that if even ten per cent of the missiles 
remained following the air strike, they would be enough to 
seriously endanger American interests. The Soviet field 
commanders who had suffered from the air strike might 
launch their missiles independently of orders from the 
Soviet Union. In addition, the air strike included the 
targeting of air fields and other military sites besides 
the missiles. The bombing of these targets would cause the 
death of many Cuban civilians. Under these conditions. 
President Kennedy rendered a final decision that the quar­
antine choice was the correct one.^^^ The initial American 
action would be based upon the blockade response.
An Ex Comm meeting was held at 10:00 a.m. in the 
White House. The group went over the third draft of the 
speech which the President was going to use in announcing 
the blockade to the world. A suggestion was made to in­
clude an indictment of Castro in the speech, but this sug­
gestion was overruled; the members did not want to allow 
Khrushchev a "scapegoat." McNamara argued for a simpli­
city and clarity in the speech; he said that the purpose
203Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 48-49. See also 
Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 697, and Abel, The Missile Crisis, 
p. 84.
^^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 84-85.
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of the quarantine was to remove the missiles and that the
speech should concentrate on presenting that message. In
addition, Stevenson made a point about ensuring that the
phrasing of the speech left the Soviets with no loopholes
which they might use to provide themselves with diplomatic
delay. The meeting then ended, and preparations for the
j 205quarantine were continued.
Kennedy met with David Ormsby-Gore, the British Ambas­
sador, a little after noon on Sunday. He explained the 
nature of the crisis to the diplomat, and without telling 
which response the United States had chosen he asked the 
Briton what course of action he thought was best. The 
ambassador pleased the President by picking the blockade 
as the proper response under the circumstances.
The secret of the crisis was beginning to break on 
Sunday. Washington was beginning to suspect that something 
was happening. In order to ensure as much secrecy as was 
still possible, the President had three of his top aides 
come to the White House where they were to make themselves 
conspicuous. Averill Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs, Martin Hillenbrand, of the German 
Affairs Office, and Philips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs, sat in the White House for
^°^Ibid., pp. 87-89. 
ZO^Ibid., p. 89.
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several hours on Sunday. The result of this action was to
initiate rumors that the impending crisis involved Berlin
or the Chinese-Indian dispute. Meanwhile Ex Comm assembled
by entering the White House through a tunnel which led from
207the Treasury Department.
Ex Comm’s second Sunday meeting was held at 2:30 p.m. 
Kennedy reviewed the preparations for the implementation of 
the quarantine. The instructions to American diplomats, 
Presidential letters to American allies, and the approaches 
to the United Nations and the Organization of American 
States were carefully studied. A decision was made to agree 
to United Nations inspection of the missile sites to ensure 
that they had been removed, if occasion for this inspection 
arose. When Ex Comm had examined the diplomatic prepara­
tions, Admiral George Anderson, the Chief of Staff for the 
Navy, was asked to present the plans and procedures for the 
implementation of the quarantine. Ex Comm was told that 
the Navy would request that all ships headed for Cuban 
ports stop for boarding and inspection. If a ship failed 
to comply with this request the naval vessel issuing the 
request would fire a warning shot across the bow of the 
uncooperative ship. If this action failed to stop the
Cuban-bound ship, then the American naval vessel would fire
20 8into the ship's rudder assembly, thus crippling it.
ZO^lbid., pp. 85-86.
208Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 698.
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Most of the 2:30 meeting, however, was concerned with 
a detailed review of the speech which would announce the 
blockade to the world. Steps were taken to ensure that the 
speech did not alarm the American people to the extent that 
there was a national panic; certain words and phrases were 
deleted or replaced to achieve this end. Any part of the 
speech which dealt with multi-lateral actions or delibera­
tions was carefully worded so as to prevent any interpreta­
tion which would limit the United States in exercising what­
ever options it chose in seeking to provide for its own 
security. A decision was made to admit U-2 surveillance; 
it was to be justified as necessary, and it was to find 
virtue in this "necessity." Finally, the members of Ex 
Comm attempted to ensure that the wording of the speech 
anticipated and forestalled any Soviet response elsewhere 
in the world; this effort was directed at carefully deline­
ating the crisis so as to include only Cuba, the missiles,
7f)Qand the Soviets.
Many other changes in the speech were made during the
remainder of the day. As these changes were made, they
were rushed to the State Department and to the United States
210Information Agency. These deletions, additions, or sub­
stitutions covered a wide variety of subjects, but their
ZO^Ibid., pp. 698-700. 
Zl^Ibid., p. 700.
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impact upon the quarantine policy was negligible. The 
major decision had been made on the previous day, and it 
had been verified in the morning meeting with General 
Sweeney; the United States would respond to the presence 
and the threat of the Soviet missiles with a military block­
ade of Cuba. If this course of action did not achieve the 
removal of the missiles, then the United States would take 
further military action to achieve this end.
At 11:30 on Monday morning, the President again met
with Ex Comm. The purpose of the meeting was to approve
211the final draft of the President's quarantine speech.
The rest of the day was filled with the hurried preparations 
for the President's address and the application of the re­
sponse which it would outline.
Many officials, both American and foreign, learned of 
the missiles and the- American decision to quarantine Cuba 
on Monday. Those members of the President's Cabinet who 
did not already know were told of the impending crisis in 
a 4:00 p.m. Cabinet meeting. American legislative leaders 
learned of the missiles and the quarantine in a 5:00 p.m. 
meeting with the President; the meeting was disappointing to 
Kennedy because the Congressmen were not pleased with the 
President's proposed response, with some of the bitterest 
opposition coming from his own party's leaders. The 
foreign diplomats in Washington were briefed in a series
711Abel, The Missile Crisis, pp. 98-99
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of meetings which were held shortly before the address; 
most of these people were told in groups, but the Soviet 
Ambassador was told privately in a meeting with Rusk.
In addition to those who were briefed in Washington 
on Monday, other important officials were told of the con­
tent of the President's speech prior to its delivery.
Special envoys briefed the leaders of the major American 
allies on Monday morning. These leaders included the 
British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, the French Presi­
dent, Charles de Gaulle, the German Chancellor, Conrad 
Adenauer, and the Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker. 
These men offered their support to the President and to the 
United States.
At 7:00 p.m., the President went before the television 
cameras and the radio microphones; there he made public the 
causes, the nature, and the purpose of the American quaran­
tine of Cuba. The deliberations of Ex Comm thus had led 
to the application of the response which its members had 
deemed most desirable.
^^^Ibid., pp. 96-104.
CHAPTER III: AN ANALYSIS
The preceding chapter has presented a history of the 
American decision to quarantine Cuba in 1962. Before ana­
lyzing this decision in terms of the hypotheses developed 
in Paige's study of the American decision to intervene in 
chc Korean War in 1950, some attention must be directed to 
Paige's concept of sequential sub-decisions.
Paige spoke of the Korean decision as both a single 
decision and as a sequence of sub-decisions. He felt that 
there were several sub-decisions which were similar enough 
to be regarded as part of the process which produced the 
final American commitment. These sub-decisions represented 
a process of escalation; with the exception of the first, 
each led to a greater military commitment on the part of 
the United States. The first sub-decision, on June 24, was 
to call for a Security Council meeting in which the problem 
posed by the North Korean invasion would be discussed. The 
second was reached the following day. The United States, 
it was decided, would adopt a strong posture of opposition 
and would endeavor to supply the Republic of Korea with 
needed military equipment. On June 26, the commitment of 
American air-sea forces was accepted by the decision-makers;
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in addition, the United States acted to neutralize the 
Straits of Formosa to prevent difficulties from developing 
through some kind of confrontation between the two China's. 
On June 29, the United States decided that it should extend 
its air-sea military action to North Korean territorial 
areas; it was also decided to use American ground troops to 
help protect the Americans who were being evacuated from 
Korea. On June 30, two sub-decisions were reached. Early 
on that day a decision was made to commit one regimental 
combat team in support of the South Koreans; later that 
day this commitment of ground troops was expanded to include 
the discretionary use of all ground troops under the command 
of General Douglas MacArthur, the American commander in the 
Far East. The United States, through the decision to com­
mit ground troops to the defense of the South Koreans, had 
fully intervened in the Korean War.^
It is difficult to accept the view that the decision 
to commit ground troops to the defense of the South Koreans 
was the result of a sequence of sub-decisions leading to 
this final commitment; it is more realistic to view the 
nature and the extent of the American intervention as the 
product of a series of related but discrete decisional 
processes, each of which produced a separate and discrete 
decision. The first decisional process might be said to
^Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30,
1950 (New York: Free Press , 1968) , pp. 2TS-2 8'd.
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have begun with the American notice of the North Korean 
attack and ended with the decision to commit air and sea 
forces to the defense of South Korea. The following de­
cisions were expansions of this initial response. When 
the American commitment of air-sea forces was not sufficient 
to enable the South Koreans to ward off the North Korean 
attack, the United States decided to extend its commitment 
of these forces to include their use in North Korea itself. 
When this expansion of the American commitment proved in­
effective in stemming the Communist invasion, the United 
States decided to commit one regimental combat team to the 
battle. Later, this commitment was expanded to include the 
possible use of all ground troops under MacArthur's command. 
The final commitment of large numbers of ground troops was 
the product of an environment which included all previous 
decisions, but each of these previous decisions had been 
made with the hope that the actions which they entailed 
would halt the North Korean invasion. Each of these pre­
vious decisions would probably have been terminal had this 
goal been achieved. Each was the product of a new set of 
stimuli which included the failure of the previous responses, 
and each was set apart from the other decisions because the 
differing sets of stimuli produced differing decisional en­
vironments. Even though the core of the decisional unit 
remained the same, the decisional processes differed because 
of these alterations to their environments. The essence of
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the decision-making approach is to study separate decisions
2so as to understand why they were made; Paige seemingly 
clouded his work by combining several decisions and studying 
them as if they were one.
Paige analyzed several separate decisions, but he
chose to refer to his analysis as the study of a single
decision, that of the American decision to intervene in
Korea in June of 1950. This was particularly damaging in
regard to his hypothesized stages of a crisis decisional 
3process.
According to Paige, a crisis decisional process pro­
ceeds through four distinct stages, each following the other 
in the manner in which they are presented below. First, 
there is a stage in which the crisis-producing stimulus is 
categorized and a general frame of reference for the crisis 
is established. Second, there is a stage in which a will­
ingness to respond is established and the capabilities for 
response are inventoried. Third, there is a stage in which 
a specific positive response is chosen and a decision is 
made to commit resources. Fourth and finally, there is a 
stage in which the amount and kind of the resources so
2Cf. James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of 
Decision-Making Analysis," Contemporary Political Analysis, 
ed. by James C. CharleswortE (New York : Free Press, 1967),
pp. 194-195.
^For a full discussion and presentation of Paige's 
hypothesized decisional process stages, see Paige, The 
Korean Decision, pp. 276-278.
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committed are progressively expanded or escalated. The 
first; second, and third stages represent the patterns of 
action which Paige observed in the initial decisional 
process, or the one which ended with the commitment of the 
United States to the defense of South Korea through the 
limited use of American air and sea forces in the area.
The fourth stage represents the patterns observed when the 
following decisions to expand the military commitment were 
included as part of the American decision to intervene.
The expansion of the military commitment represented 
modifications of the initial commitment, and, as stated 
earlier, they were necessarily separate from it for that 
reason. Not only the reality of the Korean decision, how­
ever, but also the logic of the decision-making approach 
negates Paige’s hypothesized fourth stage; the decision­
making approach is based on the concept of discrete deci­
sions and decision-making processes which produce discrete 
decisions.^ The conscious modification of a previous de­
cision must entail a separate decisional process which in­
cludes knowledge of the previous decision in an altered de­
cisional environment, altered if for no other reason than the 
fact that the previous decision now exists. Two decisional 
processes cannot be combined and studied as one, nor can
Cf. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, 
"Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International 
Politics," Foreign Policy Decision-Making, ed. by Richard C. 
Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 89-92.
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their products be combined and studied as a single decision. 
It can also be argued that if a decision is to be modified, 
then it must exist, but if it exists, then according to the 
definition of a decision-making process,^ the process which 
produced it has ended. A modification or alteration then 
must represent a separate decision produced by a separate 
decisional process. Paige's fourth stage is invalid not 
only because he failed to differentiate between decisions 
that pertained to the American military commitment in Korea, 
but also because he ignored the boundaries which are imposed 
upon the decision-making approach by its very nature.
The first three stages would seem to be a statement of 
the obvious; they represent a logical progression of actions 
directed toward a rational policy choice, and they could 
easily be hypothesized on an a priori basis. They are not 
in conflict with the main body of decision-making theory, 
and the likelihood that they exist is supported not only by 
Paige's study, but also by the data obtained in the study 
of the quarantine decision.
The first stage consists of the categorization of 
the stimulus and the range of possible responses. The Ex
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin define decision-making as 
"a process which results in the selection from a socially 
defined, limited number of problematical, alternative 
projects of one project intended to bring about the particu­
lar future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-maker." 
(Project refers to a policy or course of action in the con­
text of this definition.) Cf. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 
"Decision-Making," p. 90.
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Comm meetings on the first day were primarily concerned with 
evaluating the Soviet move and possible American responses. 
The concern with American responses would carry beyond 
this initial stage, but it was on the first day that the 
attempts to outline all possible responses were made. Ex 
Comm was attempting to bring forth all possibilities in 
order to give perspective to the more detailed discussions 
that would follow the initial meetings. The concern with 
possible Soviet motives would also enter the Ex Comm dis­
cussions at a later time, but it was in the first Ex Comm 
meeting that the Soviet move was accepted by all as an im­
portant threat to American interests. The experience of 
Ex Comm tends to substantiate this first of Paige's hypo­
thesized stages.
The second stage, according to Paige, consists of 
the determination of a willingness to act and the in-depth 
study of the possible responses outlined in the previous 
stage. In the case of the quarantine decision, the Presi­
dent attended the first meeting determined to act; he 
charged Ex Comm with helping him decide what policy would 
best serve American interests, but he had already decided 
that some response would be made. Paige referred to this 
willingness to act as one that was shared by the members 
of a decisional unit. The development of this shared 
willingness to act encompassed almost all of the Ex Comm 
deliberations; the whole purpose of the Ex Comm meetings
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on Friday, October 19, was to create unanimity in favor of 
the blockade choice. In addition, most of the week was 
spent in arguing for or against specific responses; Ex Comm 
was attempting to develop a shared willingness to either 
blockade Cuba or mount an air strike against her. During 
these arguments, it should be noted, in-depth studies of 
the possible responses were made. From the initial cate­
gorization of the threat and the possible responses, until 
the quarantine policy was adopted, Ex Comm was concerned 
with what policy would best serve American interests; this 
would seem to strengthen Paige's hypothesis that a second 
stage exists in a crisis decisional process in which the 
decisional unit determines a willingness to act and studies 
the possible actions open to it.
Paige's third stage was one which consists of the 
articulation (or choice) of a particular response. That 
this stage existed in the quarantine decisional process is 
attested to by the quarantine decision itself, or the 
product of the terminal act of this decisional unit in 
this particular decisional environment.
Perhaps the most realistic typology of stages within 
a crisis decisional process is one that hypothesizes the 
first stage as one in which is found the perception of a 
threat and a need for a response. The second stage could 
be termed the deliberative stage, or that stage in which 
all discussion or thought as to what response would best
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serve a nation's interests is conducted. The third stage 
could be said to consist of the enunciation of a particular 
response. This represents a modification of Paige's hypo­
thesized typology which would be applicable to both the 
process which produced the decision to intervene in Korea 
and the process which produced the decision to quarantine 
Cuba. It should be noted that this very simple typology 
may be all that can be said to be universally valid; one 
might be able to hypothesize that a function will occur, 
but it is much different to hypothesize when the function 
will occur. The nature of the decisional process which 
produced the quarantine decision was rather unstructured 
and sometimes repetitive, and it would be difficult to 
hypothesize a typology of crisis decisional stages that was 
more specific than the one presented above.
Much attention has been paid to Paige's stages.of a 
crisis decisional process because they are important to 
his summarization of his other empirical findings; the 
crisis decisional stages serve as the framework for the 
summarization of his empirical work.^ Since his fourth 
stage does not exist in the case of the quarantine decision, 
and since this fourth stage is also open to serious question 
on theoretical grounds, a summarization based upon this 
typology is worthless, especially insofar as the comparative
^See Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 315-321, for a 
presentation of this summarization.
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nature of this immediate study is concerned. By including 
the fourth stage in his hypothesized stages of a decisional 
process, Paige destroyed any claim to universality which 
this typology might have had, and he also made his summari­
zation of his results suspect.
The main thrust of Paige's work lay, however, in his 
empirically grounded propositions which he put forth re­
garding the decision-making variables of organization, in-
7
formation, and values, as well as propositions concerning 
the internal and external settings of a crisis decisional 
event. These propositions were to serve as the basis for 
an explanation of a crisis decision; Paige's summarization 
was intended to provide this explanation. Even though their 
summarization is useless because of the nature of Paige's 
typology of decisional stages, the individual propositions 
remain.
Unlike the typology of decisional stages, the empiri­
cally grounded propositions regarding the decision-making 
variables and the settings of a crisis decision were based 
upon single decisional processes. Paige developed these 
propositions through an exhaustive analysis of the Korean 
decision as he had defined it, but the observations were
7These are simplified terms which Paige used in place 
of "organizational roles and relations," "communication and 
information," and "motivation," the terms originally used 
by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin. Paige's terms are simpler 
terms with which to work, and this study will also adopt 
them, both for clarity and for simplicity.
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based upon individual events, actions, relationships, 
problems, and other such properties. These propositions 
were based upon the integral parts of the processes pro­
ducing individual and discrete decisions rather than the 
over-all aspects of a sequence of decisions. In many in­
stances, the properties of more than one decisional process 
were used as the basis for a proposition, but each charac­
teristic (or the observed property from each decisional 
process) stood alone; the results were not the sum of the 
parts, but rather were representative of what each indi­
vidual observation indicated. While Paige proposed a 
typology of crisis decisional stages that was invalid be­
cause it was based on something other than a single crisis 
decisional process, his propositions regarding decision­
making variables were saved by the nature of the observa­
tions upon which they were based.
Paige presented these propositions in groupings which 
were based upon the nature of the decision-making variable 
to which they pertained. In addition, some of the proper­
ties had corollaries which served to expand or clarify the 
parent concepts. These empirically generated propositions 
represented the effects of a crisis upon a decision-making 
process; they were the characteristics which Paige hypo­
thesized would exist in a process producing a crisis de­
cision, and which would serve to provide an understanding 
of such a process.
133
These propositions will be analyzed in the remaining 
portion of this chapter; each variable will be considered 
separately, and the propositions which pertain to it will 
be examined in light of the characteristics which the 
quarantine decisional process possessed. Other, new propo­
sitions will also be offered, but they will be based solely 
upon the nature of the quarantine decisional process; their 
general applicability will be in question until they too 
can be compared with the characteristics of other crisis 
decisional processes. The summarization of these results, 
together with an evaluation of the decision-making approach, 
will be presented in the following chapter.
Organizational Propositions
The first set of propositions that this study will 
analyze is that pertaining to the variable of organization 
within a crisis decisional unit.
Paige's first proposition was that the decisional 
unit producing a crisis decision tends to be ad hoc in
g
nature. This proposition is supported by the nature of
Ex Comm. The members were chosen by President Kennedy in 
order that they might counsel him; they were specially 
convened to help decide what course of action the United 
States would take in meeting the challenge of the Soviet 
offensive capability in Cuba. He did not use his Cabinet,
g
Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 281,
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although some of these members were participants in Ex Comm. 
The President brought together military men, diplomats, 
and others, both inside and outside the government, and in 
doing so, he created an ad hoc committee to deal with a
9special problem upon which he desired advice. The quaran­
tine decision was the product of this ad hoc committee, or 
decisional unit, and this bolsters the general applicability 
of Paige’s proposition.
Paige’s second proposition was that decisional units 
that produce crisis decisions tend to have narrow limits 
in terms of size and composition.^^ Paige believed that 
such decisional units would vary in size from twelve to 
fifteen m e m b e r s , b u t the decisional unit which produced
the quarantine decision consisted of approximately twenty 
12people. Paige’s numerical limits are not then valid for 
all crisis decisional units, yet his second proposition is 
not seriously weakened by this. While the numerical limits 
which he set are not acceptable, the idea that certain 
limits do exist is supported by the quarantine decision. 
Kennedy asked certain key advisors to aid him in choosing
^Supra, pp. 47-48.
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 285.
l^Ibid. , p. 286.
12Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days : A Memoir of the
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton § Company,
Inc. , 1968) , ^  30. See also Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy 
(New York: Harper  ̂Row, Publishers, 1965), pp. 674-675.
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a response to the missile presence in Cuba; the number of 
people who knew of the crisis was limited so as to ensure 
secrecy, yet the President sought to have adequate repre­
sentation of both the Department of State and the Department 
of Defense, as well as representation of other interests or 
opinions which he valued. The need for secrecy set an 
upper limit upon the size of the group while the need for •
adequate representation of those whom the President sought
13for advice set a lower limit. Given a limited number of
members and a desired combination of represented interests,
President Kennedy could not allow any single department or
set of interests to be either under or over represented if
14Ex Comm were to serve the purpose which he set before it. 
Thus, Paige's hypothesis that certain limits exist regard­
ing the size and composition of a crisis decisional group 
is substantiated by the analysis of the quarantine decisional 
process.
13Paige indicated that this was also evident in the 
Korean decisional unit. Cf. Paige, The Korean Decision, 
p. 285.
^^It should be noted that an evaluation of the quaran­
tine decisional process does not give evidence that the 
composition of Ex Comm was carefully calculated so as to 
maximize the President's desires; it was an ad hoc unit that 
had members added to it as the President saw fit, and that 
had members leave it because of pressing business elsewhere. 
Its membership was fluid, but this does not negate the fact 
the President sought to include those who could best counsel 
him while ensuring that few people knew of the crisis, thus 
limiting both the size and composition of Ex Comm.
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Paige also hypothesized three corollaries to his 
second organizational proposition. The first was that the 
more costly the anticipated response or policy, the greater 
is the size of the decisional unit up to a psychological 
and physical l i m i t . T h i s  corollary introduced the concept 
of comparative magnitude, or the idea that the characteris­
tics of different decisional processes can be compared in 
terms of intensity or degree. This was based upon Paige's 
analysis of the several decisions which composed what he 
designated as the Korean decision. In order to facilitate 
comparison between the Korean decision and the quarantine 
decision, this corollary must be reworded so as to remove 
the concept of comparative magnitude. The two decisions do 
not lend themselves to comparisons based upon comparative 
magnitude because of the difficulty in assigning to the 
properties of each some value or weight relative to the 
properties of the other; the decisions were the product of 
different decisional environments, and one would have to 
compare the totality of these environments to be able to 
validly assign such comparative values. This is certainly 
beyond the scope of this study if not impossible in any 
event.
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 285.
^^To say that the quarantine decision was "more" or 
"less costly" than the Korean decision, is to compare two 
different decisional environments. These decisional en­
vironments are the product of national and international 
political environments, human attitudes and values, tech­
nological abilities and achievements, national strengths
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When Paige's first corollary to his second organiza­
tional proposition is altered so as to exclude the concept 
of comparative magnitude, the result is the proposition 
that an anticipated costly crisis commitment tends to be 
made by a large decisional unit limited in size by psycho­
logical and physical factors. The physical factor that
Paige referred to was that of the capacity of the meeting
17rooms in which the Korean decisional unit convened.
While knowledge of the seating capacity of all of the rooms 
in which Ex Comm met is not available, it is certain that 
there were finite limits. More important, the psychologi­
cal limits of which Paige spoke were related to the desire 
for secrecy and the sense of adequate representation of all 
related interests. That such feelings set an upper limit
and capabilities, and many other such factors. In addition, 
much of the data wouDd have to be based upon personal evalua­
tions rather than upon something which was quantifiable.
The two decisions are comparable in that they both are 
crisis decisions and that they both possess certain common 
characteristics or properties, but to go beyond this is 
unsound. To say that one decision is, in some way, of 
greater magnitude than the other is a value judgement. With 
the complexity of all of the factors that would comprise the 
two decisional environments, such a value judgement would at 
best be an "educated guess." Some of Paige's other proposi­
tions concerning organization and other variables also in­
corporate the concept of comparative magnitude, and these 
propositions have the same weaknesses described above.
Some of these propositions can be reworded to remove the 
concept of magnitude, thus leaving a proposition which can 
be evaluated in terms of the analysis of the quarantine 
decision. This will be done where it is possible to do so. 
This rewording will be done in such a manner as to present 
the essence of the proposition in as unaltered a form as 
is possible.
17Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 286.
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upon the size of Ex Comm has been demonstrated in the dis­
cussion related to the second organizational proposition. 
Given the nature of these psychological limits, one can say 
that Ex Comm was a relatively large group; it is conceivable 
that it could have included far fewer people than it ulti­
mately entailed. From the analysis of the quarantine de­
cision, the general applicability of a revised version of 
Paige’s first corollary is strengthened.
The second corollary to Paige's second organizational 
proposition stated that the more immediate the sensed 
need for action, the smaller the decisional unit tends to 
be when any one of three other conditions is also present. 
These three other conditions are: one, when the commitment
is not too costly; two, when the commitment is revocable;
and three, when the commitment is anticipated as being
18widely acceptable. This corollary also has the concept 
of comparative magnitude present within it, but even if it 
were reworded, it cannot be substantiated by the quarantine 
decision. There was certainly an element of urgency in Ex 
Comm’s deliberations, especially after the group was told 
of the introduction of intermediate range ballistic mis­
siles and the speed with which both the intermediate and 
medium range missiles were being i n s t a l l e d . T h e r e  was.
l^ibid.
^^Supra, pp. 81, 85, and 92
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however, no one of the other three listed conditions present,
in any degree, in the quarantine decisional process. Both
the commitments which were seriously studied by Ex Comm were
2 0costly, and both were irrevocable. In addition, it was 
not known how either response would be received in the United 
States or in the rest of the world. This corollary is not 
then supported by the analysis of the quarantine decisional 
process.
The third corollary to Paige's second organizational 
proposition should have been expressed as a separate propo­
sition rather than as a corollary because it does not really 
pertain to limitations of size or composition. He stated 
that appropriate specialists play a greater role within a
decisional unit as the problems of decision implementation
21become more technical. While this proposition also con­
tains the concept of comparative magnitude, the comparison
can be made in an intra-decisional analysis rather than an
2 2inter-decisional one. In the quarantine decisional
20The air strike was irrevocable by its very nature, 
and the blockade was irrevocable because it was seen as an 
initial move that, if unsuccessful, would be escalated into 
a more forceful action.
21Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 287.
2 2The first corollary to the second organizational 
proposition was composed of a hypothesized relationship 
that existed between the degree of cost of a commitment and 
the size of the decisional unit rendering the decision. 
Since there was no meaningful variation in the size of Ex 
Comm, the only way that such a proposition could have been 
checked would have been to compare the cost of commitments 
put forth by the quarantine and Korean decisional units.
If such a comparison could have been made, then it could
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process, the problem of decision implementation became more 
technical as the majority of the members came to support 
the blockade response. From Thursday evening until Sunday 
morning, it was clear that the President and a majority of 
Ex Comm's membership favored the blockade response, but the 
President did not finalize this decision until after he 
talked with General Sweeney, head of the Tactical Air Com­
mand. President Kennedy sought the counsel of the man most 
qualified to comment upon the effectiveness of an air strike
in order to dispel doubts about the desirability of the
23blockade policy. Also during this period, many of the 
more specialized aspects of the blockade response were 
charged to people with an expertise in an area pertaining 
to one of these more specialized aspects. The development 
of a legal basis for such an action was delegated to legal
have been set against the differences in size of the two 
decisional units so as to prove or disprove Paige's hypo­
thesized relationship. Such an inter-decisional endeavor 
would have required the comparison of the total decisional 
environments, an undertaking that has been explained as 
virtually impossible.
The third corollary to Paige's second organizational 
proposition lends itself to intra-decisional comparison, 
however. There is data in the study of the quarantine 
decisional process which enables one to check the proposi­
tion even though it deals with a relationship involving 
comparative magnitude. In such an instance, the type of 
relationship existing in each decisional situation can then 
be compared without the difficulty of assigning a greater 
or lesser degree of magnitude to a property in one de­




experts in both the Department of Justice and the Depart­
ment of State.Sorenson, the President's speech writer, 
was charged with preparing the speech which would announce 
the blockade to the world. The Department of Defense was 
ordered to take the necessary steps to prepare for the im­
plementation of the blockade and to develop an operational 
plan of procedures; it was also ordered to prepare a list
2 ̂of materials which should not be allowed onto the island.
The minutiae of detailed planning and implementation were 
being handled by specialists so as to ensure that the block­
ade, if it were chosen, would maximize the American strate­
gic, legal, and political positions in the confrontation 
that would follow. In both the Korean and quarantine 
decisional processes, then, the more technical matters of 
decision implementation tended to be directed by appropriate 
specialists within the decisional units.
Paige's third organizational proposition was that the 
greater the crisis, the greater is the desire for "face-to- 
face proximity" among the members of the decisional unit. 
Since the two crises cannot be compared in terms of degree, 
this proposition must be reworded; it then becomes the 
statement that crisis tends to elicit a desire for
Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 691-692. See also Elie Abel, 
The Missile Crisis (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1966),
p . 68.
^^Supra, pp. 93-94 and 107.
7 APaige, The Korean Decision, p. 288.
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face-to-face proximity among the members of a decisional 
unit. The nature of some of the President's self-imposed 
absences from Ex Comm would seem to challenge this proposi­
tion. Kennedy sought to ensure that there would be free­
dom of discussion within the meetings by absenting himself 
from them, and he was counseled in this by Sorenson and by 
his brother, the Attorney General. It could be argued 
that this was an extraordinary manuever, but it still 
represented the feeling that at least the President's face- 
to-face proximity was not altogether desirable. In addi­
tion, the actions of Acheson and Stevenson in avoiding 
sessions in which the other was in attendance would tend 
to weaken Paige's proposal. Note should be made of Soren­
son's absence from some of the Friday Ex Comm meetings.
He was drafting two announcement speeches, and he may have 
been able to do this more effectively by himself. This 
would seem to be proof, however, that he did not feel a 
great need for face-to-face proximity. Finally, Ex Comm's 
tendency to split itself into groups should indicate that 
the members did not base their actions upon a desire for
the physical propinquity of the members of their decisional
2 7unit. In the face of the observations made above, it 
would seem that neither the original nor the revised version 
of Paige's third organizational proposition is generally 
applicable to crisis decisional processes.
^^Supra, pp. 64-65, 80, 85, and 100-101.
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Paige's fourth proposition stated that the greater the 
crisis, the greater is the tendency to accentuate "positive 
affect relationships" among the members of the decisional 
unit. Paige was proposing that close, personal relation­
ships among the members of a decisional unit tend to be
related to a harmony of views under crisis conditions;
2 8the greater the crisis, the greater this tendency is.
Because the Korean and missile crises cannot be compared in 
terms of which represented a greater crisis setting, this 
proposition must be reworded; without the concept of com­
parative magnitude, the proposition becomes the statement 
that in a crisis, positive affect relationships among 
decision makers tend to be accentuated. Perhaps the 
closest relationships that existed between members of Ex 
Comm were those between the President and his speech 
writer, Ted Sorenson, and the President and his brother, 
Robert Kennedy. While the President initially seemed to 
favor the air strike, both of these key advisors were op­
posed to this action. The President later came to favor 
the blockade over the air strike, but there is no discern­
ible link between this change and the President's relation­
ships with these two men. Certainly their opposition to the 
air strike caused him to examine the possible choices more 
carefully, as did the opposition of other important ad­
visors, such as Secretary of Defense McNamara and Under
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 288-289.
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Secretary of State Ball. To say that his relationships with 
these men caused him to choose the blockade over the air
strike is to put forth an evaluation that cannot be sup­
ported with available data, however. Another close rela­
tionship within Ex Comm was that which existed between Rusk
29and his former chief, ex-Secretary of State Dean Acheson; 
Rusk’s respect for Acheson was evidenced by the fact that 
Rusk sought counsel from Acheson on the morning of the first 
day of Ex Comm's meetings. After Acheson joined Ex Comm, 
however. Rusk’s stand, while unclear at times, was markedly 
different from the stand which Acheson took. Acheson was 
never converted to the blockade response; Rusk favored the 
blockade, and he even spoke rather forcefully for it in
the final stages of the decisional process.
In discussing this fourth organizational proposition, 
Paige said that "negative affect relationships" did not 
seem to be accentuated in the same manner as positive affect
31relationships. In the quarantine decisional process, 
however, the relationship between Stevenson and Acheson 
kept them from attending meetings together, and they were 
unalterably on opposing sides. Stevenson sought to prevent
7QCf. Michael J. O ’Neill, "The Quiet Diplomat: Dean
Rusk," in The Kennedy Circle, ed. by Lester Tanzier (Wash­
ington, D. C.: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1961), pp. 111-112
and 131.
^^Supra, pp. 104-105 and 110-111.
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 288-289.
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a belligerent action, such as the air strike, while Acheson
promoted the air strike as the only course which the United
32States should take under the circumstances. It would 
seem that positive or negative affect relationships did 
not produce the same effects in the two crisis decisional 
groups. It is not clear just what effect Sorenson's or 
Robert Kennedy's opposition to the air strike had upon the 
President, but it is clear that there was no harmony of 
opinions between Rusk and Acheson. In addition, the negative 
relationship that existed between Acheson and Stevenson 
hampered the chances for any agreement between the two. 
Paige's fourth organizational proposition, and his related 
comments, indicate that there was a difference in the way 
prior relationships affected the participants in the two 
decisional groups. It would seem plausible that prior 
relationships would have some affect upon the participants 
in a decisional unit, but just what affect these relation­
ships would have is unclear. It is likely that other as­
pects of a particular decisional unit and its setting 
affect the manner in which prior relationships will con­
dition its activities; just what these other factors may be 
is not discernible in either the Korean or quarantine de­
cisional processes. In any event, Paige's fourth organi­
zational proposition is not generally applicable given the 
characteristics of the quarantine decisional process.
^^Supra, pp. 64-65, 79-80, 104-105, and 112-113,
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Paige's fifth organizational proposition stated that 
the greater the crisis, the greater is the leader's accept­
ance of responsibility for action and the greater is the
acceptance and expectation of such an assumption of respon-
33sibility by the other members of the decisional unit.
With the removal of the concept of comparative magnitude, 
the proposition becomes the statement that in a crisis 
setting, the leader tends to accept responsibility for 
action, and the other members of the decisional unit tend 
to expect and accept such an assumption on the part of the 
leader. That there is a tendency in a crisis setting for 
the members of the decisional unit to accept and expect 
the assumption of responsibility by the leader is supported 
by the experience of Ex Comm; the members accepted their 
role as advisors to the President, and they expected him 
to make the final decision. They sought to give him ad­
vice and counsel, but they saw the constitutional and 
political responsibility for whatever action that the United 
States took as belonging to the President.President 
Kennedy knew that the responsibility was his; he had 
charged the members of Ex Comm with helping him choose the 
course of action that would maximize American interests.
Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 289.
^^Robert Kennedy noted that after Ex Comm had com­
pleted its deliberations, "it was now up to one man [the 
President]," in Thirteen Days, p. 47.
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but only he could make the c h o i c e . E v e n  so, the President 
sought to spread responsibility in such a way as to protect 
himself from future political attacks upon his choice of 
policy. The Ex Comm meetings on Friday, October 19, were 
designed to create a unanimity of support for the blockade 
policy; Kennedy was attempting to ensure that no advisor 
could later say that the President had acted unwisely or 
imprudently. The Sunday morning meeting with General 
Sweeney was also designed to protect the President's posi­
tion; by recording General Sweeney's evaluation that the 
air strike could not be completely successful, the Presi­
dent was weakening any future argument that he should have 
chosen the air strike as the initial American response.
It would seem that the President was loathe to accept full 
responsibility for his choice of the quarantine response, 
even though he knew it was his decision to make. While 
the tendency for the other members of a crisis decisional 
unit to accept the leader's responsibility for action is 
supported by an analysis of Ex Comm and the quarantine de­
cision, the leader's willingness to accept such responsi­
bility appears to be affected by other factors in addition 
to the crisis setting; his acceptance would seem to be a 
function of his nature and personality as well as of the 
nature of a crisis decisional process.
35Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 694.
^^Supra, pp. 96-97 and 115-116.
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Paige proposed one corollary to his fifth organiza­
tional proposition. He said that the greater the crisis 
and the greater the leader’s history of past action in the
face of crisis, the greater is the tendency to make a
37positive response. This proposition cannot be verified
by the characteristics of the quarantine decisional process 
because there was no past history of positive responses to
international crises by President Kennedy, the political
38leader of Ex Comm. In the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco
and the erection of the Berlin Wall, Kennedy's actions were 
not aggressive or forceful; he assumed full responsibility 
for the Bay of Pigs failure, and he allowed the Berlin Wall 
to be constructed without serious challenge. Paige's 
"positive response" was one in which a forceful step was 
taken to enhance a nation's interest,and  neither of 
these responses were characteristic of such an action.
Paige's sixth organizational proposition stated that 
the greater the crisis, the greater is the tendency of the 
political leader to seek advice and counsel.IVhen the
37Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 289.
3 8Cf. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, American Foreign Policy 
in the Making (New York: Harper 5 Row, Publishers^ 1968),
pp. 183-201, and Paul Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: 
American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc., 1969), pp. 139-164.
39Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 289-290.
^^Ibid., p. 290 .
149
concept of comparative magnitude is removed from this hypo­
thesis, it may be stated as the proposition that in a
crisis decisional setting, the political leader tends to 
seek advice and counsel. President Kennedy's purpose in 
forming Ex Comm was to bring together a group of men who 
could provide him with the counsel and the advice that he 
felt that he needed before he could choose the policy that 
would maximize American interests. In the first Ex Comm 
meeting, the President charged his subordinates with this 
task. In addition, the President sought the advice and 
counsel of some who were not members of Ex Comm, such as
John J. McCloy, the New York Republican lawyer. The
President's solicitation of advice and counsel^^ supports 
the validity of Paige's sixth organizational proposition.
Paige's seventh, and last, organizational proposition 
stated that the greater the crisis, the more interdepart­
mental collaboration there tends to be within a decisional 
unit/*^ Ex Comm was composed of a number of men, many of 
whom came from either the Department of Defense or the 
Department of State. These men worked closely together as 
members of the decisional unit charged with examining all 
aspects of the problem before the United States, and they 
worked closely together in trying to formulate the policy 
choice that would best serve American interests. At least
^^Supra, pp. 47-50.
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 290.
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at times, these men forgot departmental loyalties and 
superior-subordinate relationships in their efforts to 
serve the President as he had requested. Military and 
diplomatic problems were discussed and rediscussed, with 
each group providing its expertise. Later, as support for 
the blockade grew, the two departments began to specialize 
to some extent. The State Department was charged with pre­
paring legal and political briefs supporting the quarantine; 
it was also charged with preparing for the release of the 
news to the leaders of other countries. The Defense De­
partment was charged with preparing a set of operational 
plans for the implementation of the quarantine and ensuring 
that the men and equipment needed for any eventuality would 
be available and ready. Still, however, the efforts of 
these two departments were coordinated through Ex Comm, 
which contained many of the top officials of both. Through­
out the early stages of the missile crisis, or the time in 
which Ex Comm was developing a response, there was a great 
amount of interdepartmental collaboration between the De­
partments of State and Defense.Paige's seventh organi­
zational proposition, when revised so as to exclude the 
concept of comparative magnitude, would state that in a 
crisis setting, there tends to be interdepartmental col­
laboration within the decisional unit; such a proposition
45Supra, pp. 63, 91, 93-94, 107, 114 and 116-121.
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is supported by the interdepartmental collaboration within 
Ex Comm.
Paige put forth a proposition in his discussion of the 
internal crisis setting which should have been put forth 
in the section on organizational crisis variables. His 
fourth internal crisis setting proposition stated that the 
greater the crisis, the greater is the acceptance of the 
leader's estimate of domestic feeling regarding a response 
by the members of the decisional unit.^^ This statement re­
lates more to the organizational characteristics of a de­
cisional unit than it does to the internal setting. While 
it concerns the acceptance, by the public, of a response, 
it proposes that the members of the decisional unit will 
accept the evaluation of the political leader on this matter, 
thus hypothesizing a certain relationship between the leader 
and the other decision-makers. When the concept of com­
parative magnitude is removed from this proposition, it can 
be put forth as the statement that in a crisis decisional 
unit, there is a tendency to accept the evaluation of the 
political leader regarding domestic reaction to a particu­
lar response. This proposition is supported by the charac­
teristics of Ex Comm; when the President first met with 
Ex Comm on Tuesday morning, he ruled out acquiesence as a 
response to the missiles. It was his evaluation that the 
American people would not allow him to fail to respond
44Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 304.
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to the presence of such overtly offensive weapons in Cuba. 
There were other considerations that entered into his re­
jection of a "do-nothing" policy, but his evaluation of the 
American people was that such a response would be met with
overwhelming o p p o s i t i o n . E x  Comm accepted his evalua- 
46tion, thus supporting Paige’s proposition.
In addition to the theoretical implications of the 
quarantine decisional process listed above, some further 
organizational propositions may be offered. These proposi­
tions are based solely upon the characteristics of the 
quarantine decisional process, and their general appli­
cability must be validated through the analysis of other 
crisis decisions. If these proposed characteristics were 
present in the Korean decisional process, Paige failed to 
comment on them; further analysis of the Korean decisional 
process may well indicate the presence of similar charac­
teristics, thus supporting the general applicability of 
these propositions to all crisis decisional processes.
These further propositions are discussed below.
^^Supra, pp. 50-51.
^^Acceptance of this evaluation, as well as the others 
which the President presented in the first meeting, was 
manifest in the way in which Ex Comm sought to serve him 
in the next six days. With the possible exception of 
McNamara's initial stand against any action in order to 
avoid war. Ex Comm concerned itself solely with how the 
missiles could be removed. Other additional goals were 
discussed, but at no time did Ex Comm question the Presi­
dent’s evaluations or his request for aid and advice.
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The first organizational proposition based solely on 
the characteristics of the quarantine decisional process 
is the statement that the political leader tends to use a 
crisis decisional unit in such a manner as to serve his own 
interests. President Kennedy created Ex Comm in order to 
bring together a group of people whom he trusted and re­
spected so that they could counsel him on the problem of 
the missiles; he charged the members with the discussion 
and exploration of all aspects of the problem in order that 
the group could develop more comprehensive perspectives 
of the threat and possible American responses. He was using 
Ex Comm to help himself choose that response which would 
maximize American interests. The President also used Ex 
Comm to protect himself from political attacks that might 
be made upon his choice of the quarantine response. When 
he indicated that he favored the quarantine response on 
Thursday evening, he had the support of a majority of the 
members of Ex Comm. Within the minority, however, were 
his military chiefs of staff and his chief intelligence 
advisor. In the event that the quarantine failed, these 
men would be able to leak their positions and advice to the 
public, thus placing the President in a politically un­
tenable position of having overruled his military and in­
telligence advisors on a strategic matter upon which he sub­
sequently was unsuccessful. In order to ensure against 
this, the President charged his brother and Sorenson with
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engineering a consensus o£ opinion while he was away on 
Friday and Saturday; if everyone came to agree that a 
particular course of action was most capable of maximizing 
American interests, then the President felt they would be 
less likely and less able to attack him later. In both in­
stances related a b o v e , t h e  President used the crisis de­
cisional unit in order to serve his own interests.
A corollary to this first proposition is the state­
ment that the political leader's role in a crisis decisional 
unit tends to depend upon what he thinks will best serve 
his interests. President Kennedy chose to absent himself 
from some of the deliberations of Ex Comm when he was told 
by his brother and by Sorenson that his absence produced 
less inhibited discussions. He was acting to ensure 
that the discussions were as free and as fluid as possible 
so that Ex Comm might explore all aspects of the problem. 
When the President did attend the meetings, he used his 
position to free the participants from possible inhibition 
by their department heads; he made each Ex Comm member 
responsible to him, and to no one else, in order to ensure 
that each participant could freely comment and criticize. 
After the first Tuesday meeting, the President hid his 
feelings from the participants until he was ready to an­
nounce that he had tentatively chosen the blockade response 
in order to keep such a disclosure from blocking the
^^Supra, pp. 47-50 and 95-98.
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development or exploration of all considerations. He asked
pointed questions which forced the participants to search
for answers, and he sought to initiate candid and personal
exchanges between the participants in order that all
4 8facets of the crisis could be brought forth. When he 
attended the meetings of Ex Comm, the President sought to 
use his position to secure the same goal which he sought 
by absenting himself from them; a freedom of discussion 
and exploration that would produce a comprehensive picture 
of what the President and the country faced. In doing so, 
the President was fulfilling the role which he saw as best 
serving his interests.
A second corollary to the first organizational propo­
sition drawn from the analysis of the quarantine decision 
is the statement that discussion within a decisional unit 
tends to be less constrained in the absence of the political 
leader. According to Ted Sorenson, one of the participants 
in Ex Comm, ". . . the absence of the President [from the 
Ex Comm meetings] encouraged everyone to speak his mind.” 
When the President did attend the meetings, he found that 
". . . lower ranking advisors . . . would not voluntarily 
contradict their s u p e r i o r s . A s  noted in the discussion
48For a comprehensive view of the President’s role in 
Ex Comm, see Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 679, Abel, The Missile 
Crisis, p. 58, Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 43, and Edward A 
Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink: An Intimate
Study of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1967) , p. 631
49Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 679.
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of the previous corollary, this phenomenon was related to 
the presence of the President, and he sought to absent him­
self from some of the meetings because of it.
The second organizational proposition drawn from the 
quarantine decision is the statement that as new people 
join a crisis decisional unit, or as old members return 
after an absence, discussion tends to become repetitive 
and counter-productive. This was especially true of the 
Wednesday meeting of Ex Comm, which lasted throughout the 
afternoon and well into the night. As new members joined 
the group, and as other members came and went, there was 
difficulty in ensuring that the discussions had form and 
s t r u c t u r e . T h e  situation was one in which members had 
to be constantly appraised and reappraised of what had been 
discussed and decided in the deliberations which they had 
missed. Robert Kennedy assumed the role of pressuring 
others so as to ensure that there was progress in the de­
liberations, but the task was a difficult one to fulfill.
The Attorney General was successful in his efforts, however, 
and the discussions moved ahead despite the fluid nature of 
the meetings.
A third organizational proposition drawn from the 
analysis of the quarantine decision is the statement that 
departmental jurisdictions in a crisis decisional unit tend
^^Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 44,
^^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 679.
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to become hazy where at least two areas of departmental 
specialization are involved. The two major areas of de­
partmental specialization that were involved in the quaran­
tine decision were those of the Departments of State and 
Defense. Much of the discussion of the group centered 
around the political and military problems which the pro­
posed responses to the missiles would encounter, and the 
participants commented freely on both aspects. According 
to Sorenson, the severity of the Soviet threat and the inter­
departmental nature of any proposed response effectively 
destroyed departmental jurisdictions, and the members from 
the State Department or the Defense Department acted as
individuals rather than representatives of particular de-
52partmental specializations. It should be stressed that 
departmental jurisdictions became meaningful again as the 
deliberations of Ex Comm turned to the question of the im­
plementation of the blockade; as noted in the discussion of 
Paige's third corollary to his second organizational propo­
sition, the role of specialists within Ex Comm increased as 
the more technical problems of decision implementation 
arose. General policy-making, then, tends to produce the 
situation in which departmental jurisdictions disappear, 
while, the technical problems of decision implementation 
tend to accentuate departmental jurisdiction and expertise.
Ŝ Ibid.
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A fourth organizational proposition drawn from the 
analysis of the quarantine decisional process is the state­
ment that some members of crisis decisional units tend to 
hold more important and more influential roles than formal 
position or expertise would seem to warrant. Robert Kennedy, 
the President's brother held such a position within Ex Comm. 
He not only assumed the role of "devil's advocate" and 
discussion leader, but he also was one of the stronger op­
ponents of the air strike response. His comparisons of 
such a response to the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor 
had a great impact on the other members of Ex Comm.
Stevenson, Sorenson, and McNamara evaluated his role as 
the most important one played by any of the participants, 
with the obvious exception of the P r e s i d e n t . T h i s  posi­
tion within Ex Comm was not the product of his formal 
position as Attorney General, nor was it the product of any 
expertise in diplomatic or military affairs. His position 
was the product of his personality and his close relation­
ship with his brother, the political leader of the de­
cisional unit. He was asked to join the group by his 
brother, and the close relationship that the two enjoyed 
affected the nature of the Attorney General's relationship
See Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 46, Sorenson, 
Kennedy, p. 679, and Robert McNamara, "Introduction," in 
Thirteen Days : A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by
Robert F. Kennedy^ [New York: W . W . Norton  ̂ Company, Inc., 
1969), pp. 14-16.
159
with the other participants. Another such individual was 
ex-Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson, as the leader 
of those who favored the air strike, was fulfilling a role 
for which he had some claim to expertise, but it had been 
several years since he had actively been involved in 
diplomatic or military affairs. In addition, he lacked 
any formal position upon which to base his forceful role. 
The respect with which he was regarded by a number of the 
participants, including the Attorney General,formed the 
basis for his important position within Ex Comm. Both of 
these individuals held roles which were not based upon ex­
pertise or formal position, but were based instead on 
factors that were not directly related to the nature of the 
crisis or the decisional unit. In addition, both had the 
initiative and drive to exploit these factors and assume 
the roles which they fulfilled.
A fifth organizational proposition drawn from the 
analysis of the quarantine decision is the statement that 
the tension inherent in a crisis decisional setting may 
produce aberrations in the behavior of the members of the 
decisional unit. By Thursday, the members of Ex Comm were 
beginning to feel the pressures and tensions under which 
they worked. Under the President's careful and pointed 
questions in the Thursday evening meeting at the White 
House, many of the members became uncertain, and some even
Supra, pp. 47, 75-76, and 98.
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switched sides. In the Ex Comm meetings the next day, 
the impact of the strain and the tension was again evident; 
arguments that had been resolved earlier were reopened, and 
the majority in favor of the blockade response began to 
fall apart. In noting the impact of the long hours and 
tension of the previous few days, Robert Kennedy later 
wrote, "That kind of pressure does strange things to a 
human being . . . .  For some it brings out characteristics 
and strengths . . . for others the pressure is too over­
whelming."^^ The Friday morning meeting was characterized 
by arguments, anger, impatience, and uncertainty; there was 
no obvious or simple solution to the threat posed by the 
missiles, yet a response had to be formulated. In addition, 
time was a factor because of the speed with which the 
Soviets were completing their installation of these weap­
ons. In this crisis setting, some members of the de­
cisional unit were, in the Attorney General's words, 
"overwhelmed."
These five organizational propositions and their corol­
laries constitute the body of hypotheses drawn from the 
analysis of the quarantine decisional process. These
^^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 44.
^^Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 44. See also Theodore 
Sorenson, Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive
Branch or the Arrows (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), pp. 31 and 76.
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propositions, as well as Paige’s propositions that are sup­
ported by the characteristics of the quarantine decisional 
process, will be summarized in the following chapter.
Informational Propositions 
The second set of propositions that this study will 
analyze is that pertaining to the variable of information 
within a crisis decisional unit.
Paige’s first informational proposition was the state­
ment that the greater the crisis, the more information the
5 7members of a crisis decisional unit feel that they need.
When this is altered so as to remove the concept of com­
parative magnitude, the proposition can be put forth as 
the statement that in a crisis decisional unit, the decision­
makers experience a desire for more information to augment 
that which they already have. One of President Kennedy’s 
first actions within Ex Comm was to order increased sur­
veillance of Cuba; over-flights and peripheral flights were 
scheduled several times a day so as to ensure that the 
United States had a complete picture of the Soviet offen­
sive build-up and the speed with which it was being ef­
fected. As noted in the narrative history, the President 
felt that the United States would need the strongest evi­
dence possible to support whatever course of action it 
took. In addition, the participants tried to evaluate
57Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 292.
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such things as the American ability to remove the missiles
with an air strike and the nature of Soviet responses to
the possible policy choices before Ex Comm. Ex Comm sought
both substantive and evaluative information, and there was
a predominant feeling that it was desirable to have as much
information as it was possible to gather. The characteris-
5 8tics of the quarantine decisional unit then support the 
revised version of Paige's first informational proposition.
Paige's first corollary to this proposition stated 
that the more limited the information, the more emphasis 
the decision-makers within a crisis decisional unit tend to 
place upon the reliability of the informational source. 
Without the concept of comparative magnitude, this proposi­
tion can be put forth as the statement that if information 
is limited, the members of a crisis decisional unit tend to 
stress the reliability of its source. In the quarantine 
decisional process the discovery of the missile threat was 
based upon intelligence photos that did not indicate the 
definite presence of a single missile; the intelligence 
community interpreted certain types of construction and 
related activities as representing the initial stages of 
the introduction of offensive missiles onto Cuban soil by 
the Soviet Union. When McNamara was presented with the
C O
Supra, pp. 49, 60, 65-66, 68-74, 83-85, 100-101, 
and 115-116.
qq
Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 292-293.
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information, he did not feel that this proof was definitive, 
but others, including Bundy, disagreed. When the President 
was briefed on Tuesday morning by Bundy and members of the 
intelligence establishment, he accepted the assertion of 
the intelligence experts. Without having positive proof 
of the existence of a single missile in their first meet­
ing, the members of Ex Comm, with the possible exception of 
McNamara, also accepted the statement of the intelligence 
community that the activities present in the high-level 
reconnaissance photos indicated that the Soviets were in­
deed in the process of building medium-range ballistic 
missile s i t e s . T h e  respect for the ability of the in­
telligence community experts to interpret pictures taken 
from planes flying at heights over fifteen miles, and the 
respect for the intelligence community's ability to piece 
together bits of information, tended to create a sense of 
reliability of the intelligence information in the minds of 
the participants. Because of this, they accepted the 
sketchy information as indicating that there would soon be 
Soviet missiles threatening American interests from Cuban 
soil. In addition. President Kennedy went directly to the 
man who could most authoritatively evaluate the effective­
ness of an American air strike before he completely ruled 
out this response as the initial American action; in his
^^Supra, pp. 45 and 48-49. See also Abel, The Missile
Crisis, pp. 17-18
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Sunday meeting with General Sweeney, the chief of the Tacti­
cal Air Command, the President was seeking the advice and 
counsel of a person whose position and expertise made him 
the most competent to declare how successful an air strike 
could be in removing the missile t h r e a t . I n  doing so, 
the President set aside even the statements or evaluations 
by his Joint Chiefs of Staff. Given the limited or hypo­
thetical nature of the information desired, the most authori­
tative and direct source was regarded as the most reliable, 
and information obtained from this source had emphasis 
placed upon it.
Paige’s second corollary to his first informational 
proposition stated that the greater the variation of or­
ganizational origins and routes of like information, the
greater is the confidence of the members of the decisional
6 2unit in its validity. This proposition cannot be vali­
dated by the characteristics of the quarantine decisional 
process. There was only one real source of substantive in­
formation; the photographic intelligence was used exclu­
sively to determine the nature and extent of the Soviet 
b u i l d - u p . I n  his discussion of this corollary, Paige
^^Supra, pp. 115-116.
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 293.
^^The information presented in each of the intelli­
gence briefings was based upon the photographic surveil­
lance of the island. If other sources of information were 
used, they were so secondary as to be completely overlooked
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referred to information detailing the extent of the North 
Korean actions, or information that was substantive in 
nature. Since his corollary is based upon comparisons of 
degree or magnitude, the single source of substantive in­
formation for the quarantine decisional unit cannot serve 
to validate the proposition, nor can a comparison in degree 
be made between the Korean decisional process and the 
quarantine decisional process that would serve to validate 
the corollary. If the concept of comparative magnitude is 
removed from the corollary, it could be stated as the propo­
sition that varied organizational routes and sources of 
similar information tend to elicit the confidence of the 
members of a decisional unit in the validity of such in­
formation. Even this cannot be supported by the quarantine 
decisional process, because there was no substantive in­
formation except that which came from one source and through 
one channel.
Paige’s third corollary to his first informational 
proposition stated that the more prolonged the crisis, 
the greater is the feeling by the members of the decisional 
unit that their information is a d e q u a t e . W h e n  the concept
in the discussions of the intelligence briefings. See 
Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign
Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday § Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 193-201.
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 293.
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of comparative magnitude is removed from this corollary, 
it can be stated as the proposition that in the later stages 
of a prolonged crisis, the members of the decisional unit 
tend to feel that their information is adequate. This 
corollary, as it is restated, is not supported by the 
characteristics of the quarantine decisional process. The 
information which Ex Comm had relative to Soviet reactions 
to possible American responses was based upon evaluations 
by the members, but no one knew exactly what reaction the 
Soviets might make. There was a definite feeling of in­
formation inadequacy that manifested itself in the short 
tempers and impatience of the Friday meetings; any action 
which the United States took might have led to nuclear war, 
and this weighed heavily upon the minds of the partici­
pants.^^ The blockade was finally chosen as the initial 
American action because it was thought to have less chance 
of provoking a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets, 
but it was not known whether this would actually be the 
case.^^ The photographic evidence of the Soviet moves in 
Cuba was thought to be adequate, both as a basis for Ameri­
can action before the world and as solid intelligence data 
upon which to evaluate American interests, but the lack of 
information regarding the Soviet reaction to any American 
response made the task of choosing the course of action
^^Supra, pp. 98-100 and 102-103. 
^^Supra, pp. 108-112.
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that would maximize American interests a difficult one to 
perform.
Paige’s second informational proposition stated that 
the greater the crisis, the greater is the tendency for 
primary messages to be taken to the top of the organiza­
tional hierarchy. When the concept of comparative magni­
tude is removed, this proposition can be put forth as the 
statement that in a crisis decisional situation, there is 
a tendency for primary messages to be taken to the top of 
the organizational hierarchy. This is supported by the 
experience of Ex Comm; the intelligence report, comprised 
of data collected daily, was presented to Ex Comm at the 
beginning of each m e e t i n g . T h e  intelligence data con­
stituted the bulk of the primary messages related to the 
quarantine decisional process, but other such information 
was also elevated to the top of the organizational hierarchy 
For instance. Ambassador Foy Kohler was called to a meeting 
with Khrushchev on Tuesday, October 16; Khrushchev again 
pledged that Soviet intentions in Cuba were peaceful and 
defensive, and he asked that Kohler report to the President 
that the last thing he or the Soviet Union wanted to do was 
to cause the President any embarrassment on the eve of 
American elections. When this message was reported to the
6 7Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 294. 
^^Supra, pp. 65-66.
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President, it was evaluated as an attempt to deceive the
69United States and its leaders.
One point should be made before Paige's second infor­
mational proposition is accepted upon the basis of the analy­
sis of the quarantine decisional process. When Bundy learned 
of the missile presence on Monday evening, he did not relay 
this information to the President until the following morn­
ing. Bundy's reasons for doing so are covered in the 
narrative history,'^ but the point should be made that he 
took it upon himself to decide whether the President should 
or should not be informed of matters that were of vital 
importance to American security. He informed the President 
of these matters early the next morning, but one night 
had been lost in which the government might have begun 
its operations to counter the missile threat. Based upon 
the experiences of the quarantine decisional process, in­
formation has a tendency to be elevated to the top of the 
organizational hierarchy in a crisis, but there may be . . 
delays in the process that are the product of the judgement 
of men who find themselves in key positions within that 
hierarchy.
Paige's third informational proposition stated that 
the greater the crisis, the more the decisional unit 
members rely upon the central themes in information which
69Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 291. See also Abel, The 
Missile Crisis, p. 37.
70Supra, pp. 43-44.
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71exist prior to the crisis. When the concept of compara­
tive magnitude is removed, this may be stated as the proposi­
tion that in a crisis decisional process, the decision­
makers rely upon the central themes in information that 
exist prior to the crisis. This is not supported by the 
characteristics of the quarantine decisional process. The 
central theme of previously existing information precluded 
the introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba; the 
"September Estimate," the intelligence community's evalua­
tion of strategic actions or developments for the Fall of 
1962, ruled out such an eventuality because of the Soviet 
knowledge that the introduction of offensive missiles into
Cuba would be met by a strong and negative American re- 
72action. The photographic intelligence presented to the 
President and Ex Comm on Tuesday, October 16, indicated 
that the central theme in previously existing information 
was obviously fallacious. Instead of placing reliance 
upon previous information, as Paige proposed. Ex Comm was 
forced to act upon the basis of information that was im­
mediately incidental to the crisis itself.
In a corollary to this third informational proposition, 
Paige said that the greater the confidence in existing in­
formation, the greater is the amount and authority of con­
trary evidence that the decisional unit requires to change
71Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 294.
^^Supra, p. 37.
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73its interpretation. When the concept of comparative mag­
nitude is removed, this can be stated as the proposition 
that when there is great confidence in existing information, 
the decisional unit requires a large amount of authoritative 
evidence if it is to change its interpretation. As indi­
cated earlier, the initial evidence presented to Ex Comm 
on the first day of the crisis was accepted, and previous 
evidence and interpretations were set aside. While the 
authoritativeness of the information was accepted, there 
was no large quantity of physical evidence. What pictures 
there were indicated that the Soviets were installing bal­
listic missiles upon Cuban soil, and the trust and faith 
whlcli the members of Ex Comm had in the ability of the in­
telligence establishment in the area of photographic re­
connaissance and interpretation caused the members of 
the decisional unit to set aside the previous interpreta­
tions and analyses that such an occurrence was unlikely.
The characteristics of the quarantine decisional process 
indicate that the authoritativeness of new information is 
an important factor in prompting a change in interpre­
tation of situational properties, but these character­
istics do not support the proposition that a large amount 
of such information is required for such a change. Paige's 
corollary to his third informational proposition is only
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 295.
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partly supported by the analysis of the quarantine decisional 
process.
Paige's fourth informational proposition stated that 
the greater the crisis, the greater is the tendency of the 
decision-makers to supplement the information incidental to 
the crisis with information based upon their own past ex­
perience.^^ When the concept of comparative magnitude is 
removed, this becomes the proposition that in a crisis set­
ting, the members of a crisis decisional unit tend to supple­
ment the information incidental to the crisis with informa­
tion drawn from their past experiences. In the case of the 
quarantine decisional process, the members of Ex Comm, 
including the President, felt that the Soviets had to be 
stopped in order to prevent them from committing more ag­
gressive acts in the future. This was not the sole basis 
for the consensus against allowing the Soviets to success­
fully place missiles in Cuba, but it was a major considera­
tion. Ex Comm felt that if the Soviets were not challenged, 
they would feel free to move to maximize their international 
position, possibly in ways or in areas which would provide 
an even greater strategic threat to American interests than 
did the Cuban m i s s i l e s . W h i l e  some of the members of 
Ex Comm -- such as Acheson, Rusk, Thompson, Nitze, and
^^ibid.
75Supra, pp. 50 and 54,
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Martin -- had participated directly in the foreign policy­
making process prior to the Kennedy Administration, the 
entire group had the traditional evaluations of the Soviet- 
American rivalry and "containment" theory as integral parts 
of their background and experiences relative to foreign 
affairs. The participants were proceeding to evaluate the 
possible outcome of American acquiescence in the same 
manner in which it had been evaluated since 1947; while no 
one knew that the Soviets would act in even more aggressive 
ways if not challenged, the members of Ex Comm thought 
that this would be the case. It would seem that this feel­
ing or evaluation was based, at least in part, upon the 
past experiences of the participants, or the way in which 
they had perceived the Soviet-American rivalry in the post­
war world. Paige's fourth informational proposition is then 
supported by the characteristics of the quarantine deci­
sional process.
Paige put forth a hypothesis in his propositions 
concerning the relationships between crisis and external 
setting that pertained more to informational properties 
than it did to external setting properties. His first 
external setting proposition stated that the greater the 
crisis, the greater is the tendency of the decisional unit 
to seek additional information from the external environ­
ment. With the removal of the concept of comparative
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 309.
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magnitude, this proposition becomes the statement that in
a crisis decisional setting, the decisional unit tends
to seek additional information from the external setting.
President Kennedy's directive for accelerated photographic
7 7coverage of Cuba at the first meeting of Ex Comm supports 
this hypothesis. By directing his intelligence establish­
ment to seek more information regarding the extent and 
nature of Soviet actions on the island, the President was 
ensuring that additional information would be obtained from 
the external environment, thus validating Paige's revised 
first external setting proposition.
In addition to the discussion of the propositions put 
forth by Paige, another proposition may be offered and dis­
cussed that is based solely on the characteristics and 
properties of the quarantine decisional process. This 
proposition is the statement that tension within the 
decisional unit is increased by the introduction of addi­
tional information detailing the expansion of a threat.
The Wednesday morning intelligence briefing disclosed the 
discovery of several more missile sites, including three 
intermediate range ballistic missile pads. In the Thursday 
morning intelligence briefing, McCone disclosed that the 
rate of installation could provide for the operability
78of all missiles within one week. These additional facts
^^Supra, p. 49
7 ASupra, pp. 66-67 and 81.
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served to expand the nature of the threat in that the number
and character of the missiles now represented a capability
>
to strike most of the United States, and that this capa­
bility would very soon become operational. The effects 
upon Ex Comm were to increase the seriousness of the possible 
impact of the Soviet move in the minds of the participants 
and to place a premium upon the time which Ex Comm needed 
to complete its deliberations. These factors in turn in­
creased the tension and pressure upon the participants, and 
the combination of the expanded threat, the shortage of 
time, and the need to carefully choose the proper response 
produced the irritability, indecision, and uncertainty
which characterized much of the Thursday and Friday meet-
79ings of Ex Comm. Additional information detailing the 
expansion of the threat thus led to heightened tension 
within the quarantine decisional unit and the related 
problems which an increase in tension might produce in any 
decisional unit.
This informational proposition constitutes the only 
theoretical implication drawn solely from the analysis of 
the quarantine decisional process. This proposition, as well 
as Paige's propositions that are supported by the character­
istics of the quarantine decisional process, will be summa­
rized in the following chapter.
79Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 58. See also Kennedy, 
Thirteen Days,""p. 44, and Sorenson, Decision-Making in the 
White House, p. 30.
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Value Propositions 
Paige chose to analyze values and their relationships 
to crisis decision-making in terms of the explicit state­
ments of the objectives of the decision-makers associated 
with the decisions made in response to the crisis in Korea. 
Within this framework, he divided values into two cate­
gories. First, there were the negative or positive state­
ments about desired goals, or the goal values. Second, 
there were the positive or negative statements about the 
various means of achieving these goals, or the instrumental 
values. When combined, these values made up the explicit 
value structure of the Korean decisional process. The 
implicit value structure, Paige felt, was not something
which could be adequately researched, if it could be re-
80searched at all. The analysis of the quarantine deci­
sional process supports Paige's contention; it is virtually 
impossible to determine the implicit value structure that 
pertained to the decision rendered, but it is possible to 
determine the explicit values as they were represented in
the particular goals and means supported by the Ex Comm
, 81 members.
on
Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 295-296.
81Implicit value structures involve values which are 
not made public, possibly for some reason or purpose. In 
addition, these values may be either consciously or uncon­
sciously held by the decision-makers, thus making the struc­
ture hard to determine even to the participants in a par­
ticular decisional unit. With these drawbacks, any attempt 
to reconstruct the implicit value structure underlying a
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Since the explicit value structure may not be readily 
apparent in the narrative history of the quarantine deci­
sional process, it is desirable to reconstruct this struc­
ture. The dominant goal was the removal of the missiles, 
and the two dominant means for securing this goal concerned 
the use of a blockade and the use of an air strike. This 
goal and these means, and their related values, will be 
discussed below, but it should be noted that the values 
discussed will not exhaust the range of values which were 
made evident in the quarantine decisional process. Other 
values will be discussed as they are important and in­
cidental to the analysis of Paige's propositions.
The major goal of Ex Comm was to secure the removal 
of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. With the possible ex­
ception of McNamara's comments on the first day of the 
crisis, this goal was unanimously supported during the 
entire decisional process. The related value to this goal 
was the preservation of American interests, and it was 
felt that the removal of the missiles would remove this
particular decision would prove to be a very difficult, if 
not impossible, task to fulfill. The explicit value struc­
ture is relatively easy to reconstruct, however; it con­
sists of the goals, and the means of achieving the goals, 
which are put forth by the participants. While they 
are at best an incomplete presentation of the total value 
structure underlying a particular decision, these explicit 
values can be used to make general propositions concerning 
the relationships between values and particular types of 
decisional processes.
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specific threat. American interests were accepted as en-
8 2compassing three different concerns, or related values. 
First, the decision-makers were concerned with the preser­
vation of American security. The missiles were viewed as 
a direct threat to American security by many of the members 
of Ex Comm; they would represent a significant increase in 
the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union, and they would 
enable the Soviet Union to launch an attack upon the united 
States, if it so desired, with little warning. Second, 
all of the members of Ex Comm felt that the Soviet missiles 
would adversely affect American prestige and influence.
The United States would no longer be without serious chal­
lenge in the Western Hemisphere, and this might decrease 
American influence in Latin America. More important, how­
ever, other allies might begin to doubt American defense 
commitments and resolution; faced with a serious deterrent 
capability on its southern border, the United States might 
not choose to act to uphold its commitments, and the fact 
that it allowed such a deterrent force to be developed 
might be viewed as a lack of resolve and will on the part 
of the United States. Third, the Soviet action in placing 
the missiles in Cuba was viewed as a serious threat to 
peace in that it showed that the Soviets were capable of 
serious miscalculations concerning American will and deter­
mination to react to provocative and interest-damaging
^^Supra, pp. 50-56, 67-69, and 112-113,
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Soviet moves. Ex Comm believed that these three particular 
concerns would be removed, and American interests in general 
would be served, through the removal of the missiles by the 
Soviet Union.
The two major means to this end which were considered 
by Ex Comm concerned the implementation of a blockade of 
the island and the use of a surgical air strike upon the 
missile sites. While there was unanimous agreement on the 
goal of the removal of the missiles, there was serious 
disagreement upon the means which would secure this end 
in a manner which would best serve American interests.
Other means were also discussed early in the deliberations 
of Ex Comm, but they were rejected and the efforts of Ex
8 3Comm were concentrated upon the two means mentioned above.
The values which were associated with the support of 
the air strike were based upon the belief that the air 
strike could eliminate the threat in a fast, sure way.
Those who supported this action -- such as Acheson, McCone, 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- maintained that the mis­
siles had to be removed as soon as possible, and that the
air strike was the only means which could ensure that this
84could be accomplished. Those who opposed the air 
strike -- such as Robert Kennedy, Ball, McNamara, and
O 7
Supra, pp. 59-62 and 68-79.
°^Supra, pp. 71-72, 82, 88, 95, and 98-99
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Thompson -- did so upon the basis of one or more of three
8 5associated values. First it was maintained that the air 
strike would not be as sure as its adherents thought. No 
guarantee could be given that all the missiles could be 
destroyed, and it was thought that the remaining missiles 
would constitute a very real danger to at least some Ameri­
can cities or military targets. Second, the opponents of 
the air strike felt that it would be extremely provocative 
and that it might conceivably lead to a nuclear exchange 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet 
Union would be placed in a position which could very well 
force it to respond to the American action in such a way as 
to escalate the conflict to the point of general war be­
tween the two countries. Third, some of the members 
such as Ball and Robert Kennedy -- felt that such an action 
would be an abandonment of traditional American values; if 
there were an air strike, many Cubans would be killed.
The surprise nature of the attack and the resultant loss 
of civilian life were viewed as being contradictory to 
American values, and it was felt that American interests 
would be hurt by such an action.
Robert Kennedy, Ball, McNamara, and others who sup­
ported the blockade based their actions upon three associ­
ated v a l u e s . F i r s t ,  they maintained that the blockade
Q C
Supra, pp. 72-75, 79, and 81-82.
^^Supra, pp. 76-79, 88-90, and 109-111.
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would register strong opposition; the Soviet Union would 
be made aware of American determination to secure the re­
moval of the missiles. This would indicate to the Soviets 
that the United States would not fail to react to what it 
considered a threat to its interests. Second, it was main­
tained that the blockade would not be so provocative that 
the Soviet Union would be forced to make some punitive or 
retaliatory military response. Third, those who supported 
the blockade believed that it gave the United States more 
control over ensuing events; if the blockade were not suc­
cessful, the United States could escalate the military 
aspects of this response into whatever action was required 
to effect the removal of the missiles. Whatever was done, 
however, could be controlled by the United States so as to 
ensure that the removal of the missiles was secured at the 
lowest cost and the least threat to American interests. 
McCone, Acheson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others who
opposed the blockade based their opposition upon two 
8 7values. First, they believed that time was a factor 
which would work against American interests; the blockade 
could not immediately secure the removal of the missiles, 
and the Soviets would have the opportunity to complete 
their installation. When the missiles were installed and 
ready, it was believed, it would be very hard and very 
dangerous to force their removal through an air strike.
0 7
Supra, pp. 82, 96, and 98-99
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Also related to the factor of time was the belief that the 
Soviets would be forewarned of impending action by the 
United States, and they would be given the opportunity to 
prepare themselves for any eventuality. Second, the op­
ponents felt that the blockade could not be successful; at 
some point, the air strike would have to be implemented.
Any warning or opportunity to prepare for this action would 
detract from the American advantage, and it was in the best 
interests of the United States to go ahead and act to de­
stroy the missiles rather than wait until the advantage 
of surprise had been lost or until the missiles had in­
creased the ability of the Soviet Union to respond to such 
a move.
The members of Ex Comm who favored one means usually 
opposed the other, and the values associated with opposition 
to one response and support for the other were usually 
closely related, as is indicated by the discussion of the 
values presented above. These values, and those which 
were presented in association with the goal of the removal 
of the missiles, constitute the explicit value structure 
which was predominant in Ex Comm's deliberations, and which 
formed the basis for Ex Comm's choice. With this value 
structure in mind, the propositions put forth by Paige may 
now be discussed in a more enlightened fashion.
Paige's first value proposition stated that crisis 
tends to educe a dominant goal-means value structure that
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8 8persists as a framework for subsequent responses. Paige
meant that the goal-means value structure that is created
or that exerts influence in a given decisional process
will continue to exert influence on decisions that are made
subsequent to the initial decision and which are related
89to the initial decision in substance and in nature. Since 
the quarantine decisional process encompassed only one de­
cision, the hypothesized impact of a goal-means value com­
plex upon subsequent decisions cannot be verified by the 
quarantine decisional process characteristics.
Paige's second value proposition stated that the 
goal-means value structure educed by a crisis setting tends 
to have broad applicability.^^ The values associated with 
the goal of the removal of the missiles indicate that the 
members of the quarantine decisional unit were concerned 
with the broader aspects of American interests. The re­
moval of the missiles would promote the preservation of 
American influence and prestige in Latin America and the 
rest of the world, and would offset the damage to American 
influence and prestige that would accrue when the knowledge 
of the missiles became public. In addition, American 
efforts to force the removal of the missiles would impress 
upon the Soviet Union the danger of miscalculating the will




and determination of the United States. By acting in an
extremely provocative way to enhance its interests at the
expense of the United States, the Soviet Union had shown
that its view of American willingness to protect American
interests was a mistaken one that could lead to a nuclear
exchange. Seen in this light, the missiles themselves
were of incidental importance to a much broader range of
American interests; the strategic threat of the missiles
was evaluated differently by the individual decision-makers,
but the broader aspects of the introduction of the missiles
were unanimously recognized as a threat to more general
91American interests. By their very nature, the means were 
closely related to the goal and its associated values. 
Moreover, certain considerations or values put forth in re­
lation to either of the two means had a broader impact than 
simply to effect the removal of the missiles. Such consid­
erations as the desire to choose a means which would not 
force the Soviets to react militarily to the American 
response and the desire to uphold traditional American
values and traditions are indicative of such a broader 
9 2impact. The goal and the means, and their associated 
values , were thus part of the value structure that went 
beyond the missile bases in its applicability; the mis­
siles were seen as an immediate threat to American
91 Supra, pp. 50-56 and 67-68.
^^Supra, pp. 61, 73-75, 76-79, 89-90, 93, and 105.
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interests, but these interests were defined by most of the 
members in terms of a much broader framework than the 
Soviet-Cuban-American triangle. Based upon this analysis, 
Paige's second value proposition is supported by the quar­
antine decisional process.
Paige's third value proposition stated that a crisis
setting tends to educe a goals-means value structure that
is strongly conditioned emotionally.^^ It would seem that
the emotions present in the quarantine decisional process
were incidental to the dominant value structure rather
than an integral part of it. The stress and tension under
which the participants operated, plus the virtual impasse
created by the conflict of differing opinions as to which
of the two means would best satisfy American interests,
produced the emotional nature of the Thursday and Friday
94meetings of Ex Comm. The values themselves were rela­
tively unaffected by such emotions, even though the inter­
group relations and individual thought processes and view­
points were greatly disturbed. The only incidence in which 
emotion seems to have affected the value structure was in 
the case of Robert Kennedy's stand on the immoral nature 
of a sneak attack; part of his argument was based upon the 
feeling that such an action was inherently wrong rather
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 298. 
Q4 Supra, pp. 91-92 and 99-100.
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than upon the feeling that such an action would fail to
9 5maximize American interests. The Attorney General re­
ceived some support for this stand, but the over-all im­
pact of this phenomenon cannot be said to support the 
broad nature of Paige's contention that crisis will produce 
a value structure that is strongly conditioned emotionally. 
Paige's fourth value proposition stated that a crisis
setting tends to educe the gradual establishment of related
9 6values around a central value core. The properties of
the quarantine decisional unit were created within the
first twelve hours of Ex Comm's deliberations; the goal of
the removal of the missiles and its associated values were
settled in the first Ex Comm meeting, and by the end of
the day the two competing means to this end and their as -
9 7sociated values essentially had been crystallized. These 
values can be said to have been present from the start, be­
cause it was on this first day that Ex Comm was creating a 
basis for its future substantive deliberations through its 
attempts to "box the compass." The use of the word "gradual" 
involves a certain degree of imprecision, but it should be 
maintained that Ex Comm's establishment of associated values 
around a central value core cannot really be said to have 
been gradual relative to the general nature of the
95Supra, pp. 74-75 and 80.
^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 299
9 7Supra, pp. 44-62.
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quarantine decisional process. Paige's fourth value propo­
sition can then not be generally applicable.
Paige's first corollary to his fourth value proposi­
tion stated that the wider the range of values served by a 
costly commitment, the more willing to accept the risks of
this commitment the members of a crisis decisional unit tend
9 8to be. With the removal of the concept of comparative 
magnitude, this can be stated as the proposition that when 
a wide range of values are served by a costly commitment, 
the members of a crisis decisional unit tend to be willing 
to accept the risks of the commitment. Paige equated risk 
with cost in his proposition, and either of the means 
seriously considered by Ex Comm involved risks if they were 
to be implemented. The fact that the quarantine logically 
seemed to create less danger of immediate war does not 
detract from the seriousness of the confrontation that the 
decision-makers thought would follow. Even though they 
called it by another name, the blockade which they were 
endorsing had the character of an act of war. Ex Comm 
was willing to embark upon a course of action based upon 
this means because the goal of the removal of the missiles 
was seen as serving several values, collectively called 
American interests, which they held to be important.
98Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 300.
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Paige's corollary is thus supported by the properties of 
the quarantine decisional process.
Paige's second corollary to his fourth value proposi­
tion stated that the greater the willingness of the members 
of a crisis decisional unit to accept the risks of a com­
mitment to protect a central core value, the wider is the
99range of additional values which they tend to try to serve. 
With the removal of the concept of comparative magnitude, 
this can be stated as the proposition that the members of a 
crisis decisional unit who are willing to accept the costs 
of a commitment in order to protect a central core value 
tend to try to serve additional values as well. This is 
not supported by the characteristics of the quarantine 
decisional process; the members of the decisional unit 
very pointedly limited their objectives so as to direct 
American efforts toward the goal of removing the missiles.
The three dominant values associated with this goal formed 
a central value core that was viewed as important to the 
United States, and any subsidiary goal value, such as the 
removal of Castro, was viewed as endangering the success of 
the principle American aim. While the removal of Castro was 
viewed as an occurrence which would serve American interests, 
it was not deemed important enough to the United States to
S^Ibid.
^^^Supra, pp. 60-61, 81, and 119.
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risk the success of the American effort to secure those 
three values which comprised what Ex Comm felt to be the 
major American interests associated with the missile crisis.
Paige’s third corollary to his fourth value proposi­
tion stated that the more prolonged the deliberations 
between crisis stimulation and response, the greater is the 
tendency of the members of the crisis decisional unit to 
specify relevant v a l u e s . W i t h  the removal of the concept 
of comparative magnitude, this can be restated as the propo­
sition that a prolonged period between crisis stimulation 
and response tends to cause the members of a crisis deci­
sional unit to specify relevant values. While the values 
associated with the goal of the removal of the missiles 
were specified from the start, the values associated with 
the means through which this goal might be achieved were 
subject to much scrutiny during the entire period of Ex 
Comm's deliberations. The attempts on Thursday afternoon, 
and again on Friday afternoon, to critically examine both
the air strike and the blockade were examples of a type of
102specification process. While the values associated with 
these means were fairly well-defined. Ex Comm split itself 
into two groups to dissect the two courses of action in 
attempts to more completely understand all the ramifications
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 300.
Supra, pp. 85 and 100-101.
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of each of the approaches. In doing so, Ex Comm was making 
the values associated with the means more specific by 
thoroughly analyzing them for their strengths and weak­
nesses. One of the results of these actions was a greater 
appreciation of the basis for the value concerning opposi­
tion to the air strike on the grounds that it was a danger­
ous and provocative move that might lead to nuclear war.
As the dangers inherent in this approach were made more 
specific, the argument that the blockade would be less 
likely to cause a nuclear holocaust, but that it did not 
rule out further action if this should prove necessary, 
began to eat away at the support for the air strike.
While this example of the specification of a value does not 
exhaust the cases in which this occurred, it is sufficient 
to indicate that Paige’s corollary is supported, and that 
there does tend to be greater specification of values during 
a prolonged period of deliberation between crisis stimula­
tion and response.
Paige’s fourth corollary to his fourth value proposi­
tion stated that the more costly the response in a crisis 
setting, the greater the complexity of the value structure 
associated with it tends to be.^^^ With the removal of the 
concept of comparative magnitude, this can be put forth as
^^^Supra, pp. 88-91 and 101-105. 
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 300.
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the statement that a costly crisis response tends to be 
associated with a complex value structure. Both of the 
responses to the missiles seriously considered by Ex Comm 
were costly, but the value structures associated with them 
do not appear to have been particularly complex. The three 
values associated with the goal of the removal of the mis­
siles were rather straightforward statements of what the 
members of Ex Comm believed to be the relevant American 
interests involved. The pro and con positions regarding 
the different means through which the goal might be achieved 
were related in that the same values which prompted one to 
oppose a particular means usually formed the basis for the 
support of the other; for instance, the concern with time 
and the certainty of the removal of the missiles played a 
large role in both the support for the air strike and the 
opposition to the blockade. The values which seemingly 
prompted support or opposition for one or the other of the 
courses of action were generally stated in as straight­
forward a manner as were the values associated with the 
goal. The value structure was composed of a relatively 
small number of values, and these values were not inter­
related in a very complex way. While a statement regarding 
the complexity of the value structure associated with the 
quarantine decision, or the deliberations of the decisional 
unit which rendered this decision, involves a personal 
judgement or evaluation, one can say that in the case of
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the quarantine decisional process, a costly response was 
not associated with a complex value structure. Paige's 
proposition would not seem to be generally valid when 
examined against the characteristics of the quarantine 
decision.
Paige's fifth value proposition stated that with a 
greater sense of urgency on the part of the members of a 
crisis decisional unit, negative values tend to be less 
effective as inhibitors of a positive r e s p o n s e . W i t h  
the removal of the concept of comparative magnitude, this 
can be stated as the proposition that a sense of great 
urgency on the part of the members of a crisis decisional 
unit tends to weaken the inhibiting effect of negative 
values upon the choice of a positive response. In the 
case of the quarantine decisional process, the negative 
values forming the basis of the opposition to both the 
air strike and the blockade were extremely effective in 
preventing positive action. Early in the deliberations of 
Ex Comm, a majority of the members favored the air strike; 
this majority was slowly eroded until a majority in favor 
of the blockade was f o r m e d . T h e  air strike was not 
chosen when a majority supported it because the minority 
was able to present its case well enough to cause
^^^Supra, pp. 62, 79, and 90-91.
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uncertainty and to create a feeling of need for further con­
sideration. The blockade was finally officially accepted 
as the initial American action, but this was two days after 
there was a clear majority in favor of it, and also two 
days after the President had tentatively chosen it as the
course of action upon which the United States would em- 
107bark. The blockade was not chosen sooner because those
who opposed it were important to the united front which 
the President wished to present later, and also because 
such men as Dean Acheson were able to put forth their values 
in opposing the blockade eloquently enough to cause un-
1 0 8certainty in the minds of many of the members of Ex Comm.
In both instances, then, negative values were effective 
inhibitors of the choice of a positive response. That there 
was a great sense of urgency has been demonstrated in pre­
vious discussions of the tension and stress that were pro­
duced by the magnitude of the threat and the pressing 
nature of the time element. Paige's proposition that 
urgency causes a relative ineffectiveness of negative 
values upon the choice of a positive response does not 
represent the characteristics of the quarantine decisional 
process.
in?Supra, pp. 89-91 and 92-93.
^^^Supra, pp. 96-97.
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Paige's sixth value proposition stated that in a crisis 
decisional setting, costly responses tend to be followed by 
a decline in the prominence and the importance of their as­
sociated v a l u e s . T h i s  proposition was based upon the 
nature of the several decisions which Paige referred to as 
the Korean decision. Since the quarantine decisional process 
concerned only one decision, it cannot be used to verify 
this proposition; the implementation of the costly response 
chosen by Ex Comm ended the quarantine decisional process.
If there was a decline in the salience of the values as­
sociated with the quarantine response, then it occurred at 
a time other than the one encompassed by this particular 
crisis decisional process.
Paige put forth a proposition in his analysis of the 
relationships between crisis decisional processes and the 
external setting that should have been presented in con­
junction with his propositions concerning the relationships 
between crisis decisional processes and values. His seventh 
external setting proposition stated that the greater the 
crisis , the greater is the tendency to clarify the values 
associated with international political objectives.
When the concept of comparative magnitude is removed, this 
proposition can be put forth as the statement that there is
1 no Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 301
H°Ibid. , p. 314.
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a tendency on the part of the members of a crisis decisional 
unit to clarify the values associated with international 
political objectives. It has already been noted that Ex 
Comm sought to isolate the interests which it sought to 
promote; in rejecting such additional goals as the removal 
of Castro, the decisional unit was acting to try to prevent 
subsidiary values and goals from diluting the impact, or 
weakening the chance of success, of whatever course of 
action the group finally chose. In addition, Ex Comm at­
tempted to clearly delineate what it sought in the speech 
which the President would use in announcing the nature of 
the Soviet move and the American reaction. The speech was 
carefully examined in both of the meetings held on Sunday, 
October 21, and the final draft of the speech was examined 
by the group at 11:30 a.m. on Monday, October 22.^^^ In 
all three of these meetings. Ex Comm was ensuring that the 
speech would serve American interests by clearly putting 
forth what interests the United States felt were threatened 
by the missile presence, and in what way this threat could 
be removed in an acceptable fashion. The decion-makers did 
not want to allow the Soviets an opportunity to delay the 
removal or to shift the responsibility for the crisis; the 
Soviets had threatened American interests by emplacing of­
fensive missiles in Cuba, and these interests could be
ll^Supra, pp. 116-117 and 119-120.
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protected only through the direct removal of these weapons
by the Soviets. Care was taken to define the crisis in
terms of the threat posed by the missiles; if the crisis
were expanded to encompass other areas or other matters, it
117was to be by Soviet initiative. The United States sought
to simplify the crisis in every way possible; only in this 
way did the members of Ex Comm feel that the main issue 
would be met without the chance of obfuscation or the dan­
ger of escalation. Through these efforts, the values were 
clarified by the decision-makers in a manner which supports 
Paige's revised seventh external setting proposition.
In addition to the propositions which Paige drew from 
his analysis of the Korean decision, there are two proposi­
tions that can be put forth upon the basis of the analysis 
of the quarantine decisional process. The first is the 
proposition that a crisis setting tends to lessen the em­
phasis placed upon the use of international organizations 
or multilateral action as a means for the solution of the 
problem causing the crisis. Ex Comm decided early in its 
deliberations not to depend upon the United Nations for a 
solution to the crisis; it would bring the issue before 
this body, but it would not rely upon it for satisfactory 
action. The chairman of the Security Council for October 
was Valerian Zorin, the Soviet delegate to the United
112 Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 698-700. See also Abel,
The Missile Crisis, pp. 98-99.
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Nations; he would have been able to use his position to 
favor Soviet interests. In addition to the Soviet advan­
tage in the Security Council, the Soviets could have exer­
cised their veto to hamstring or cripple United Nations 
113action. Multilateral action in the form of a joint 
hemispheric effort was seen as desirable, and the United 
States acted to elicit the support of the members of the 
Organization of American S t a t e s . J u s t  as in the case of 
the United Nations, however, the United States would not 
rely upon such action for the removal of the missiles; if 
support from the members of the Organization of American 
States were not forthcoming, then the United States would 
act unilaterally to protect its interests. The United 
States refused to bind itself with commitments to the 
machinery either of the United Nations or of the Organiza­
tion of American States. When American vital interests 
were concerned, the United States reserved the right to act 
to protect these interests; if it felt that the situation 
demanded actions which did not coincide with the practices 
or requirements of international bodies of a regional or 
world-wide nature it would act in the manner in which it
11 %Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 68.
^^^Robert D. Crane, "The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic
Analysis of American and Soviet Policy," Orbis, VI (Winter, 
1963), 542-543. See also Abel, The Missile Crisis, p. 73.
^^^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 699.
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felt it could best serve American interests. Multilateral 
or United Nations action would be abandoned,if their re­
quirements hampered the achievement of the goal which Ex 
Comm had set before itself.
The second proposition drawn solely from the analysis 
of the quarantine decisional process is the statement that 
values put forth by the members of a crisis decisional 
unit tend to be strongly influenced by role. With some 
notable exceptions, those who were associated with the 
military tended to favor the air strike as the response 
which would best serve American interests. Also with some 
notable exceptions, those who were not associated with the 
military tended to favor the blockade as the optimum 
policy choice. The exceptions which were most prominent 
were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and former 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson; McNamara favored the 
blockade and Acheson favored the air strike. There were 
others who did not fit this dichotomy, but in most in­
stances, insofar as it can be determined, these generali­
zations were applicable. Those who were associated with 
the military tended to value the speed and the certainty 
which the air strike afforded; it was a response which
It should also be noted that these generalizations 
were most applicable after the initial Ex Comm meetings; in 
these early meetings, the members tended to favor the air 
strike, but this was before the problems associated with 
such an action were fully developed.
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would directly act to destroy or neutralize the missiles 
before they could be made operational. These decision­
makers also tended to evaluate the danger of Soviet reaction 
as negligible in relation to the American interests which 
would be served. Those who were associated with the non­
military interests present in the decisional unit tended 
to support the blockade because they evaluated it as less 
provocative than the air strike; they felt that it would 
register American opposition to the missiles in such a way 
as to possibly lead to their removal, but in any event, 
they felt that the United States would not place the Soviet 
Union in a position in which it would be forced to react 
in some dramatic and dangerous way. When the membership of 
Ex Comm is categorized upon the basis of a military/non­
military dichotomization, the support for the proposition 
that role and values within a crisis decisional unit are 
directly related can be recognized.
These two propositions constitute the body of value 
hypotheses drawn from the analysis of the quarantine de­
cisional process. These propositions, as well as Paige's 
propositions that are supported by the characteristics of 
the quarantine decisional process, will be summarized in 
the following chapter.
Internal Setting Propositions
The fourth set of propositions that this study will 
analyze is that pertaining to the internal setting of a
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crisis decisional unit. It should be noted that internal 
setting refers to the national environment or political
117setting in which a particular decisional unit operates.
It should be further noted that this variable was not one 
which Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin put forth as a major deter­
minant of action. They considered the internal setting an 
important part of any decisional environment, but it was 
thought that its impact was a product of the subjective or 
personal interpretation of the internal setting by the 
decision-makers. This phenomenon was in turn thought to be 
a product of the impact of the variables of communication 
and information.
Where the propositions which Paige put forth in re­
lation to the internal setting were more pertinent to one 
of the previous variables that this paper has analyzed, they 
have been incorporated into the discussion of that variable. 
There are others, however, which were not amenable to such in­
corporation, and they are discussed below. That such 
propositions can be put forth and analyzed separately would 
seem to support Paige’s action in collectively presenting 
them as an important variable in the decision-making process.
117Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, "Decision-Making,"
pp. 67-68.
 ̂ pp. 124-137.
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Because the quarantine decisional process was a 
tightly guarded secret throughout the period in which the 
decisional unit met to choose a response, there are dif­
ferences between it and the Korean decisional process.
For this reason, Paige's first internal setting proposition 
cannot be verified by the characteristics of the quarantine 
decisional process. Paige hypothesized that the greater 
the crisis, the greater are the demands from the national 
environment for information concerning the responses which 
the decision-makers are c o n s i d e r i n g . T h e r e  were certain 
demands made by the national environment for information 
during the quarantine decisional process, but these demands 
were the requests for information by a very few reporters, 
and they were directed at trying to determine if there was
a crisis rather than what responses the decision-makers
120were considering. This is not what Paige meant by
"environmental demands" in his proposition. He referred 
to the activities of reporters as an example of environ­
mental demands, but the activities which he characterized 
were specific questions or demands for information which 
were based upon the knowledge that there was a crisis in 
Korea and that the United States was considering what
121response it should make to this crisis. This knowledge
119 Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 303.
IZ^Supra, pp. 87, 94-95, and 117-118. 
121 Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 303.
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of a crisis and the questions which it produced were not 
characteristic of the quarantine decisional process 
because of its secret nature, and Paige's first internal 
setting proposition is therefore not supported by an 
analysis of the quarantine decisional process.
Paige's second internal setting proposition stated
that the greater the crisis, the greater are the attempts
of the decision-makers to limit the information concerning
possible responses that is transmitted to the internal 
12 2setting. With the removal of the concept of compara­
tive magnitude, this can be restated as the proposition 
that the decision-makers of a crisis decisional unit tend 
to limit the information concerning possible responses 
that is transmitted to the internal setting. This is sup­
ported by the efforts to maintain the secrecy of the quar­
antine decisional process. Ex Comm did not just try to 
limit the "response-relevant" information that was trans­
mitted to the internal setting; it sought to prohibit any 
information of any nature from reaching the national en­
vironment. Through the President's order to maintain the 
strictest secrecy, and Ex Comm's acceptance and implementa­
tion of this order, the internal setting was kept unaware 
of the crisis and the top-level deliberations until the
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123President made his October 22 speech. Some high-ranking
administrative personnel and legislative leaders were told 
of the crisis and the American response prior to the speech, 
but this occurred after the decision was finalized on Sunday 
morning; these men were enjoined to secrecy, and their brief­
ing was ex post facto in its n a t u r e . T h e  decision to 
quarantine Cuba was the product of a process which was kept 
extremely secret, and this secrecy dramatically supports 
Paige's second internal setting proposition.
Paige's third internal setting proposition stated
that the greater the crisis, the greater are the efforts of
the members of the crisis decisional unit to diminish
12 5anxiety in the internal setting. With the removal of 
the concept of comparative magnitude, this can be restated 
as the proposition that the members of a crisis decisional 
unit tend to try to diminish anxiety regarding the crisis 
in the internal setting. Much of the effort in drafting and 
re-drafting the President's speech on Sunday and Monday was 
directed at preventing it from alarming the American people 
any more than was necessary. Words or phrases which were 
thought to be unduly alarming were struck from the speech 
and replaced with less frightening phraseology. While
^^^Supra, pp. 49, 57, 87-88, 94-95, and 106-107. 
^^^Supra, pp. 120-121.
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 303.
^^^Supra, p. 119.
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the internal setting was as yet unaware of the crisis, Ex 
Comm was ensuring that the anxiety caused by the public 
announcement of the crisis and the American response would 
be minimized. Even though Paige referred to actions which 
were directed at diminishing the anxiety which was already 
present in the internal setting during the Korean crisis, 
the action taken by Ex Comm would seem to be of a similar 
enough nature to support Paige's proposition that crisis 
decision-makers tend to attempt to diminish popular anxiety. 
Upon this basis, Paige's third internal setting proposition 
can be said to be supported by the characteristics of the 
quarantine decisional process.
12 7Paige's fourth internal setting proposition per­
tained more to the question of organizational roles and 
relationships, and for this reason, it has already been 
examined with the organizational propositions which Paige 
put forth.
Paige's fifth internal setting proposition stated 
that the greater the crisis, the more the members of a de­
cisional unit tend to avoid involvements which would inhibit
128their choice of responses. With the removal of the con­
cept of comparative magnitude, this can be put forth as the 
proposition that the members of a crisis decisional unit
127Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 304.
IZBibid., p. 305.
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tend to avoid involvements which would inhibit their choice 
of responses. One could present an argument that the at­
tempts to maintain the secrecy of their deliberations repre­
sented, in part, efforts by the members of Ex Comm to 
maintain their options, or to prevent American public opinion 
from forcing them to choose a response before they had fully
considered the various courses of action which they had be- 
129fore them. More important, however, is the manner in
which key legislative leaders and many top executive offi­
cials were informed of the crisis and the American reaction; 
these people were told of these things after the decisions 
had already been made.^^^ These were people who could have 
directly influenced the choice of policy through their 
political power and prominence, but they were informed of 
the quarantine just hours before it was announced by the 
President, and after it had been finalized as the initial 
American response. If one would argue that this was a 
function of secrecy, or that such action represented an 
effort on the part of Ex Comm to prevent the Soviet Union 
from being fore-warned of impending American action, a 
counter-argument can be presented based upon the observa­
tion that these people could have just as easily released
129Both Sorenson and Abel could be said to imply this. 




the news to the Soviets on Monday as they could have in the
earlier stages of the decisional process. While there is
direct evidence that shows that the United States sought to
avoid response-inhibiting involvements with the external
setting, there is no clear evidence that this was the case
in regard to the internal setting. Yet the comments above
indicate that many top leaders were told of the crisis and
the American response before it was announced but after the
decision was made, or at a time when they could do very
little to inhibit the choice of the American reaction to
the missiles. Again, there is no direct evidence that Ex
Comm sought to avoid inhibiting relationships with the
internal setting, but the circumstantial evidence indicates
♦
that this was the case. Thus, Paige’s fifth internal set­
ting proposition is supported by the characteristics of 
the quarantine decisiona] process.
Paige’s sixth internal setting proposition stated 
that the greater the crisis, the more the members of the
decisional unit tend to avoid involvements which challenge
131their legitimacy. With the removal of the concept of
comparative magnitude, this can be stated as the proposi­
tion that the members of a crisis decisional unit tend to 
avoid involvements which challenge their legitimacy. Ex 
Comm’s actions in withholding the information of the
131Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 306.
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crisis from the key legislative leaders could be said to 
represent an attempt to avoid involvements which could chal­
lenge its legitimacy, for the Congressmen could have, and
indeed initially did, challenge the response which the
132President chose as the official American policy. By
waiting to tell the Congressmen until shortly before the 
response was to be implemented. Ex Comm created an environ­
ment in which the negative influence of Congress could not 
be exercised to block the action which had been chosen.
Again, circumstantial evidence indicates that Ex Comm had 
more in mind by maintaining strict secrecy than simply 
preventing the Soviet Union from seizing the initiative 
from the United States. In addition, the President sought 
to limit involvements which could have challenged the legiti­
macy of his actions by creating an internal concensus behind 
the quarantine response. By waiting until all members of 
the decisional unit were agreed upon the course of action, 
and by attempting to engineer this agreement, the President
was working to prevent political attacks upon his choice
133of policy after his choice was made public. He was 
avoiding any kind of future involvement which would weaken 
the American commitment or his own political position; his 
subordinates would be inhibited from making attacks upon
132^ ^ Supra, pp. 120-121.
1 33Supra, pp. 96-97 and 115-116.
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the choice, either in a private or public manner, because 
they had supported the choice at the time at which he 
finalized it. The characteristics of the quarantine deci­
sion then support Paige's contention that the members of 
crisis decisional units tend to avoid any involvements which 
could challenge their legitimacy.
Paige’s seventh internal setting proposition stated 
that the greater the crisis, the greater is the propensity 
for the members of the decisional unit to receive positive 
and reinforcing responses to their actions from the internal 
s e t t i n g . W i t h  the removal of the concept of comparative 
magnitude, this can be stated as the proposition that the 
members of a crisis decisional unit tend to receive positive 
and reinforcing responses to their actions from the internal 
setting. It should be noted that Paige based this proposi­
tion on the responses by the internal setting to the deci-
135sions which were rendered by the Korean decisional unit; 
in short, he relied upon relationships which were actually 
beyond the scope of the decision-making processes which he 
was studying. These processes ended with the decisions 
which were the basis for the responses by the internal 
setting. It may well be that the internal setting responds 
with support for the actions of decision-makers in time of
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 307.
ISSpbid.
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crisis or great national stress, but such a response is 
not a part of the decision-making process which results in 
these actions unless it is anticipated or sought by the 
decision-makers, thereby in some way affecting their calcu­
lations or values.
Even though this proposition really pertains to 
relationships between the decisional unit and the internal 
environment that occur after the decision-making process 
has ended, it is important in that if it is a valid gener­
alization, it can be a useful piece of information to those 
who participate in a crisis decisional process. The charac­
teristics of the quarantine decisional process support this 
proposition, thereby making it more generally acceptable. 
Even though some of the Congressional leaders who had been 
given a special briefing on the crisis and the American 
response at least initially opposed the policy chosen by 
the President, the overwhelming reaction from the internal 
setting was one of support. Not all Americans were happy 
with the President’s speech, but most rallied behind him.^^^ 
The President, with the aid of Ex Comm, had made a decision 
in a crisis setting, and the majority of the American 
people supported him, thus supporting the proposition that 
such a decision will engender such support from the internal 
setting.
X 3 6Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 704,
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Paige's eighth and last internal setting proposition 
stated that the greater the crisis, the greater is the 
tendency of the decisional un^c to engage in the preferen­
tial communication of its decisions to those parts of the
internal setting that are politically sensitive and im-
137portant to the decision's implementation. With the
removal of the concept of comparative magnitude, this can 
be stated as the proposition that a crisis decisional unit 
tends to engage in the preferential communication of its 
decisions to those parts of the internal setting that are 
politically sensitive and important to the decision's 
implementation. President Kennedy's meeting with the 
legislative leaders on Monday, October 22, represented 
an attempt by Ex Comm to engage in such preferential com­
munication with an important part of the internal setting. 
These men were told of the crisis and the quarantine deci­
sion before the American people were informed; their brief-
138ing was by the President himself. In addition, those
members of the National Security Council and the Cabinet
who were not also members of Ex Comm were informed of the
situation prior to the public announcement in meetings with 
139the President. While it is true that the President had
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 307-308.
^^^Supra, pp. 120-121.
^^^Supra, pp. 108 and 120.
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some control over the members of the Security Council and 
the Cabinet, it is also true that his control was not com­
plete. Just as he wished to have the full support of
Congress, he sought the full support of his top advisors 
and administrators. These actions on the part of the 
President, who was acting in the name of Ex Comm, support 
Paige's propositions that a crisis decisional unit will 
tend to engage in the preferential communication of its 
decisions to those parts of the internal setting that are 
important, both from a political and administrative view­
point .
In his eighth external setting proposition, it should 
be noted, Paige has again put forth a proposition which 
actually refers to a relationship which exists beyond the 
limits of a decisional process. The communication of a 
decision has ended, or else the decision would not exist to 
be communicated. Just as in the previous proposition, 
Paige, has noted a relationship between the internal set­
ting and the decisional unit which may be important, but 
which is not really a part of the decision-making process.
In addition to the internal setting propositions 
which Paige drew from his analysis of the Korean decisional
Such control is never absolute. In fact, such 
control may not even approach being absolute. Cf. Richard 
E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership
(New York: John Wiley G Sons, Tnc.'J 1960].
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process, one proposition can be put forth upon the basis 
of the analysis of the quarantine decisional process. This 
is the proposition that the past policy statements or 
actions of the decision-makers in a crisis decisional unit 
tend to limit the alternatives open to these decision-makers 
because of the expectations which these past statements or 
actions are thought to create in the internal setting.
These expectations may be real, or they may exist solely 
in the minds of the decision-makers; if the decision-makers 
believe that they are expected to react within a narrow 
range of alternatives, then they will do so, and the limit­
ing influence of their past behavior will be made effective. 
It was felt within Ex Comm that the President could not 
choose a policy which simply acquiesced to the presence 
of the missiles. One of the reasons for this feeling was 
the nature of the President's past statements on American 
Cuban policy. He had dichotomized weaponry into those 
weapons which were offensive and those weapons which were 
defensive, and he had stated that the United States would 
act to protect American interests if the military build-up 
in Cuba became offensive in n a t u r e . A m e r i c a n  public 
opinion was not favorable to the President on Cuban matters; 
the public felt that he had not done enough to remove Castro 
and the Communist threat from the hemisphere. In addition.
141Su£ra, pp. 29-30, 32, 34-35, and 50-51.
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he was under strong attack from the Republican Party for 
his Cuban p o l i c i e s . G i v e n  the nature of public opinion 
and of his past statements, the President could not avoid 
action in the face of the Soviet emplacement of missiles 
in Cuba without serious political threat to his Administra­
tion. In short, the President was prevented from accepting 
one choice of action, no matter how little chance there was 
that he might otherwise have chosen this response.
This proposition is the only such proposition drawn 
solely from the analysis of the quarantine decisional proc­
ess. This proposition, as well as the others which were 
put forth by Paige and which were supported by the charac­
teristics of the quarantine decisional process, will be 
summarized in the following chapter.
External Setting Propositions 
The fifth and final set of propositions which this 
study will analyze is that pertaining to the external set­
ting of a crisis decisional unit. It should be noted that 
external setting refers to the international environment
or political setting in which a particular decisional unit 
143operates. It should be further noted that, just as in
the case of the internal setting, this variable was not one 
which Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin put forth as a major
^^^Supra, pp. 33-35, 39-40, and 58.
^^^Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, "Decision-Making,” p. 67,
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determinant of action. It was part of the decisional en­
vironment, but, like the internal setting, it was thought 
that its impact was a product of the subjective interpreta­
tion of the external environment by the decision-makers.
This in turn was a function of the communicational and
144informational variables of a decisional process.
Just as in the case of the propositions which Paige 
put forth relative to the internal setting, some of the 
propositions which he put forth relative to the external 
setting were more pertinent to some of the other variables. 
His first external setting proposition is such a one.^^^
This first proposition has been analyzed with and incor­
porated into the propositions concerning the informational 
properties of a crisis decisional process. In addition, 
Paige's seventh external setting proposition^^^ was more 
pertinent to another variable. This seventh proposition 
has been analyzed with and incorporated into the proposi­
tions concerning the value properties of a crisis decisional 
process. The other external setting propositions are dis­
cussed below. That these remaining propositions can be 
put forth and analyzed separately would again seem to 
justify Paige's actions in collectively presenting such
l^^ibid, pp. 124-137.
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 309. 
14Gibid., p. 314.
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propositions as an important variable not otherwise stressed 
in the application of the decision-making approach.
Paige's second external setting proposition stated 
that the greater the crisis, the greater is the sensitivity 
of the decision-makers to the response expectations of the 
external s e t t i n g . W i t h  the removal of the concept of 
comparative magnitude, this can be stated as the proposition 
that crisis decision-makers are sensitive to the response 
expectations of the external setting. Since the decision­
making process was shrouded in secrecy in the case of the 
quarantine decision there were no response expectations 
manifested by the external environment. The members of Ex 
Comm were sensitive, however, to what they considered 
these response expectations would be after the knowledge 
of the Soviet introduction of offensive missiles into Cut a 
were made public. Ex Comm, in its first meeting ruled out 
the alternative of acquiescence to the missile presence.
The members felt that the Soviet action constituted a 
challenge; if this challenge were unanswered, the members 
believed that the Soviet Union would have been tempted to 
take even more threatening actions in order to maximize 
its strategic and political interests. Such actions might 
have led to a confrontation in which nuclear war was un­
avoidable. In addition, the members felt that by not
l^^ibid., p. 310.
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answering the Soviet challenge, they would drive the allies 
of the United States into striking a more neutral inter­
national stance; the faith of these allies in the will and 
determination of the United States to meet its strategic 
commitments would have been shaken, and they would have 
felt that they were being forced to arrive at some under­
standing with the Soviet Union in order to enhance their 
own security interests. In order to ensure that the allies 
and the Soviet Union did not misinterpret American deter­
mination, Ex Comm felt that the United States had to act
in a forceful manner to secure the removal of the mis- 
148siles. Whether these evaluations of probable response
expectations from the external setting were correct does 
not matter; they were viewed as being correct, and Ex Comm 
predicated its actions partly upon the basis of these be­
liefs. The characteristics of the quarantine decisional 
process then support Paige’s second external setting propo­
sition.
Paige hypothesized two corollaries to his second ex­
ternal setting proposition. The first stated that the
greater the crisis, the greater are the demands by the
149external setting for response information. Paige based
his corollary upon a decisional process that was conducted
^^^Supra, pp. 49-56, 58-61, and 69-79.
1 4Q Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 311-312.
216
in an environment which involved an informed internal 
setting and an informed external setting; the environment 
knew of the crisis and the fact that the United States was 
formulating a suitable response. In the case of the quar­
antine decisional process, however, the external environ­
ment was unaware of the crisis until after the President's 
announcement. Some foreign diplomats and allied heads of 
state were informed of the American decision before the 
public announcement, but their notification was similar to 
that which key political figures in the internal setting 
received; they were told shortly before the announcement, 
and they had no opportunity to take any action that would 
have had a bearing on the President's speech or its subject 
matter. They were informed in an ex post facto manner, or 
after the decision had been made.^^^ Since the external 
setting was not aware of the crisis while the decisional 
process was in progress, requests for information by the 
external setting were not a factor in the process. Paige's 
proposition cannot therefore be supported by the character­
istics of the quarantine decisional process.
Paige's second corollary to his second external set­
ting proposition stated that the greater the crisis, the 
greater are the efforts by the decision-makers to withhold 
information concerning response strategies from unfriendly
^^^Supra, pp. 117 and 120-121.
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elements within the external s e t t i n g . W i t h  the removal
of the concept of comparative magnitude, this can be stated
as the proposition that crisis decision-makers tend to
withhold information concerning response strategies from
unfriendly elements in the external setting. The point in
keeping the deliberations of Ex Comm secret was partly to
avoid allowing the Soviet Union the opportunity to prepare
for American action; Ex Comm felt that surprise would work
152in favor of the United States. In short, part of the
response strategy of Ex Comm v\ras to withhold all informa­
tion from public disclosure so as to maximize the impact of 
whatever American action was chosen. In acting to prevent 
the internal and the external environments from receiving 
any information concerning Ex Comm’s deliberations, the 
decisional unit was attempting in part, to withhold infor­
mation concerning response strategies from unfriendly ele­
ments within the external environment, thereby supporting 
Paige’s second corollary to his second external setting 
proposition.
Paige’s third external setting proposition stated 
that the greater the crisis, the less acceptable to the ex­
ternal setting is that information which emanates from the
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 312.
^^^Supra, pp. 49 and 70-71.
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decision-makers who are directly involved with the crisis. 
Because of the secret nature of Ex Comm's deliberations, 
there no information disseminated which could have been 
either more or less acceptable to the external environment. 
Again, the fact that Paige based his propositions upon a 
non-secret decisional process created a situation in which 
these propositions cannot be verified by the characteris­
tics of the quarantine decisional process, or a process that 
was kept entirely from public view.
Paige's fourth external setting proposition stated 
that the greater the crisis, the more frequent and direct 
are interactions between friendly leaders in the external 
environment.^ W i t h  the removal of the concept of compara­
tive magnitude, this can be stated as the proposition that 
in a crisis decisional setting, there are frequent and 
direct interactions between friendly leaders in the external 
environment. There were no contacts which concerned the 
missile crisis between the leaders of the United States and 
the leaders of other friendly countries during the quaran­
tine decisional process. In ensuring the secrecy of its 
deliberations, Ex Comm prevented all information concerning 
the threat or the possible American responses from being 
released. There were no contacts with other countries 
concerning the crisis because the other countries knew
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 312.
IŜibid.
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nothing of its nature, and the United States’ leaders chose 
to maintain such an environment until they were ready to 
act. The allies of the United States were informed of the 
American decision only shortly before it was to be imple­
mented. This in no way satisfies the requirement of
"frequent and direct interactions." Paige’s fourth exter­
nal proposition is then rejected upon the basis of the 
characteristics of the quarantine decisional process.
Paige's fifth proposition stated that the greater 
the crisis, the greater are the efforts by the decision­
makers to secure support and cooperation from the external 
environment for an appropriate r e s p o n s e . W i t h  the re­
moval of the concept of comparative magnitude, this can be 
stated as the proposition that crisis decision-makers tend 
to try to secure support and cooperation from the external 
environment for an appropriate response. On Thursday, the 
third day of Ex Comm's deliberations, George Ball and 
Leonard C. Meeker presented the argument that if the block­
ade were chosen, perhaps it should be called a "defensive 
quarantine." A blockade was traditionally an act. of war, 
and they argued that defensive quarantine would provide the 
United States with the opportunity to construct a better 
legal case in support of its actions; this would enable the 
United States to more easily gain support and cooperation
^^^Supra, pp. 117 and 120-121. 
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 313,
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1 r 7from the international community for its actions. On
Thursday evening, orders were given to the Justice and State
Departments to begin the preparation of legal and political
briefs for the blockade which would appeal to the rest of 
158the world. On Friday, the fourth day of the decisional
process. Ex Comm was told by Llewellyn Thompson, Leonard C. 
Meeker, and Nicholas Katzenbach, that the support of the 
Organization of American States would strengthen the Ameri­
can case, and orders were given to prepare for the assembly 
of this inter-American body.^^^ After the decision was 
finalized on Sunday morning. Ex Comm still continued to 
work to secure the support of the external community; the 
approaches to the United Nations and the Organization of 
American States were reviewed on Sunday afternoon, and 
envoys were sent to inform key allied leaders of the 
American d e c i s i o n . I n  summary, the United States was 
acting to prepare the most favorable case possible to 
set before the world; it was attempting to secure the sup­
port of the world through this case and through its actions 
in presenting this case to the world leaders and inter­
national organizations. This supports Paige's proposition
157Supra, p. 84
1 CO
Supra, pp. 9 3-94.
159Supra, p. 106.
^^^Supra, pp. 118-121. See also Abel, The Missile
Crisis, pp. 91-92.
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that crisis decision-makers tend to try to secure support 
and cooperation from the external environment.
Paige's sixth external setting stated thet the wider 
the range of involvements with the external environment 
undertaken by the decision-makers in response to a crisis, 
the wider is the range of legitimations required to secure 
their acceptance by the external environment. With the 
removal of the concept of comparative magnitude, this can 
be stated as the proposition that international involvements 
undertaken by decision-makers in response to a crisis require 
legitimations in order to gain their accepcance by the ex­
ternal environment. This proposition concerns relationships 
which occur after a decisional process has ended, but these 
relationships are important in that the members of decisional 
units may anticipate the difficulties in legitimizing their 
actions in the eyes of the external setting. This anticipa­
tion by the decision-makers will affect their calculations 
or decision-making activities, and in this way, such antici­
pation affects the decisional outcome. The analysis of 
the previous proposition indicated that the decision-makers 
in Ex Comm sought to present as strong a case as possible 
for their actions; they were acting to legitimize their 
chosen response. In addition to the activities which were 
previously discussed, mention should be made of President 
Kennedy's directive for more photographic coverage of the
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 313,
Ill
island; he ordered this action in the first Ex Comm meeting
because he felt that the United States would need as much
162proof for its case as it was possible to obtain. This
directive is very important, because it produced evidence 
which was later needed in securing the acceptance of the 
quarantine decision by part of the external environment. 
With the possible exception of Canada, the NATO allies were 
in immediate and unqualified support of the United States. 
The members of the Organization of American States also 
responded with over wheiming support. The British press, 
the press of some neutral nations, and many private citi­
zens in allied or neutral countries were negative in their 
reaction, however. The Canadian Government, even though it 
supported the United States, wavered in this support ini­
tially. In order to bolster the American case, the Presi­
dent released the best of the photographs of the missile 
sites to the world. This destroyed the effectiveness of 
the Soviet attempts to deny the presence of the missiles, 
and engendered much support for the United States.
Because of the attempts to create the best possible legal 
and political cases for its actions, and because of the 
photographic proof of the Soviet actions, the United States 
was able to create "legitimacy” for its response. In
^^^Supra, p. 49.
163Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 705-706. See also Hilsman,
To Move A Nation, pp. 210-212.
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short, it was able to overcome most of the resistance to 
the quarantine because it had prepared for this end. The 
fact that it encountered some difficulty in securing sup­
port for its position supports Paige's contention that a 
nation requires legitimations of the response which it 
chooses in a crisis situation if it is to receive support 
from the external environment. The fact that it was able 
to overcome this difficulty in securing full support for 
its position indicates the importance of preparing for such 
an eventuality in the decisional process.
Paige's eighth external setting proposition stated 
that the greater the crisis, the greater are the decision­
makers' efforts to provide an opportunity for the withdrawal 
of the threat by the source of the threatening behavior.
With the removal of the concept of comparative magnitude, 
this can be stated as the proposition that crisis decision­
makers tend to try to provide the source of the crisis 
with an opportunity to withdraw the threat. Much of the 
argument in favor of the quarantine response within Ex 
Comm was based upon the belief that such an action did not 
preclude a more peaceful solution to the problem than war 
between the two super-powers. Many of the members feared 
that an air strike or an invasion would force the Soviet 
Union to respond to the American action in a belligerent
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 314
224
fashion; it was feared that the Soviet decision-makers would 
feel that they had no alternative other than to strike back 
at the United States, either in a direct or indirect fashion. 
These people maintained that the blockade, or the quarantine, 
would be a forceful response by the United States, but that 
it would be far less provocative than either of the other 
two responses. It would be forceful enough to register 
strong opposition and the determination to see the missiles 
removed, but it would not push the Soviets into a political 
or military corner from which they would feel that they had 
to emerge fighting. By trying to provide the Soviets with 
the opportunity to remove the missiles without military 
conflict, the United States was acting to extend to the 
Soviets the opportunity to remove the cause of the crisis. 
This supports Paige's eighth external setting proposition.
Paige's ninth and last external setting proposition 
stated that the greater the crisis, the greater are the 
efforts of the decision-makers which are directed toward 
limiting the range and the degree of the threat which they 
c o n f r o n t . W i t h  the removal of the concept of comparative 
magnitude, this can be stated as the proposition that crisis 
decision-makers tend to try to limit the range and the 
degree of the threat which they confront. Ex Comm felt 
that it had to delimit the issue to include only the
IGSgupra, pp. 61, 72-73, 76-79, 81-82, 88-90, and 92-93. 
^^^Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 315.
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offensive weapons which the Soviet Union had emplaced in 
Cuba. The goal of the removal of Castro was rejected 
partly because it clouded the issue, or it interjected 
another element into the crisis. In addition, Ex Comm
directed a great deal of effort toward ensuring that the 
President's announcement was clear and precise; much of 
the analysis of the speech drafts was directed toward this 
end. Ex Comm sought to ensure that only one thing was at 
issue; it sought to isolate the offensive weapons from all 
other considerations. Its reasons were simple: the
offensive weapons constituted the primary and immediate 
disturbing element, and other goals or issues would have 
clouded the nature of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n . I f  the con­
frontation were to have been clouded, the Soviets would 
have been given an opportunity to obfuscate the real issue, 
or the question of the missiles. They also would have been 
able perhaps to bring other parts of the world into the 
confrontation, or they would have been able to act in other 
parts of the world to create a stand-off between the two 
countries. A Soviet move on Berlin could have been used 
to try to force the United States to soften its stand on 
the Cuban missiles. If this were to have happened, the 
two nations very easily could have lost control of the 
situation, and the world could have been driven toward
^^'Abel, The Missile Crisis, p . 89.
IGSgupra, pp. 69, 81, 102-103, 116-117, and 119-120,
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nuclear holocaust. In seeking to limit the range and the 
degree of the threat, Ex Comm displayed characteristics 
which support Paige's ninth proposition.
The propositions which have been analyzed in this 
section, and which have been supported by the characteris­
tics of the quarantine decisional process, will be summa­
rized in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV: A CONCLUSION
This study has been based upon the decision-making 
approach which was put forth by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 
as an explanation of international politics. It was their 
contention that if man could understand the manner in which 
policies were chosen by those who were charged with acting 
in the name of nation-states, then international politics 
could be understood and made more predictable. The scope 
of this study does not provide a basis for commenting upon 
the general applicability or validity of the assumptions 
which serve as the core of this approach. The analysis of 
one decisional process, or possibly two such processes in 
the instance of this study, does not afford sufficient data 
upon which such comments would have to be based. This 
study does, however, provide a basis for commenting upon 
the usefulness of this approach in particular applications. 
Four such comments become readily apparent.
First, the variables which these three men have put 
forth as explaining a particular decisional process are 
rather hard to satis V in terms of their informational re­
quirements. Organizational properties and the properties 
of information and communication can be satisfied in terms
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of their informational requirements, or the data which in­
dicates the nature of the relationships of these two varia­
bles to the decision-making process, but this involves a 
great deal of effort. It may also be that much of the needed 
information will not be forthcoming. This is especially 
true of the reconstructed quarantine decisional process; 
when a decisional process has had national security restric­
tions imposed upon it, much of the necessary and relevant 
information cannot be obtained. One will have to rely upon 
secondary sources to a great extent, and there will be the 
need for a certain amount of extrapolation from and piecing 
together of what data can be obtained.
In addition, the variable of values, or motivation, 
cannot really be informationally satisfied in a very 
satisfactory way. Values or motivations are at best sub­
jective, not only in the way in which they are held but 
also in the way in which they are perceived to be held. In 
the reconstruction and analysis of the Korean decisional 
process, Paige was forced to use only the positive or nega­
tive statements concerning desired goals and the methods 
through which these goals could be achieved; Paige's study 
was based upon extensive interviewing as well as many other 
sources of information, yet he was not able to create a 
value structure which went beyond the surface of the ex­
pressed ends-means statements. The decision-makers in the 
Korean decisional unit may have been consciously or
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unconsciously misleading as to the real impetus or motiva­
tion for their actions, yet there is no reliable way to 
check their motivations that is readily available to the 
political scientist. Since the informational sources for 
the reconstruction of the quarantine decisional process 
were even more limited, the value or motivational informa­
tion for this process is even more suspect.
The decision-making approach demands a complete and 
thorough picture of a decisional process if that process 
is to be explained, or if hypotheses or propositions are to 
be developed from the analysis of the variables operating 
within the decisional process. If this cannot be done, 
then the analysis and the propositions which are developed 
are subject to suspicion. This study has attempted to 
analyze Paige’s propositions against the characteristics 
of the quarantine decisional process, and to develop new 
propositions based solely upon the quarantine decisional 
process, only where the information seemed to be accurate 
and complete enough to warrant such actions. Still, how­
ever, the narrative history created upon the framework of 
the decision-making approach may be inaccurate, thus creat­
ing a situation in which the analysis and the presentation 
of some propositions would be spurious. Given the limited 
nature of the available information, however, this is the 
best that can be done at the present time, and the proposi­
tions which the study of the quarantine decisional process
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supports must be given a qualified acceptance. It should 
be noted that the results of the analysis of any decisional 
process must be given qualified acceptance at best, unless 
there is no doubt about the accuracy of the data and its 
analysis. This occurrence is highly unlikely, especially 
so when one considers the near impossibility of determining 
the relevant values or motivations associated with the be­
havior of the decision-makers.
The impact of these considerations upon the useful­
ness of the decision-making approach as a tool for analysis 
or the development of knowledge concerning the nature of 
the decision-making process is to limit such usefulness.
It should be noted, however, that any approach would suffer 
from these limitations. If the variables can be at best 
imperfectly satisfied with information, then the results 
of the analysis of these variables can be at best imperfect, 
but if one realized these shortcomings, one can find value 
in the approach by using the results of its application 
with respect for its limitations. Many, if not all of the 
propositions which the analyst might develop may be correct 
or valid, especially if he has taken care to use that data 
which he considers to be valid or most accurate as the 
basis for the propositions. There will be some foundation 
for these propositions if they have been developed with 
professional concern and attention to the methodology
231
employed, and if they have been verified through the analy­
sis of other such decisions.
Such efforts cannot be dismissed as inaccurate or 
irrelevant simply because the demands of the decision-making 
approach are difficult to fulfill. One cannot accept all 
propositions as law, or accurate descriptions of the reality 
of the decision-making process, but if one realizes this 
limitation, then one may use the information gained from 
the application of the decision-making approach to enhance 
his understanding of a decisional process.
Second, the variables which Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 
have put forth as the basis for the study and analysis of 
a particular decisional process are not exhaustive. Paige 
put forth several propositions which concerned the external 
and the internal settings; some of these propositions were 
more applicable, in the opinion of this study, to the 
variables which had originally been put forth by the au­
thors of this approach, but most were not. Snyder, Bruck, 
and Sapin thought that all relationships with the external 
and internal settings would be functions of information and 
communication, or the way in which the decision-makers per­
ceived these settings; the propositions which Paige put 
forth indicated that this was not the case, and that the 
variables of internal and external settings should be added 
to those which form the basis for the application of the 
approach. There may be additional variables which have yet
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to be isolated that should be added, and anyone utilizing 
the decision-making approach must bear this in mind. The 
impact on the usefulness of the decision-making approach of 
these comments is not too great; as long as the analyst is 
aware that there may be relationships which are important 
to the decision rendered by a decisional process, but which 
are not accounted for in the variables put forth in the 
basis for decision-making analysis, he may watch for these 
relationships and comment upon them when they are encoun­
tered.
Third, there is a certain marginal utility encoun­
tered in using the decision-making approach. If one wishes 
to better understand a particular decision, then he might 
very well be able to re-create the process and analyze it 
without putting his re-creation and analysis upon the frame­
work of this approach. The narrative history of the quar­
antine decisional process, which is built upon the decision­
making approach, could have been created if one had simply 
followed the tenets of thorough research. The propositions 
drawn from this decisional process could have just as 
easily been the product of a process of thorough and com­
plete analysis. In addition, many of the propositions 
generated by decision-making analysis would seem to be 
"statements of the obvious." In short, one can study and 
understand a decisional process without going through
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the added effort of applying the Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 
approach.
Such an observation leads to the fourth comment upon 
the usefulness of the approach. One can study and under­
stand a particular decisional process without employing 
the approach upon which this study is based, but one may 
encounter difficulty in comparing his analysis with those 
of others. The decision-making approach lends reproduci­
bility and comparability to those studies which are based 
upon its application. It provides a framework that ensures 
a regularity in the analysis of decisional processes; 
such regularity can be used to verify the results of a 
study in that if a particular approach is applied correctly 
and consistently to a problem, the results should be iden­
tical no matter how many times such an application is made. 
In addition, the decision-making approach ensures that 
studies of different decisional processes can be compared; 
it provides a framework of analysis that regularizes the 
manner in which analysis is made and the phraseology or 
terminology that is employed. It provides a similarity of 
terminology which acts to prevent semantic problems of 
comparison, and it ensures that the properties of deci­
sional processes are analyzed in a similar fashion or 
pattern so that the analyses of these processes have a 
common ground for comparison. These goals of reproduci­
bility and comparability would seem to be essential if one
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wishes to systematically develop valid and general proposi­
tions which increase man's understanding of decisional 
processes. Any lack of utility caused by the extra effort 
required to apply the decision-making approach then can be 
more than offset by the increased utility which accrues 
through the benefits of reproducibility and comparability.
With the limitations inherent in these comments in 
mind, this study may now turn to a summary of the analyses 
of Paige's crisis decisional propositions, and those propo­
sitions which are hypothesized solely upon the basis of 
the characteristics of the quarantine decisional process. 
The propositions which are supported by the analysis of the 
quarantine decisional process are listed categorically 
below.
Propositions Concerning the Relationships 
Between Organizational Properties and Crisis 
Decisional Processes
In a crisis decisional process, the following organi­
zational properties can be observed:
1. The decisional unit tends to be ad hoc in nature.
2. The decisional unit tends to have narrow limits
in terms of size and composition; the size may 
vary from twelve members to approximately twenty 
members, and the composition will vary according 
to the number of interests which the political 
leader wants represented.
3. A commitment that is anticipated to be costly
tends to be made by a relatively large deci­
sional unit.
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4. The political leader will tend to use the deci­
sional unit in such a manner as to serve his own 
interests (based solely upon the quarantine 
decisional process).
5. The political leader's role in a crisis deci­
sional unit tends to depend upon what he feels 
will best serve his interests (based solely 
upon the quarantine decisional process),
6. The political leader tends to seek counsel and 
advice.
7. The political leader tends to accept responsi­
bility for action, and the other members of 
the decisional unit tend to expect such accept­
ance .
8. The political leader's evaluation of domestic 
reaction to a particular response tends to be 
accepted by the other members of the decisional 
unit.
9. Discussion tends to be less constrained in the 
absence of the political leader (based solely 
upon the quarantine decisional process).
10. There tends to be interdepartmental collabora­
tion within the decisional unit.
11. Departmental jurisdictions tend to become hazy 
where at least two areas of departmental 
specialization are involved within a decisional 
unit (based solely upon the quarantine deci­
sional process) .
12. Appropriate specialists tend to play a greater 
role in the decisional process as the problems 
of decision implementation become more technical.
13. Some members of decisional units tend to hold 
more important and more influential roles than 
formal position or expertise would seem to 
warrant (based solely upon the quarantine 
decisional process).
14. As new people join the decisional unit, or as 
old members return after an absence, the dis­
cussion tends to become repetitive and counter­
productive (based solely upon the quarantine 
decisional process).
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15. The tension inherent in the setting may produce 
aberrations in the behavior of the members of 
the decisional unit (based solely upon the 
quarantine decisional process).
Propositions Concerning the Relationships 
Between Informational Properties and Crisis 
Decisional Processes
In a crisis decisional process, the following informa­
tional properties can be observed.
1. The decision-makers tend to seek more information 
to augment that which they have concerning the 
crisis.
2. If information is limited, the members of the de­
cisional unit tend to stress the reliability of 
the sources of this information.
3. The authoritativeness of new information tends 
to be an important consideration if this new in­
formation is contrary to what has been accepted 
earlier.
4. There is a tendency to elevate primary messages 
to the top of the organizational heirarchy, 
but there may be delays in this process that 
are the product of men who find themselves in 
key positions within this hierarchy.
5. The members of a decisional unit tend to supple­
ment the information incidental to a crisis with 
infromation drawn from their past experiences.
6. The introduction of new information detailing 
the expansion of a threat tends to increase 
tension within a decisional unit (based solely 
upon the quarantine decisional process).
Propositions Concerning the Relationships 
Between Value Properties and Crisis 
Decisional Processes
In a crisis decisional process, the following value 
properties can be observed:
1. The goal-means value structure educed by a crisis 
setting tends to have an applicability which ex­
tends beyond the nature of the crisis.
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2. When a wide range of values are served by a 
costly commitment, the members of a decisional 
unit tend to be willing to accept the cost of 
the commitment.
3. There is a tendency on the part of the members 
of a decisional unit to clarify the values 
associated with international political ob-
j ectives.
4. A prolonged period between crisis stimulation
and response tends to promote the specification
of relevant values by the members of the deci­
sional unit.
5. The values put forth by members of a decisional 
unit tend to be strongly influenced by role 
(based solely upon the quarantine decisional 
process).
6. The members of the decisional unit tend to place
less emphasis upon the use of international or­
ganizations or multilateral action as a means 
for the solution of the problems causing the 
crisis (based solely upon the quarantine deci­
sional process).
Propositions Concerning the Relationships 
Between Internal Setting Properties and 
Crisis Decisional Processes
In a crisis decisional process, the following internal
setting properties can be observed:
1. The members of a decisional unit tend to try to
limit the information concerning possible responses
which is transmitted to the internal setting.
2. The members of decisional unit tend to try to 
diminish anxiety regarding the crisis in the in­
ternal setting.
3. The members of a decisional unit tend to avoid 
involvements which would inhibit their choice of 
responses.
4. The members of a decisional unit tend to avoid in­
volvements which would challenge their legitimacy.
5. The past policy statements of decision-makers 
tend to limit the alternatives open to these
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decision-makers because of the expectations 
which these past statements or actions are 
thought to create in the internal setting 
(based solely upon the quarantine decisional 
process).
6. Members of a decisional unit may expect to 
receive positive and reinforcing responses to 
their actions by the internal setting.
7, A decisional unit tends to engage in preferen­
tial communication of its actions to those 
parts of the internal setting that are politi­
cally sensitive and important to décision im­
plementation.
Propositions Concerning the Relationships 
Between External Setting Properties and'
Crisis Decisional Processes
In a crisis decisional process, the following external
setting properties can be observed;
1. The members of the decisional unit tend to be 
sensitive to the response expectations of the 
external setting.
2. The members of a decisional unit tend to try to 
withhold information concerning response strate­
gies from the external setting.
3. The members of the decisional unit tend to try 
to secure the support and the cooperation of 
the external setting for appropriate responses.
4. International involvements or actions undertaken 
by a decisional unit in response to a crisis re­
quire legitimations in order to gain their 
acceptance by the external setting.
5. The members of a decisional unit tend to provide 
the source of the crisis-producing threat with 
the opportunity to withdraw the threat.
6. The members of a decisional unit tend to try to 




The value of the summaries presented above lies in 
the fact that they encompass a body of hypothesized rela­
tionships or characteristics which may help to explain a 
crisis decisional process. This value is dependent, however, 
upon the general applicability and validity of these proposi­
tions. If the re-creation of the two decisional processes 
is accurate, and if the analysis of these two events is 
accurate, then the propositions are valid, at least for 
these two processes. In order for these propositions to 
be truly useful, however, they must be checked and rechecked 
against the characteristics of other crisis decisional pro­
cesses. If they stand this analysis, then they can truly 
be said to be worthwhile, for they will explain and make 
predictable much of the process which is encountered when 
the leaders of a nation-state make a decision in a crisis 
setting. If these propositions are not checked and re­
checked in this fashion, then they will be worth little 
more than descriptive statements indicating the similari­
ties of the Korean and quarantine decisional processes, 
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